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Nothing is concealed that will not be revealed, and nothing
hidden that will not become known.'
INTRODUCTION
The growing crisis of pedophilia in the Roman Catholic Church 2
has cast renewed focus on the clergy-penitent privilege in America.3
As many state legislatures scramble to consider proposed amend-
ments to their child abuse reporting statutes that would designate
clergy as mandated reporters,4 the scandal has prompted wide-
spread debate about whether information learned from otherwise
privileged communications should be excluded from the statutory
obligation to report.' This debate has highlighted the tension
between respecting clergy confidences and protecting the public
1. Matthew 10:26 (New American Bible).
2. Elizabeth Mehren, Scandal Shaking Catholicism to Core, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2002,
at A12. The present crisis began following revelations that Reverend John Geoghan, a Roman
Catholic priest, allegedly abused more than one hundred children and was transferred from
one parish to another even after high-ranking church officials knew or had reason to know
about his pedophilia. Id.; see also Angie Cannon & Jeffrey L. Shelter, Catholics in Crisis, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Apr. 1, 2002, at 51 (describing the Church's response to sex-abuse
scandals).
3. The privilege for confidential communications with religious clerics has been referred
to variously throughout its history as the "priest-penitent" privilege, the "clergy-penitent"
privilege, the "minister-penitent" privilege, the "cleric-congregant" privilege, and the "clergy-
communicant" privilege. With no intent to limit its reach or application to any particular
religion, class of clerics, or type of confidential spiritual communication, the privilege will be
referred to throughout this Article as the "clergy-penitent" privilege.
4. See Julia C. Martinez & Howard Pankratz, Legislators in no Hurry to Amend
Reporting Laws, DENVER POST, Mar. 24, 2002, at A24; Stephanie McRummen, Bill Would
Mandate Clergy Abuse Reports, NEWSDAY, Mar. 26,2002, at A42.
5. The Massachusetts legislature recently amended its child abuse reporting statute to
add clergy to the list of professionals, including doctors, teachers, and social workers, who are
required to report suspected instances of child abuse to the state Department of Social
Services. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West 2002). The new Massachusetts statute
excludes privileged conversations from the clergy reporting obligation, providing that a clergy
member "need not report information solely gained in a confession or similarly confidential
communication in other religious faiths." Id. This exception for privileged communications
was widely debated in the Massachusetts legislature. See Stephanie Ebbert, Measure Would
Require Clergy to Report Abuses, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 24, 2002, at B6. Several states other
than Massachusetts already include clergy in their statutes requiring certain professionals
with responsibility or oversight of children to report suspected child abuse to state authorities,
with only some of these states exempting privileged communications. See infra notes 213-28
and accompanying text.
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welfare. In this Article, I suggest that it is time to revisit the clergy-
penitent privilege, and to question seriously whether its presently
broad application truly serves the public interest.
The clergy-penitent privilege is deeply engrained in American
culture.' Although the privilege has its origins in the seal of the
confessional of the Roman Catholic Church,7 statutory forms of
the privilege in most states now protect any confidential commu-
nications with a clergy member for the purposes of "penitential
confession or spiritual advice" from compelled disclosure.' In recent
years, another area of growth in the doctrine has been in the
expanding definition of who constitutes a cleric for purposes of the
privilege.9 Many nonhierarchical religions rely on peer counseling
rather than counseling by ordained ministers. 10 Other churches
are experiencing a scarcity of ordained clergy, and increasingly
are relying on lay ministers to perform certain spiritual functions
previously performed only by the officially ordained." Just as courts
and legislatures over the past several decades have expanded the
definition of what constitutes a protected communication, many
states have taken a similarly broad view of who constitutes a clergy
member for purposes of their clergy-penitent privilege statutes. 2
As a consequence of this interpretive growth, more types of
religious officers and functionaries are now recognized as ministers,
and more types of communications, such as marital counseling
6. All fifty states and the District of Columbia recognize by statute some form of the
clergy-penitent privilege. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 76.2, at 109 (John William Strong ed.,
4th ed. 1992).
7. WILLIAM HAROLD TIEMANN & JOHN C. BUSH, THE RIGHT TO SILENCE: PRIVILEGED
CLERGY COMMUNICATION AND THE LAw 33-35 (1983).
8. See Jane E. Mayes, Striking Down the Clergyman-Communicant Privilege Statutes:
Let Free Exercise of Religion Govern, 62 IND. L.J. 397, 400 (1987). See generally PROPOSED
FED. R. Evm. 506, 56 F.R.D. 183, 247 (1973).
9. See Seward Reese, Confidential Communications to the Clergy, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 55,
64-65 (1963).
10. See TIEMANN & BUSH, supra note 7, at 194-97; Reese, supra note 9, at 64-65. For
example, in the Quaker tradition, the Society of Friends believes that the spirit of the
scriptures requires no specially ordained ministers. MACMILLAN, WORLD RELIGIONS 441
(1998).
11. See Gustav Niebuhr, Demand is Rising for Members of the Clergy as Fewer Answer the
Calling, N.Y. TIMES, June 9,2001, at A10; Larry Witham, Searching for Shepherds: American
Churches Struggle to Find Qualified Leaders to Answer the Call, WASH. TIMES, July 2, 2001,
at Al.
12. See infra notes 142-59 and accompanying text.
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sessions, are recognized as falling within the ambit of spiritual
counseling or advice.' This expanding application of the privilege
during the twentieth century has been motivated in part by a
growing respect for the diversity of religious affiliation and spiritual
belief in our society, if not an explicit concern for potential collision
with the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First
Amendment."'
The doctrinal creep of the clergy-penitent privilege described in
this Article has come with serious collateral costs. 5 Whenever more
types of conversations with more types of religious or quasi-religious
functionaries are protected from disclosure, society pays a price in
terms of relevant and highly probative evidence being excluded from
the fact-finding process. 16 Because ministers are often intimately
involved in the lives of many citizens, they frequently have relevant
and highly probative evidence to offer a judicial tribunal on a wide
variety of subjects including, among others, paternity, domestic
violence, child abuse, child custody, and will contests.
In this Article, I scrutinize one highly problematic yet previously
unexamined issue raised by the clergy-penitent privilege: Whether
the doctrine should protect a parishioner's disclosure to a clergy
member that the parishioner intends to commit a future violent
act against another individual. I argue that a member of the clergy
who learns that a parishioner intends to commit a crime involving
death or serious bodily injury should be required to disclose this
conversation. The pivotal question is: How should our society en-
force this duty of disclosure? Should it be through tort law, through
canons of ethics, or through the rules of evidence? After analyzing
each of these options, I conclude that the rules of evidence offer the
best possible vehicle for reform, and I propose that the law should
recognize a limited exception to the clergy-penitent privilege for
certain conversations pertaining to future dangerous crimes.
In Part I of this Article, I review the purposes of the clergy-
penitent privilege and trace its historical roots. In Parts II and III,
. 13. See Jacob M. Yellin, The History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege,
23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95, 114-20 (1983).
14. See id.; see also Scott v. Hammock, 133 F.R.D. 610, 616-17 (D. Utah 1990).
15. See Yellin, supra note 13.
16. See id.
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I analyze the evolution and expansion of the privilege in state and
federal courts in the United States since its adoption in the early
nineteenth century. In Part IV, I look at the clergy-penitent
privilege through the lens of child abuse reporting statutes, and
discuss the implications of these laws for a clergy member's duty to
report future dangerous behavior. In Part V, I hypothesize a
scenario in which a parishioner discloses to his clergy member an
intention to murder his spouse, and I use this fact pattern as a
vehicle to compare the ethical and legal responsibilities of a clergy
member with those of an attorney and a psychotherapist facing a
similar dilemma. In Part VI, I explore the possible avenues for
closing the gap that presently exists between the responsibilities of
each of these professionals with respect to dangerous clients, and
ultimately recommend a model clergy-penitent privilege statute that
contains an exception for conversations involving threats of death
or serious bodily harm to a reasonably ascertainable individual.
Finally, in Part VII of this Article, I conclude that such a carefully
crafted dangerous person exception to the clergy-penitent privilege
would not violate either the Free Exercise or the Establishment
Clauses of the First Amendment.
I. PURPOSE AND HISTORY OF THE CLERGY-PENITENT PRIVILEGE
A. Rationale for the Privilege
Testimonial privileges contravene the general principle that "the
public ... has a right to every man's evidence." 7 Because privilege
rules tend to hinder litigation and make the accurate ascertainment
of the truth more difficult, they have been strictly construed.18 The
most generally accepted rationale for the adoption of privileges, and
the one recognized by the United States Supreme Court in several
opinions, is the utilitarian justification. 9 Privileges are recognized
17. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2192 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961);
see United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
18. See David W. Louisell & Byron M. Crippin, Jr., Evidentiary Privileges, 40 MINN. L.
REV. 413, 413-14 (1956).
19. "Our cases make clear that an asserted privilege must also 'serv[e] public ends."
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,
389 (1981)).
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only when necessary to preserve relationships that society values
above the truth-finding functions of its courts.2 ° "Their warrant is
the protection of interests and relationships which, rightly or
wrongly, are regarded as of sufficient social importance to justify
some sacrifice of availability of evidence relevant to the admin-
istration of justice."2 Even Wigmore, a general critic of privileges,
made a strong argument for recognizing the clergy-penitent
privilege on utilitarian or instrumental grounds.22
Under the utilitarian view, the privilege protecting confidential
communications with clergy, like the attorney-client and psycho-
therapist-patient privileges, is grounded in a policy of preventing
disclosures that would tend to inhibit the development of a
confidential relationship that society has decided is socially
desirable.23 Relationships with clergy are thought to be socially
desirable because they may lead to repentance and spiritual
salvation, a nonsecular goal, and because they may lead to reform
of errant conduct, a secular goal.2 Apart from the individual's
interest in spiritual health and redemption, society has an interest
in fostering a morally-grounded and well-behaved citizenry.
Denying the clergy-penitent privilege may not only chill confidential
communications with clergy,2" but it may also hamper activities of
20. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1979) (citing Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 234 (1960)).
21. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 72, at 101.
22. Wigmore posited four threshold conditions for the application of an evidentiary
privilege: (1) the communication must have originated in confidence; (2) the confidence must
be essential to the relationship in question; (3) the relationship must be one worth fostering;,
and (4) the injury to society from disclosure of the communication must be greater than the
benefit to society and the truth finding function achieved by disclosure. WIGMORE, supra note
17, § 2396, at 877. Believing that all four of these prerequisites to the recognition of a
privilege had been met, Wigmore concluded that "[oin the whole, then, [the clergy-penitent]
privilege has adequate grounds for recognition." Id.
23. Yellin, supra note 13, at 109.
24. See Fred L. Kuhlmann, Communications to Clergymen-When Are They Privileged?,
2 VAL. U. L. REV. 265, 286-87 (1968); see also Good News Club v. Milford Cent, Sch., 533 U.S.
98, 111 (2001) (stating that a "quintessentially religious" organization can also be
characterized as playing a role in character development and the teaching of morals).
25. See Kuhlmann, supra note 24, at 287. Interestingly, Wigmore's utilitarianjustification
for the clergy-penitent privilege has its weakest force for faiths in which confession is required
by rules of the church, notwithstanding that these religious denominations are commonly
conceived to have formed the historical basis for the privilege in early English law. See infra
notes 43-46 and accompanying text. Where confession is required by religious precepts,
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religious groups that perform important social functions, such as,
among others, education and works of charity.28 For these reasons,
respect for clergy confidences can be seen as instrumental in
safeguarding the important role that religion plays in a civil
society.27
Empirical studies" and scholarly comment2 9 suggest that there
may be reasons to doubt the utilitarian justification for the
professional privileges, which claims that individuals will be
inhibited from confiding in attorneys, psychotherapists, or clergy
members unless they know that such private conversations are
shielded from disclosure in court. But the clergy-penitent privilege,
like the other professional privileges, is motivated by more than
instrumental concerns-it is also motivated by concerns for
privacy. 0 The privilege "is based in part upon the idea that the
human being does sometimes have need of a place of penitence and
confession and spiritual discipline. When any person enters that
secret chamber, this [privilege] closes the door upon him, and civil
confidential communications would continue among the devout even if courts did not
recognize the privilege. For example, faithful Catholics who practice the sacrament could not
stop seeking confession for fear that their admissions would be used against them, because
confession is required by church doctrine. Perhaps then the strongest utilitarian argument
for the privilege comes from examining the effect not on the parishioner, but on the clergy. To
the priests, compelling disclosure "would be an order to violate what by them is numbered
amongst the most sacred of religious duties." 4 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL
EVIDENCE 588 (Rothman & Co. 1995) (1827).
26. Yellin, supra note 13, at 113.
27. "'Civil society' is the voluntary sector of society, which includes churches, civic
associations, charitable groups, religious hospitals, and private educational institutions....
This sector is responsible for forming people's character and identity and for inculcating and
instantiating values that are essential to a democratic government." Michael M. Maddigan,
The Establishment Clause, Civil Religion, and the Public Church, 81 CAL. L. REV. 293, 309
(1993). Maddigan and others have argued persuasively that religious groups are in a unique
position to teach our nation's citizens important values, such as "the infinite worth of the
individual, the obligation to tell the truth, the importance of mutual respect, and the value
of mutual care," all crucial to the well being of a civil society. Id. at 316; see also John A.
Coleman S.J., Public Religion and Religion in Public, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 279, 281
(2001).
28. See, e.g., Robert Weisberg & Michael Wald, Confidentiality Laws and State Efforts to
Protect Abused or Neglected Children: The Need for Statutory Reform, 18 FAM. L.Q. 143, 183-
84(1984).
29. Robert P. Mosteller, ChildAbuse ReportingLaws and Attorney-Client Confidences: The
Reality and the Specter of Lawyer as Informant, 42 DUKE L.J. 203, 232 (1992).
30. See David W. Louisell, Confldentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in
Federal Courts Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101, 110-14 (1956).
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authority turns away its ear."3 ' The privacy rationale for privileges
suggests that there is intrinsic value to confidences apart from their
instrumental ends, and that it would be fundamentally indecent for
the law to intrude upon certain intimate relationships.32
A third justification for the clergy-penitent privilege, unrelated to
the concern for fostering confidences or protecting privacy, is a
practical one.33 Society pays a cost collateral to the inhibition of the
clergy-penitent relationship by not recognizing the privilege. If a
priest or minister resists a call to testify about a confidential
conversation, society cannot obtain such testimony without
compulsion.3" Such compulsion of a minister, either in the form of a
fine or imprisonment, would engender public backlash and perhaps
undermine public faith in government." The community feels
uncomfortable when ministers are forced to testify despite deeply
held religious objections; moreover, such compulsion may be
ineffective, leading to public sentiment that the secular state has
punished a cleric simply for adhering to religious convictions.36
Legislative enactments of the clergy-penitent privilege may thus be
seen as nothing more than a pragmatic recognition that the costs to
society in enforcing a duty to disclose are too high to warrant the
effort.37 Even Jeremy Bentham, a sharp opponent of privileges,'
supported the clergy-penitent privilege, not on instrumental or
privacy grounds, but rather for reasons of religious tolerance. 9 "But,
with any idea of toleration, a coercion of this nature [forced clergy
testimony] is altogether inconsistent and incompatible."0°
31. Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 161 N.W. 290, 293 (Iowa 1917).
32. See RICHARD M. GULA, S.S., ETHICS IN PASTORAL MINISTRY 120-21 (1996) (discussing
ethical foundations for clergy duty of confidentiality); cf Charles L. Black, Jr., The Marital
and Physician Privileges-A Reprint of a Letter to a Congressman, 1975 DuKE L.J. 45 (stating
that the diminishment of human privacy is one of the great evils of our time).
33. Yellin, supra note 13, at 110-11.
34. See id. at 111.
35. See id. at 111-12.
36. See id
37. See id. at 112.
38. Professor Wigmore referred to Bentham as the "greatest opponent of privileges."
WIGMORE, supra note 17, § 2396, at 877.
39. BENTHAM, supra note 25, at 588.
40. Id. Although Bentham was himself a Protestant, he argued on religious liberty
grounds that government should have no part in undermining auricular confession, which is
so central a part of the discipline of the Roman Catholic Church. See id. at 588-91; TIEMANN
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B. History of the Privilege
The clergy-penitent privilege has its origins in the sacramental
confession of the early Roman Catholic Church."1 Under Canon law,
the seal of the confessional is "inviolable," and a priest may be
excommunicated for disclosing a matter revealed to him during a
sacramental confession. 2 The evidentiary privilege was first
recognized in England after the Norman Conquest circa 1066,' s in
large part due to deference to the official status of the Roman
Catholic Church, and to the fact that the King's courts at the time
were manned by bishops." The privilege ceased to exist sometime
after the break from Rome during the Reformation in the sixteenth
& BUSH, supra note 7, at 125.
41. Biblical references to confession are to public rather than to private confession; that
is, confession to other members of the church or to the church as a whole. Matthew 3:6
contains a reference to people coming to the river Jordan to be baptized by John the Baptist
and acknowledging their sins. James 5:16 exhorts the faithful to "confess your sins to one
another, and pray for one another so that you may be healed." The first reference to private
confessions appears to come from Saint Augustine in 431 A.D, in Sermon 82. Augustine
emphasizes that "[God] endeavors to heal secret sins in secret, without exposing them."
BERTRAND KURTSCHEID, A HISTORY OF THE SEAL OF CONFESSION 49-50 (Rev. F. A. Marks
trans., 1927). The first papal recognition of a private confession came from Pope Leo I, Bishop
of Rome from 440 to 461, who outlawed public confessions and instead mandated that they
be made in private. TIEMANN & BUSH, supra note 7, at 34-35; see also KURTSCHEID, supra, at
51-55. At the Council of Trent in 1551, the Catholic Church officially recognized that oral
confession and absolution by a priest were necessary to obtain forgiveness for sins. 1 HENRY
CHARLES LEA, A HISTORY OF AURICULAR CONFESSION AND INDULGENCES IN THE LATIN CHURCH
251 (1968).
42. The seal of the confessional was codified in 1917 as Canon 889. 1917 CODE c.889, § 1.
"The sacramental seal is inviolable; therefore a confessor will diligently take care that neither
by word nor by sign nor in any other way or for any reason will he betray in the slightest
anyone's sin." Id. The 1983 revisions to Canon law contain an almost identical reference to
the inviolable seal of the confessional, 1983 CODE c.983, § 1, and makes excommunication
automatic for any priest who violates the seal. See id. c. 1388, § 1 ("A confessor who directly
violates the sacramental seal, incurs a[n automatic] latae sententiae excommunication ... he
who does so only indirectly is to be punished according to the gravity of the offence."). Under
the nomenclature of the Catholic Church, it is important to note that the "confessor" is the
priest, and the penitent is the parishioner receiving the sacrament. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
269 (5th ed. 1979).
43. See EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND
629 (1797). Coke looked to the Articuli Cleri, a statute of parliament enacted in 1315, as the
first statutory proof that the privilege was recognized in pre-Reformation England. Id.
44. TIEMANN & BUSH, supra note 7, at 41-42.
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century and the rise of the Anglican Church.4 Confession in the
Anglican Church, unlike the Roman Catholic Church, was voluntary
and not compulsory.' 6 As the Anglican Church began to shed certain
practices of the Roman Catholic tradition, English law ceased to
recognize the clergy-penitent privilege."7 By the mid-seventeenth
century, the clergy-penitent privilege had been eliminated in
England altogether," and presently it does not exist under English
law. 49
One leading authority suggests that there was no common law of
clergy-penitent privilege in early America.50 State cases in this
country at the turn of the nineteenth century denied the privilege,
45. Id. at 52. Scholars have debated whether and for how long the privilege continued to
exist in England after the Reformation and the break from Rome in 1531. Tiemann argues
that the common law of England continued to recognize the privilege for some years after the
Reformation, whether the confession was made to a Catholic priest or Anglican minister. Id.
Wigmore also suggests that the privilege endured in England prior to the Restoration. See
WIGMORE, supra note 17, § 2394, at 869. He dates its abolition to the return of the monarchy
of Charles II in 1660. Id. For a history of the privilege during this period and a summary of
this debate, see Yellin, supra note 13, at 101-04.
46. TIEMANN & BUSH, supra note 7, at 50. By contrast, in the Roman Catholic tradition,
auricular confession is mandatory, and is one of the seven sacraments of the church. Even
post-Vatican II, with the renaming of the sacrament "Reconciliation," the Holy See has
reaffirmed the importance and mandatory nature of this sacramental right. See Pope Paul
Speaks on Sacrament of Penance in Liturgical Reform, L'OBsERVATORE ROMANO (Eng. ed.),
Apr. 11, 1974, at 1, 12. See generally Robert John Araujo, S.J., International Tribunals and
Rules of Evidence: The Case for Respecting and Preserving the "Priest-Penitent" Privilege
Under International Law, 15 AM. U. INTL L. REV. 639 (2000). There is some dispute as to
whether an Episcopal Minister has a duty to keep confidential a pastoral counseling session.
See People v. Edwards, 203 Cal. App. 3d 1358, 1363-64 (Ct. App. 1988). Although "the
Episcopal Church recognizes the inviolability of an act of confession" seeking absolution from
God, the rules of the church are not clear on a pastor's duty to keep confidences not involving
confession and request for absolution. See id. The Book of Common Prayer adopted by the
Episcopal Church in America provides that "[tihe content of a confession is not normally a
matter of subsequent discussion." BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER 446 (1979) (emphasis added).
47. See Mary Harter Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting Requirements
Versus the Clergy Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion, 71 MINN. L. REV. 723, 736 (1987).
48. Blackstone's Commentaries written in 1765 mention no such privilege. 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 370-71 (U. of Chi. Press 1979) (1768);
see also Regina v. Hay, 175 Eng. Rep. 933 (1860) (upholding contempt for Catholic priest who
refused to reveal name of parishioner who had delivered stolen goods to church); Cook v.
Carroll, 1945 Ir. R. 515, 517 (recounting English common law).
49. 17 LORD HALISHAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE, HALSBURY'S LAW OF ENGLAND § 237 n.4 (4th
ed. 1973).
50. WIGMORE, supra note 17, § 2394, at 870.
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citing English common law.51 "During the period [in America] when
most of the common law privileges were taking shape, no clear-cut
privilege for communications between priest and penitent emerged.
The English political climate [of hostility toward Rome] may well
furnish the explanation."52
The earliest judicial recognition of the clergy-penitent privilege in
the United States has been traced to the 1813 case of People v.
Phillips.53 In this decision by the New York Court of General
Sessions, the court held that provisions of the New York State
Constitution protecting free exercise of religion prevented the court
in a criminal case from forcing a Roman Catholic priest to testify as
to what a penitent told him during confession regarding where and
how he had received stolen goods.54 The court ruled that such
compulsion would infringe upon the priest's right to freely practice
his religion. "Secrecy is of the essence of penance.... To decide that
the minister shall promulgate what he receives in confession, is to
declare that there shall be no penance; and this important branch
of the Roman [Clatholic religion would be thus annihilated.""5
Four years later, the Phillips decision was limited in scope by the
New York case of People v. Smith, wherein the court ruled that a
criminal defendant's confession of murder to a protestant minister
was not similarly privileged.5" The court made the distinction
between auricular confession made to a priest according to canons
of the Church, as in Phillips, and those confessions made to a prot-
estant minister, which were for spiritual advice but not expressly
required by the religion.57 In response to this decision, the New York
legislature enacted the first clergy-penitent privilege statute in
51. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Drake, 15 Mass. (14 Tyng) 161 (1818) (affirming denial of
motion for new trial of defendant convicted, in part, based on admission of penitential
confessions made to clergyman).
52. PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 506 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 247 (1972)
(citation omitted).
53. This case was not officially reported, but the record and opinion were later reprinted
in 1 W. LJ. 109 (1843).
54. In 1813 when Phillips was decided, the court quoted and distinguished two English
cases denying the privilege. See Privileged Communications to Clergymen, 1 CATH. LAW. 199,
202 (1955).
55. Id. at 207.
56. Id. at 209, 211 (quoting People v. Smith, 2 City Hall Recorder 77 (N.Y. 1817)).
57. Id.
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America in 1828, reversing the effects of Smith and extending the
privilege to priests, rabbis, and ministers of other religious
denominations.' The New York statute served as a model for the
subsequent adoption of a clergy-penitent privilege in many other
states.5 9
II. STATE STATUTES TODAY
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have now enacted
privilege statutes that protect certain communications between
parishioners and clergy members.' Although there is significant
uniformity in the core value being protected, these statutes differ
widely in their definitions and their reach, which makes
generalizations about the state of the doctrine difficult.6' The
general prerequisites to the application of the privilege in almost all
states require that there be a confidential communication between
a person and a minister, in the minister's professional capacity, for
purpose of confession, spiritual advice, or counseling.62 Specific
definitions of terms within this construction vary widely from
state to state. They differ in their definitions of who constitutes a
minister, who holds the privilege, and what types of communica-
tions are covered.' In most states, the privilege survives the death
of the parishioner, and may be asserted by his representative."
Notably, only a few states require the parishioner to be a member
of the same religious denomination as the clergy member to whom
he confides.65
58. Yellin, supra note 13, at 106.
59. Reese, supra note 9, at 57.
60. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 76.2, at 109.
61. See Mitchell, supra note 47, at 742.
62. Mayes, supra note 8, at 400-01.
63. Mitchell, supra note 47, at 740-42.
64. See ROBERT E. DOYLE, JR. & HUGH O. HAYES, MANUALFOR EVIDENCE IN FLORIDA § 4.49
(5th ed. 1999); see, e.g., ALA. R. EVID. 505; ALAsKA R. EVID. 506; ARK. R. EVID. 505; DEL. R.
EVID. 505; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505 (West 1999); HAW. R. Evm. 506; KY. R. EvID. 505; LA.
CODE EVID. ANN. art. 511 (West 1995); ME. R. EVID. 505; MIss. R. EvID. 505; NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 27-506 (1995); N.M. R. EVID. 11-506; N.D. R. EvID. 505; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 19-13-16, 19-
13-17, 19-13-18 (Michie 2002); TEX. R. EviD. 505; VT. R. EVID. 505; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.06
(West 2000).
65. Arkansas, Idaho, and Iowa appear to require that the minister and parishioner be
members of the same religious sect in order to invoke the privilege. See, e.g., Alford v.
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Attempts to unify state law in this area have been relatively
unsuccessful. The American Law Institute's Model Code ofEvidence
adopted in 1942 and the National Commissioners of Uniform State
Laws' Uniform Rules of Evidence adopted in 1953 both made a
provision for a clergy-penitent privilege, although they were ex-
tremely narrow in scope.' Common features of these model laws
included a narrow definition of priest (only those whose religious
discipline recognized secret penitential communications) and a
narrow definition of penitential communication (confession of
culpable conduct). Both model laws defined the holder of the
privilege as the penitent.67 In 1974, the National Commissioners of
Uniform State Laws amended their Uniform Rule of Evidence 29 to
Model Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 506, which is discussed
below, eschewing any "penitential communication" language, and
protecting simply "confidential communication [s] by [a] person to a
clergyman in his professional character as spiritual advisor. ' 8 Since
1974, more than thirty states have enacted or amended their
statutes to more closely track this latter version of the uniform state
law.69
A. The Discipline Enjoined Requirement
One of the early prerequisites of the privilege, found in both
the Model Code and the 1965 version of the Uniform State Laws,
was that the confession have been made to a clergy member "within
the sanctity and under the necessity of their own disciplinary
requirements."70 This phrase suggests that the evidentiary privilege
Johnson, 146 S.W. 516, 517-18 (Ark. 1912); Angleton v. Angleton, 370 P.2d 788, 797 (Idaho
1962); Allen v. Lindeman, 148 N.W.2d 610, 614-15 (Iowa 1967).
66. MODEL CODE EVID. 219 (1942); UNIF. EVID. AcTs 29, 9A U.L.A. 617 (1965); Mitchell,
supra note 47, at 738-39.
67. In 1974, Rule 505 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence was modified to broaden its
application to a larger class of clerics and a larger class of communications, almost identical
to Proposed Rule of Evidence 506, discussed infra note 171 and accompanying text.
68. TIEMMANN & BUSH, supra note 7, at 153.
69. UNIF. R. EVID., 13A U.L.A. 1 (2000) (Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been
Adopted). The 2000 version of the uniform clergy-penitent privilege statute substantially
tracks the 1974 version. See UNIF. R. EvID. 505, 13A U.L.A. 371 (2000).
70. See UNIF. EVID. AcTs 29, 9A U.L.A. 617, 618 (1965); MODEL CODE EVID. 219 (1942);
see, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2233 (West 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West 2000).
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protects communications that would be held confidential under the
governing religious code. Yet the term is far from unambiguous.
Does the discipline enjoined requirement refer to the communi-
cation (that is, the religious discipline must require the confidential
communication) or to the minister's obligation of secrecy (that is,
church discipline must require the minister to keep the conversation
confidential)? Only Roman Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, and some
Lutheran sects recognize the formal sacrament of confession.7' Most
Protestant denominations and the Jewish tradition do not practice
confession, nor do they have religious tenets that mandate pro-
fessional secrecy.72 "The vast majority of ministers, due to personal
conscience and the realization that their effectiveness as clergy
members would be destroyed, operate under a self imposed duty of
confidentiality."73 A construction of discipline enjoined that applied
the privilege only to mandated auricular confessions would limit its
application to members of very few religious denominations.74
Although sixteen states and the District of Columbia still have
some remnant of the discipline enjoined requirement in their clergy-
penitent privilege statutes,75 the trend among the states is to
71. Yellin, supra note 13, at 128-29. Lutheran churches require confession, but not
enumeration of each specific sin. J.L. NEVE, D.D., THE AUGSBERG CONFESSION: A BRIEF
REVIEW OF ITS HISTORY AND AN INTERPRETATION OF ITS DOCTRINAL ARTICLES 11 (1914). In the
Lutheran tradition, the seal of the confessional is also inviolate. See JOHN T. MCNEILL, A
HISTORY OF THE CURE OF SOULS 188 (1951).
72. Yellin, supra note 13, at 132. The American Baptist Convention and the Lutheran
Church have included requirements of confidentiality in their ministerial codes of ethics. Id.
at 131.
73. Id. at 132.
74. Sherman v. State is an example of a strict construction of this requirement. 279 S.W.
353 (Ark. 1926). The court held that a letter from a parishioner to a Protestant minister
asking for prayer, and implying his guilt of rape, was not privileged in a subsequent criminal
prosecution, because the church member was not under a religious duty to confess his sins
according to the doctrine of the church. Id.
75. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2233 (West 1994); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1033 (West 1995);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107 (2001); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-309 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
90.505 (West 1999); IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (Michie 1998); 735 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. 5/8-803
(West 1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2156 (West 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-804
(2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.260 (2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-23 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. §
24-1-206 (2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400 (Michie 2002);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (West Supp. 2002); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-9 (Michie
Supp. 2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101 (Michie 2001). The recent trend has been for state
legislatures to amend their priest-penitent privilege statutes to eliminate any discipline
enjoined language. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-506 (1995). Indiana, Massachusetts, and
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remove this requirement from their privilege statutes altogether,
making them consistent with the uniform state laws.76 Although it
has become part of the lexicon in this area, there is much confusion
surrounding the meaning of the term," and what, if anything, it
adds to the other requirements of the clergy-penitent privilege.75
Many states, such as Minnesota, have construed this phrase broadly
to mean simply that the parishioner was confiding to the minister
in his professional capacity; these states do not require either that
the church mandate the communication (e.g., confession), or that
church rules mandate that the minister keep the confidence secret.79
States that equate "discipline enjoined" with "professional capacity"
Minnesota have retained their protections for confessions made in the course of discipline
enjoined by the church, but have added protection for communications made for the purposes
of religious or spiritual advice, without modifying the latter phrase by the traditional
discipline enjoined language. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-3-1 (Michie 1998); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 233, § 20A (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West 2000).
76. See Yellin, supra note 13, at 126 (noting that in 1983, twenty-one states had statutes
utilizing discipline enjoined language).
77. So entrenched is the "discipline enjoined" requirement in the history of the privilege
that some courts cite it as a prerequisite to the application of the privilege, notwithstanding
the fact that the statute that they are construing contains no such language. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Stewart, 690 A.2d 195 (Pa. 1997) (finding the "discipline enjoined"
requirement satisfied when a statement is made in confidence for the purpose of spiritual
guidance or penance).
78. Mitchell, supra note 47, at 754-55.
79. Kuhlmann, supra note 24, at 268; Yellin, supra note 13, at 122. The frequently cited
case of In re Swenson began the trend of liberalization of the "discipline enjoined"
requirement. 237 N.W. 589 (Minn. 1931). The Minnesota Supreme Court held that a Lutheran
minister could not be compelled in a divorce proceeding to testify as to what the defendant's
husband said to him about extramarital affairs, even though such confidential
communications occurred not in confession but in a private counseling setting. Id. at 590-91.
Although at the time the applicable Minnesota statute referred to confession, the court
interpreted this term broadly to include any confidential spiritual advice. Id. "Certainly the
Legislature never intended the absurdity of having the protection extend to the clergy of but
one church." Id. at 590. Turning then to the definition of "discipline enjoined," the court ruled
that this term did not limit application of the privilege to religions that require the minister
to keep secrets. Id. at 591. The court interpreted the "discipline enjoined" requirement very
broadly, essentially reading it right out of the rule. "'[Dliscipline enjoined' includes the
'practice' of all clergymen ... to be as willing to give spiritual aid, advice, or comfort as others
are to receive it, and to be keenly concerned in reformatory methods of correction leading
towards spiritual confidence."Id. "Under such 'discipline' enjoined by such practice all faithful
clergymen render such help to the spiritually sick and cheerfully offer consolation to
suppliants who come in response to the call of conscience." Id. The court essentially
interpreted "discipline enjoined" to mean "in the line of duty," and then took notice of the fact
that it was the duty of all clergy to hear confidences and give spiritual advice. Id.
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render a confidential communication between parishioner and
minister privileged so long as the parishioner was seeing the
minister for religious reasons."0 This approach allows courts to
avoid the sometimes unwelcome, if not difficult, task of parsing
church doctrine to determine whether the type of communication
at issue was required to be made and to be kept confidential.
Other "discipline-enjoined" states have construed their statutes
to require that at least one of the following conditions be present in
order for the minister to be acting in the course of discipline
enjoined by the church: (1) the doctrine of the church requires the
minister to hear confidences and give spiritual advice; or (2) the
doctrine of the church requires the minister to keep confidences
secret."' In these states, some doctrinal obligation on the part of the
clergyman regarding the confidential communication is necessary
before the privilege attaches. For example, an appellate court in
Illinois has ruled that where a clergyman seeks to testify despite the
80. See, e.g., State v. MacKinnon, 957 P.2d 23, 28 (Mont. 1998) (holding that a
conversation in which group leaders of a church facilitated discussion between the defendant
and his estranged wife about child visitation was not privileged under Montana clergy-
penitent privilege statute in later sexual assault prosecution). Although the court interpreted
the term 'confession" in the state statute broadly to include confidential conversations for the
purpose of spiritual advice, "nothing in the record suggests that they were acting as ministers
or counselors at the time they facilitated the [conversation]". Id.
81. See State v. Martin, 975 P.2d 1020, 1025-28 (Wash. 1999) (affirming reversal of an
order of contempt against an ordained Evangelical minister for refusing to answer deposition
questions about confidential communications with father suspected of shaking to death his
three-month-old child). The Washington Supreme Court interpreted the phrase "confession
made ... in the course of discipline enjoined by the church" in the state privilege statute to
refer to the doctrinal obligations of a clergy member in hearing confidence, not the doctrinal
obligations of a parishioner in making the confidence. Id. at 1025 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE
§ 5.60.060 (1995)). The "discipline enjoined" language does not mandate that the church at
issue require the parishioner to make a confession or disclose a wrongdoing; the "discipline
enjoined" language of the Washington statute requires only that a church doctrine require the
minister "to receive the confidential communication and to provide spiritual counsel." Id.
(quoting State v. Martin, 91 Wash. App. 621,629 (Ct. App. 1998)); see also People v. Johnson,
75 Cal. Rptr. 605, 607 (Ct. App. 1969) (holding there was no privilege where an armed robber
fled into church and made statements to minister dressed in civilian clothes, absent showing
that minister "was authorized or accustomed to hear such communications, or that he had a
duty to keep any such communications secret under the discipline, practice or tenets of his
church") (emphasis added); Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d 947, 955 (Utah 1994) (holding that
a nonpenetential communication between father and bishop was privileged because it was
intended to be confidential and was made for the purpose of seeking spiritual counseling,
guidance, or advice from a cleric acting in his professional role and pursuant to the discipline
of his church).
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parishioner's objection, the court will presume that the disclosure
is not prohibited by church doctrine, absent evidence to the
contrary.8 2 Some churches have reacted to the discipline enjoined
doctrine by specifically recognizing in their charters that ministers
are required to keep secret confidential spiritual counseling
sessions.83
The most traditional view suggests that both of the foregoing
elements must be met in order for the priest to be acting in the
course of discipline enjoined by the church; that is, the minister
must be required under church doctrine to hear confidences, and
must be required under church rules to keep them secret.8 4 This is
the most conservative construction of the term, and it has fallen out
of favor. As noted above, legislatures are either deleting the
"discipline enjoined" requirement from their statutes altogether,8 5
or courts faced with such language are applying the requirement
with less rigor.86
82. People v. Diercks, 411 N.E.2d 97, 101 (Ill. 1980).
83. For example, in the Presbyterian and Baptist faiths, which do not recognize formal
confessions, ministers are nonetheless required to keep spiritual counseling sessions
confidential. See TIEMANN & BUSH, supra note 7, at 70-71, 80.
84. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8(3) (1996), superseded by UTAH R. EVID. 503; Ball v.
State, 419 N.E.2d 137, 139-40 (Ind. 1981) (holding that Baptist minister was allowed to testify
about parishioner's admission to murders, where constitution of church did not require
pastoral confession, or confidential pastor-parishioner discussion with respect to crime); see
also Sherman v. State, 279 S.W. 353, 354 (Ark. 1926) (holding that a letter written to a
preacher by the defendant, which might have indicated an indirect confession, was admissible
into evidence because confessions were not enjoined by the rules of the preacher's
denomination).
85. See People v. Carmona, 627 N.E.2d 959, 962 (N.Y. 1993) (discussing history of New
York privilege and legislature's abandonment of"discipline enjoined" language, expanding the
privilege to protect all confidential communications with religious ministers for purposes of
obtaining spiritual guidance or advice).
86. Yellin, supra note 13, at 134. For a general construction of the discipline enjoined rule,
see TIEMANN & BUSH, supra note 7, at 109-10.
1644
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B. Types of Protected Communications
Only certain forms of communication 7 are protected under the
clergy-penitent privilege. All states require that the communications
be made in private," with an expectation of confidentiality, to a
minister in his or her professional capacity as a member of the
clergy. They differ in terms of what topics of conversation are
covered 9
The most conservative approach to the privilege is to protect only
confessions made in the course of discipline enjoined by rules of the
church. 9 This is the narrowest possible construction of the privilege,
87. "Communication" refers to both oral and written forms of expression and it may also
include nonverbal acts intended to be communicative. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Zezima, 310
N.E.2d 590, 592 (Mass. 1974) (holding a murder defendant's act of displaying gun to priest in
private car could have been "communication" within meaning of state privilege statute and
that voir dire should have been allowed to determine whether the purpose of the
communication was to obtain spiritual advice).
88. The presence of third parties will not defeat the privilege where those third parties
are essential to the objective of the conversation, such as in joint marital counseling sessions.
See TIEMANN & BUSH, supra note 7, at 109-10; see, e.g., Miss. R. EVID. 505; State v. Martin,
975 P.2d 1020, 1029 (Wash. 1999) (holding that the presence of defendant's mother who
brought him to preacher and urged him to confess did not necessarily vitiate privilege). But
see Commonwealth v. Drake, 15 Mass. 161, 162 (1918) (holding no privilege existed where
defendant "confessed" to charge oflewdness before entire congregation); People v. Diercks, 411
N.E.2d 97 (Ill. 1980) (holding that statement by burglary suspect to reverend in presence of
suspect's friend and neighbor was not privileged). See generally WIGMORE, supra note 17, §
2311, at 601-03 (discussing presence of third party and the effect on the attorney-client
privilege). The presence of multiple parties, however, may defeat the condition that the
communication be made with a reasonable expectation of confidentiality. See, e.g., In re Grand
Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 386-88 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that the "modern view of the
privilege is more expansive than the traditional one," and remanding for consideration of
whether family members' group consultation with a Lutheran minister was privileged,
considering practices and doctrines of particular denomination and utility of having family
members present for spiritual objective to be achieved). Some states explicitly provide in their
statutes that the privilege applies even when third parties are present, so long as those third
parties are essential to the objective of the confidential communication. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 90.505 (West 1999); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 905.06 (West 2000).
89. Yellin, supra note 13, at 121-26.
90. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (Michie 1998); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2156 (West
2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-804 (2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (1996); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (West 1995); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101 (Michie 2001). Some states
whose statutes expressly apply only to confessions nonetheless have interpreted the word
broadly to include any communications for the purpose of spiritual counseling or advice that
are required to be kept confidential under the doctrines of the religion involved, undoubtedly
to avoid constitutional challenges based on the Free Exercise or Establishment clauses of the
First Amendment. See, e.g., State v. MacKinnon, 957 P.2d 23, 28 (Mont. 1998) (interpreting
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applying it only to sacramental confessions.9 Another traditional
formulation of the privilege is to protect "penitential" commu-
nications.92 Penitential communication is broader than confession,
because the term sweeps within its reach any confidential commu-
nication admitting a perceived moral transgression, regardless of
whether the minister is empowered under church doctrine to
absolve the parishioner of his sin.93 In California, for example,
courts interpreting the term "penitential communication" have
protected conversations seeking spiritual healing and forgiveness
for past acts, whether in the Catholic Church or some other
denomination, but have excluded from protection marital counseling
sessions94 and private pastoral counseling or problem-solving
the term "confession" in Montana's statute to encompass any private conversation for
purposes of spiritual counseling, "in order to minimize the risk that § 26-1-804 ... might be
discriminatorily applied because of differing judicial perceptions of a given church's practices
or religious doctrine"); Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d 947, 954 (Utah 1994) (analyzing question
certified by federal court in Scott v. Hammock, 133 F.R.D. 610 (D. Utah 1990), and
interpreting word "confession" in Utah statute to avoid constitutional defect). According to the
Scott court, "a narrow construction of the statute would raise serious questions under Article
I, section 4 of the Utah Declaration of Rights, which provides for freedom of conscience and
religion." Scott, 870 P.2d at 954. Other courts have taken a similar approach. See Martin, 975
P.2d at 1028 (holding that even though Washington's statute uses the word "confession," this
word means any "confidential communication between a clergy and a penitent" for the
purposes for spiritual advice).
91. See Killingsworth v. Killingsworth, 217 So. 2d 57, 63-64 (Ala. 1968) (holding that a
church pastor who had discussed marital troubles with parties in a divorce action did not have
the privilege to refuse to answer questions as to whether husband had stated that his wife
had threatened his life).
92. Although California and Kansas use the terms "penitent" and "penitential
communication" in their clergy privilege statutes, the phrase is defined differently in the two
states. California defines "penitential communication" as a confidential communication made
to a clergyman "who, in the course of the discipline or practice of his church, denomination,
or organization, is authorized or accustomed to hear such communications and, under the
discipline or tenets of his church, denomination, or organization, has a duty to keep such
communications secret." CAL. EVID. CODE § 1032 (West 1995). The Kansas privilege statute
defines "penitent" as "a person who recognizes the existence and the authority of God and who
seeks or receives from a regular or duly ordained minister of religion advice or assistance in
determining or discharging his or her moral obligations, or in obtaining God's mercy or
forgiveness for past culpable conduct." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-429 (1997).
93. Webster's Dictionary defines penitence as "sorrow for sins or faults." WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1670 (Philip Babcock Gove ed.,
1986).
94. Simrin v. Simrin, 43 Cal. Rptr. 376, 378-79 (Ct. App. 1965) (refusing to allow wife to
call rabbi in child custody proceeding to testify about statements made by her husband during
joint counseling session because both parties had agreed at the outset of counseling that rabbi
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sessions conducted for purposes other than seeking forgiveness for
sin."
The more modern approach, which has become the majority
position, is to discard any requirement of confession or penitential
communication as a precondition to the application of the privilege,
and to protect any confidential communication with a clergy
member whenever the parishioner is "seeking spiritual counsel
and advice,"6 or communicating with the clergy member "in his
professional capacity as a spiritual advisor."97 This approach
avoids issues of which religious denominations require auricular
confession, and whether the parishioner was undertaking the
communication for the purposes of forgiveness of sin. Instead, it
focuses simply on the minister's role in providing spiritual advice,
and whether the confidence was shared in that context. This is the
construction recommended by Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence
506"8 and the 2000 version of the Uniform State Laws. Under this
approach, any private conversation with a clergy member that is
related to the spiritual well-being of the parishioner would be
protected by the privilege, even if the source of the underlying
problem pertained to employment, financial issues, family matters,
would not be forced to testify). The court held the conversations excluded by advance
agreement, not because they were legally privileged. Id. "It would wrench the language of the
statute to hold that it applies to communications made to a religious [official] ... acting as a
marriage counselor." Id.
95. People v. Edwards, 248 Cal. Rptr. 53,56 (Ct. App. 1988) (stating that parishioner who
sought out parish priest for advice involving embezzlement from parish guild was "seeking
counseling and not absolution," and therefore, conversation did not constitute a penitential
communication).
96. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400 (Michie 2002).
97. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060 (West 1996); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505 (West 1999);
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22 (1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-3-1 (West 1998); MD. CODE ANN.,
CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-111 (2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20A (West 2002); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 516:35 (1997); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4505 (McKinney 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-
53.2 (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206 (2000); see also People v. Carmona, 627 N.E.2d 959,
962 (N.Y. 1993) (finding that statute protects conversations for purposes of spiritual guidance
and providing that "the privilege may not be invoked to enshroud conversations with wholly
secular purposes solely because one of the parties to the conversation happened to be a
religious minister"); Simpson v. Tennant, 871 S.W.2d 301, 306 (Tex. App. Ct. 1994) (finding
privilege where communicant was "seeking spiritual solace and guidance," and ruling that
communication need not be strictly penitential to qualify for protection).
98. PROPOSED FED. R. EvID. 506, 56 F.R.D. 183, 248 (1973) (rendering privileged any
confidential communications made to clergy "in professional character as spiritual advisor").
99. UNIF. R. EVID. 505, 13A U.L.A. 371 (2000).
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or physical and mental health."° For example, most states that
protect communications "for the purposes of spiritual advice or
counseling" or similar language have interpreted their privilege
statutes to protect marital counseling sessions. 1' 1
Many state statutes-whether they shield "confessions,"
"penitential communications," or "conversations for the purposes of
spiritual advice or counseling"-emphasize that the confidence must
also be shared with the minister in his professional capacity. 0 2
When the parishioner confides in the clergy member due to
friendship, kinship, business association, or some other relationship,
the communication is not privileged.' 3
100. Cf. United States v. Isham, 48 M.J. 603, 605 (1998) (interpreting privilege broadly
under Military Rule of Evidence 503 to include discussion of mental depression with Navy
chaplain, where conversation had "obvious religious overtones"). Seegenerally Mitchell, supra
note 47.
101. See Pardie v. Pardie, 158 N.W.2d 641, 645 (Iowa 1968); LeGore v. LeGore, 31 Pa. D.
& C.2d 107, 108 (Ct. Com. P1. 1963); cf. Rivers v. Rivers, 354 S.E.2d 784, 787 (S.C. 1987).
Other states expressly include marriage counseling sessions in their clergy-penitent privilege
statutes. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-309 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West 1994).
102. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107 (West 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
146B (West 1991); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-309 (2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20A
(West 2002).
103. See People v. Thompson, 184 Cal. Rptr. 72, 76 (Ct. App. 1982) (holding that Christian
Science "ethics officer" hired by business as sales consultant was not acting in capacity as
clergyman in hearing confession of murder); People v. Police, 651 P.2d 430,431 (Colo. Ct. App.
1982) (holding that the conversation between the father of a murder victim who also happened
to be a minister and the defendant at the jail house was not privileged because there was no
evidence that the minister was acting as the defendant's spiritual advisor or providing
pastoral counseling to him); People v. Bole, 585 N.E.2d 135, 147 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (finding
no privilege where cleric had informed defendant accused of sexually assaulting his
stepdaughter before disclosure that he would not act as defendant's pastoral counselor
because in that situation defendant could not have been confiding in minister "in his
professional capacity"); Christensen v. Pestorious, 250 N.W. 363, 365 (Minn. 1933) (denying
privilege where witness told minister about accident when he visited her in the hospital, but
there was no spiritual component or purpose to the confidence); State v. Cary, 751 A.2d 620,
626 (N.J. 2000) (holding that the cleric-penitent privilege did not apply to confession made to
Baptist deacon who was also a New Jersey State Trooper, when defendant told his pastor he
wanted to surrender on charge of murder, and pastor thereafter summoned the deacon/trooper
to take his statement in his role as a police officer and take him into custody); State v. Barber,
346 S.E.2d 441, 441-45 (N.C. 1986) (finding no privilege where rape suspect confided in
minister as friend); Masquat v. Maguire, 638 P.2d 1105, 1106 (Okla. 1981) (holding that no
privilege existed where hospital patient 'contacted and consulted with [a Catholic nun] in her
capacity as a hospital administrator and not in her capacity as a 'clergyman').
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The broadest construction of the privilege, but still the minority
position, is to protect all confidential communications made to a
minister "in his professional capacity," without any limitation as to
the spiritual purpose or nature of the conversation. 14 A few states
have apparently concluded that parishioners frequently turn to
clergy members with a wide variety of problems and attempts
to restrict the privilege to spiritual advice causes no fewer
complications of line drawing than confessions or penitential
communications. In these jurisdictions, a wide variety of counseling
sessions are protected, including, among others, child rearing
advice, employment counseling, and personal problems such as
alcoholism or sexual dysfunction, so long as they are directed to
the minister in his professional capacity. With the increasing
involvement of ministers in a wide variety of counseling activities,
the potential for expanding the reach of the privilege in these states
is greatly increased.l0 ' Moreover, states that protect any confidential
communication to a minister in his professional capacity run the
risk of sweeping within their reach matters relating not to the
counseling needs of the parishioner, but to the business or
employment affairs of the religious organization."°c For example, in
Illinois the applicable clergy-penitent privilege statute was held to
protect conversations between a youth group counselor and a
Lutheran minister about the counselor's alleged molestation of a
youth in his charge.' v Although this interview about charges of
104. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-803 (West 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West 1999); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West 1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-90 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
105. Some critics have argued that extending the privilege to all forms of counseling
conducted by ministers is unwise because many ministers do not have adequate training or
experience in counseling to meet minimum standards of competency in this area. Samuel
Knapp & Leon VandeCreek, Privileged Communications for Pastoral Counseling: Fact or
Fancy?, 34 J. PASTORALCARE 293 (1985) (arguing that lack of competency in counselingmeans
that society should not sedulously encourage ministers to enter such relationships, thus
undercutting Wigmore's four-pronged justification for application of privilege).
106. Cf Commonwealth v. Stewart, 690 A.2d 195, 197-200 (Pa. 1997) (affirming order of
trial court requiring production for in camera inspection of church records pertaining to
personnel records of priest and investigation into allegations of drug and sexual abuse by him
with the records being privileged only if "spiritual or penitential" in nature); Hutchison v.
Luddy, 606 A.2d 905, 909-12 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (ordering church to comply with discovery
requests for personnel documents and internal investigatory reports of suspected child abuse
because Pennsylvania statute limits privilege to discussions of "spiritual" matters).
107. People v. Burnidge, 664 N.E.2d 656, 659 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
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work-related misconduct could readily have been termed an
employment matter rather than a spiritual matter, the court
concluded that the session was privileged because the defendant
was summoned to speak with the minister "in [his] professional
character" under the express terms of the Illinois statute."' 8
C. Who Holds the Privilege?
States are split on who holds the privilege, but a substantial
majority recognize that the privilege belongs to the parishioner,"°9
just as the attorney-client privilege and the doctor-patient privileges
rest in the hands of the client and not the professional."' A common
formulation in these state statutes provides that the privilege may
be asserted by the parishioner or the clergyman on behalf of the
parishioner, and that the clergy member is presumed to have
authority to assert the privilege on behalf of the parishioner in the
absence of evidence to the contrary."' In states where the
parishioner holds the privilege,112 he can choose to waive the
privilege and thereby force the minister to testify."'a This can lead
108. Id. In Illinois, the clergy-penitent privilege statute applies to confidential
communications made to a clergyman "in [his] professional character or as [a] spiritual
advisor." 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-803 (West 1993) (emphasis added).
109. ScoTT N. STONE & ROBERT K TAYLOR, 2 TESTIMONIAL PRIvILEGES § 6.08, at 6-15 (2d
ed. 1995).
110. Id. at § 7.01, at 7-8; PAuL R. RICE, ATrORNEY-CLIENTPRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES
§ 1.3 (2d ed. 1999).
111. See, e.g., DEL. R. EviD. 505; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505 (West 1999).
112. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2233 (West 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146b (West
1991); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-309 (2001); IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (Michie 1998); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 622.10 (West 1999); LA. CODE EviD. ANN. art. 511 (West 1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
233, § 20A (West 2002); MINN STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-804
(2001); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49.255 (Michie 2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516:35 (1997);
N.Y. C.P;L.R. 4505 (Consol. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.260
(2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-23 (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-90 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN.
CODE. ANN. § 24-1-206 (2000). As a variation on this approach, some states follow Proposed
Rule 506 and place the privilege in the hands of the parishioner, but these states also provide
that the cleric is presumed authorized to assert the privilege on behalf of the parishioner
unless there is evidence to the contrary, such as an affirmative waiver. ARK. R. EVID. 505;
DEL. R. EviD. 505; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505 (West 1999); ME. R. EVID. 505.
113. See, e.g., De'Udy v. De'Udy, 495 N.Y.S.2d 616, 618-19 (Sup. Ct. 1985). With perhaps
the strongest religious justification for the privilege in light of its Roman Catholic traditions,
even Ireland has recognized that the privilege belongs to the penitent, not to the clergyman.
See Johnston v. Church of Scientology, 1999 Ir. H. 682 (Ir. H. Ct.) (recognizing that although
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to some seemingly harsh results, such as holding a priest in
contempt for refusing to reveal a private conversation with the
defendant even after the defendant has waived the privilege and
called the priest to testify. 14 If one of the purposes of the privilege
is to protect religious freedom, why is it not equally abhorrent
to require a minister to violate what they perceive to be a sacred
duty of confidence, even when the parishioner has waived the
privilege?"' Not surprisingly, in states where the parishioner holds
the privilege, there are very few reported cases compelling the cleric
to testify over the clergy member's objection, even when the
parishioner desires the confidence to be revealed."
6
A smaller number of jurisdictions provide that both the parish-
ioner and the priest hold the privilege." 7 Where both parties to the
communication hold the privilege, both must consent before the
minister may be forced to testify. This means that a minister may
seal of confessional may be absolute, counseling session outside of confession "would always
be capable of waiver unilaterally by the person being counseled").
114. Commonwealth v. Kane, 445 N.E.2d 598, 602-03 (Mass. 1983) (holding priest in
contempt and fining him for refusing to reveal contents of private, nonpenitential
conversation with defendant in murder case); De'Udy, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 618 (denying minister's
motion to quash subpoena and forcing him to testify in contested divorce proceeding after both
husband and wife waived privilege in marital counseling sessions with clergyman).
115. Statutes that place the privilege in the hands of only the parishioner create a direct
conflict with the seal of confession of the Roman Catholic Church because priests are required
under Canon law to keep sacramental confessions secret, notwithstanding any waiver of the
confidence by the parishioner. 1983 CODE c.983, § 1.
116. There are several possible reasons for this scarcity of case law. First, when the
parishioner wishes to reveal the confidence, he can do so through his own testimony absent
a hearsay bar. Second, it is unlikely that the parishioner's attorney would pursue the cleric's
testimony as a matter of litigation strategy because such compulsion may potentially backfire
before a jury. This latter dynamic is a likely explanation for the relatively small number of
reported cases in the clergy-penitent privilege area in general. Attorneys who wish to
subpoena a minister to provide relevant evidence in a case may be reluctant to risk backlash
from the jury, or, in the case of an elected or appointed government attorney, backlash from
the public.
117. ALA. R. EviD. 505; CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1033-1034 (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-90-107 (West 2001); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-803 (1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-429
(1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West 1994); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5943 (West
2000); see Eckmann v. Bd. of Educ., 106 F.R.D. 70, 73 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (interpreting Missouri
law under pendant state law claims). The wording of Pennsylvania's statute is interesting
because it provides that a minister shall not "be compelled, or allowed without consent of such
person" to disclose confidential communications. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5943 (West
2000). The use of the disjunctive "or" suggests that a priest may not be compelled even if the
penitent waives the privilege.
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refuse to testify to the substance of a confidential communication
even if the parishioner wishes him to reveal the confidence."' States
that place the privilege in the hands of the minister as well as the
parishioner recognize that the privilege serves not only to protect
the parishioner's expectation of privacy and confidentiality, but also
the clergyman's status as repository of spiritual information. " 9 This
approach suggests that the free exercise rights of the minister are
an important value underlying the privilege,"' and that even a
participant to the conversation and the presumed beneficiary of the
confidential relationship should not be allowed to require a minister
to violate a sacred oath or mandate of his church.''
New Jersey is unusual among the states in differentiating the
holder of the privilege depending on the type of confidential
communication at issue. For most spiritual counseling sessions,
both the clergyman and the parishioner hold the privilege; that is,
both have to consent before either can testify.122 However, for
communications occurring in a spiritual counseling setting that
pertain to a future criminal act, only the minister holds the
privilege.'23 The minister may choose to testify or not testify about
the content of such communications depending on his own moral
118. See, e.g., People v. Pecora, 246 N.E.2d 865,872-73 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1028 (1970) (upholding a ruling that a clergyman did not have to answer questions
relating to conversations between himself and the defendant because "a clergyman cannot be
compelled to disclose in any court any 'confession or admission made to him in his professional
character or as a spiritual advisor in the course of the discipline enjoined by the rules or
practices of [his] religious body').
119. Eckmann, 106 F.R.D. at 73.
120. Yellin, supra note 13. In People v. Phillips, the first case in America to recognize the
clergy-penitent privilege, the New York court founded its decision on the free exercise rights
of the subpoenaed priest. 1 W.L.J. 109 (1843); see also supra notes 53-54 and accompanying
text.
121. In some states, such as Illinois, where both the parishioner and clergyman are deemed
to hold the privilege, if the clergyman does not object to testifying and the parishioner asserts
the privilege, the parishioner has the burden of showing that disclosure is enjoined by the
rules or practices of the minister's religion. People v. Burnidge, 664 N.E.2d 656, 659 (Ill.
1996). The Illinois and Maryland statutes do not expressly state that both parties to the
conversation hold the privilege, but rather that clergy shall "nolt] be compelled (to testify]."
735 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/8-803 (1993); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROc. § 9-111 (2002).
Although those words are equally consistent with only the clergy person holding the privilege
and both parties holding the privilege, the courts in Illinois have interpreted this language
to vest the privilege in both parties. See Burnidge, 664 N.E.2d at 689.
122. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West Supp. 2002).
123. Id.
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judgment and the applicable religious doctrine of his church. As
discussed more fully below, New Jersey is thus unique among the
states in that it carves out conversations pertaining to future crimes
for special treatment in its clergy-penitent privilege statute. 124
Finally, some states place a complete bar to clergy testimony
about certain qualifying confidential communications.'25 In these
states, such clergy testimony is not privileged, but rather is deemed
incompetent."12 Even if the parishioner calls the minister to testify
and the minister wishes to testify, he is not allowed to do so. This is
a minority position. Ohio and Oregon statutes contain variations of
this incompetence rule; statutes in these states provide that the
parishioner is the holder of the privilege, but declare a minister
incompetent to testify despite parishioner consent if the minister's
testimony would constitute a violation of a sacred trust, such as
with an auricular confession in the Roman Catholic tradition. 27
D. Who Constitutes a Cleric?
State statutes also differ widely in terms of what types of
religious clerics and functionaries are entitled to invoke the
privilege. The most traditional approach is to confine the privilege
to confidential communications with priests or members of the
clergy without further specification or definition of these terms. 12
124. New Jersey amended its statute in 1994 in response to a decision by the New Jersey
Supreme Court upholding the prosecutor's use of a confession at trial, because under the old
statute, only the priest held the privilege; thus a "minister of visitation" from a Baptist church
was allowed to testify that a prisoner had confessed to him the murder of a sixteen-year-old
boy. State v. Szemple, 640 A.2d 817, 825-29 (N.J. 1994). Public outrage over this decision, and
the fear that priests could unilaterally disclose even confessions about past crimes led New
Jersey to amend the statute.
125. In Vermont, a priest or minister of the gospel "shall not be permitted to testify in court
(about] statements made to him by a person under the sanctity of a religious confessional."
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1607 (1973) (emphasis added); cf Eckmann v. Bd. of Educ., 106
F.R.D. 70, 73 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (interpreting the Missouri statute, which similarly uses the
word "incompetent," not to create an absolute bar, but rather a privilege that is waivable by
the parties to the conversation).
126. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1607 (1973).
127. Ohio and Oregon statutes render a clergyman's testimony incompetent if disclosure
would be a "violation of his sacred trust," OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (West 1994), or if
he "has an absolute duty to keep the communication confidential." OR. REv. STAT. § 40.260
(2001).
128. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2233 (West 1994); IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (Michie 1998); IOWA
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Some states attempt to ensure the cleric is bona fide by protecting
only those officially affiliated with a religious organization, such as
those ordained or licensed by the church.'29 This limits the privilege
to ministers who have achieved official status in their church
through ordination or accreditation. 3 ' Another approach is to focus
not on the bona fides of the minister, but on the bona fides of the
church; some states limit the privilege to practitioners of an
"established" or "legally recognizable" religion.' 3 ' The requirement
that the church be "established" suggests that one of the legislative
objectives in crafting the privilege in these states was to ensure that
the religion indeed played a meaningful role in the lives of some
citizens, rather than being a sham created solely for the purposes of
obtaining secular or legal benefits.'
32
CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-804 (2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 49.255 (Michie 2002); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (Consol. 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-23 (1997);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101 (Michie 2001). Georgia's statute is the most traditional and
specific of all in this regard, limiting the privilege to a "Protestant minister of the Gospel, any
priest of the Roman Catholic faith, any priest of the Greek Orthodox Catholic faith, any
Jewish rabbi, or to any Christian or Jewish minister." GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22 (1995).
Because this statute excludes clerics in many non-Western religious traditions, it might be
found unconstitutional if challenged.
129. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20A (West 2002); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 516:35
(1997); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (West Supp. 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-90 (Law.
Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206 (2000).
130. See State v. Barber, 346 S.E.2d 441, 445 (N.C. 1986) (denying privilege to "exhorter"
of Church of God who had never been ordained and whose ten dollar license from Christian
Ministry of Tennessee had expired at time of confidential conversation). Few states actually
license ministers, except to solemnize marriage; even in those states, authority to conduct
marriages flows automatically from ordination and/or official recognition as a minister by the
ecclesiastical body of the denomination. N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW, § 2 (Consol. Supp. 2002);
Olo REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.08 (West 2000); see also Valentine A. Toth, The Clergyman: His
Privileges and Liabilities, 9 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV. 323 (1960). The District of Columbia
privilege statute extends its testimonial privilege to any minister "authorized to perform a
marriage ceremony." D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-309 (2001).
131. States following this "official status" approach include Ohio, which limits the privilege
to ministers of an "established and legally cognizable church," OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02
(West 1994), and Alabama, which limits the privilege to a practitioner "of any bona fide
established church or religious organization," ALA. R. EVID. 505. See also KY. R. EVID. 505;
MD. CODE. ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-111 (2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (2002).
132. The Internal Revenue Service has developed fourteen criteria to determine whether
a religious group is a "church" entitled to particular tax benefits:
(1) a distinct legal existence;
(2) a recognized creed and form of worship;
(3) a definite and distinct ecclesiastical government;
(4) a formal code of doctrine and discipline;
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Although somewhat dated, one of the few cases to thoughtfully
address the issue of who constitutes a minister for purposes of state
privilege law is Reutkemeier v. Nolte,'33 a civil action in tort by a
farmer against his neighbor for allegedly debauching the farmer's
minor daughter and impregnating her.13' The defendant attempted
to impeach the victim by inquiring into her alleged confession of
sexual activity to a Presbyterian minister and elders within the
church.'35 Through his inquiry, the defendant hoped to prove that
the fourteen-year-old victim had sexual relations with other men
thereby "castling] much uncertainty upon the paternity of the
child."'36 The trial court refused to allow this cross-examination, and
the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed. 37 Interpreting Iowa Code section
4608, the court confronted the issue of whether a group meeting
among the victim, the minister, and three ruling elders of the
church constituted a confidential communication with a "minister
of the gospel" within the meaning of the state privilege statute.
138
The court reasoned that in order to determine who constitutes a
minister within a particular religious denomination, the court must
look to church doctrine.
39
What is a "minister of the gospel" within the meaning of this
statute? The law as such sets up no standard or criterion. That
(5) a distinct religious history;
(6) a membership not associated with any other church or denomination;
(7) an organization of ordained ministers;
(8) ordained ministers selected after completing prescribed studies;
(9) a literature of its own;
(10) established places of worship;
(11) regular congregations;
(12) regular religious services;
(13) Sunday schools for religious instruction of the young; and
(14) schools for the preparation of its ministers.
Church of the Visible Intelligence That Governs the Universe v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 55,
64 (1983) (citing Remarks of IRS Commissioner Jerome Kurtz, PLI Seventh Biennial
Conference on Tax Planning (Jan. 9, 1978), reprinted in Fed. Taxes (P-H) P54, 820 (1978)).
133. 161 N.W. 290 (Iowa 1917).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 291-92.
136. Id. at 291.
137. Id. at 291-92.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 292.
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question is left wholly to the recognition of the "denomination."
The word "minister," which in its original sense meant a mere
servant, has grown in many directions and into much dignity. 1 40
The court looked to the "Confession of Faith" of the Presbyterian
Church and determined that elders were actual officers of the
church with the power to preach in the minister's absence, to
exercise church discipline, and to "inquire into the knowledge and
Christian conduct of the members of the church," and thus that they
were ministers of the gospel.1
4
'
Rather than generally applying the privilege to clergy or
ministers of the gospel, some states protect communications with
designated clergy, typically priests, rabbis, ministers, or any
"similar functionary" of a church."4 This is the more modern scope
of the privilege and has become the majority view. Some states have
interpreted the term "similar functionary" broadly to include those
in roles such as deacons, nuns, or elders who perform officially
recognized church functions, whether they are employed full-time
or part-time, for compensation or as a volunteer."4 Extending even
broader protection, Oklahoma, Nebraska, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin apply their privileges to confidential
communications with persons "reasonably believed" by the parish-
ioner to constitute such a religious cleric. '4 Other states have taken
140. Id.
141. Id. at 292-93.
142. See ALA. R. EvID. 505; ARK. R. EVID. 505; CAL. EViD. CODE § 1030 (West 1995); DEL.
R. EVID. 505; HAw. R. EVID. 506; LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 511 (West 1995); ME. R. EVID. 505;
Miss. R. EVID. 505; MO. ANN. STAT. § 491.060 (West Supp. 2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-506
(1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West Supp. 2002); N.M. R. EVID. 11-506; N.D. R. EVID.
505; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2505 (West 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-16 (Michie
1995); TEX. R. EVID. 505; VT. R. EVID. 505; WiS. STAT. ANN. § 905.06 (West 2000).
143. See, e.g., Eckmann v. Bd. of Educ., 106 F.R.D. 70,72-73 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (holding that
a Catholic nun acting as the spiritual director of a congregation met the statutory definition
of "minister" under the Missouri privilege statute, because the statute includes "a minister
of the gospel, priest, rabbi or other persons serving in a similar capacity," and the nun in
question undertook many aspects of Catholic ministry engaged in by priests and sisters alike)
(emphasis added).
144. NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-506 (1995); N.D. R. EVID. 505; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2505
(West 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-16 (Michie 1995); TEX. R. EviD. 505; WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 905.06 (West 2000); see also TIEMANN & BUSH, supra note 7, at 115.
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a more moderate approach and have excluded "helpers" in the
church who have a subsidiary role to the official clergy. 14
5
States have struggled with the issue of whether to protect
conversations with self-proclaimed ministers who have not gone
through any formal training or ordination ceremony,'1 lay officers
of a church,' 7 and even peer counseling groups such as Alcoholics
Anonymous. 148 An overly broad interpretation of the term "minister"
would encourage cult leaders and self-appointed spiritual healers4 9
to avoid testifying by claiming the privilege, thus opening the doors
to fraud and abuse.'50 Pennsylvania's statute, which some have
argued reflects an obvious Judeo-Christian bias,15' excludes from
145. See In re Murtha, 279 A.2d 889, 893 (N.J. App. Div. 1971) (holding that a Roman
Catholic nun could not claim the privilege because she was not authorized to receive
penitential communications according to the discipline of her church); State v. Buss, 887 P.2d
920, 922.24 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that conversations with an assistant to a Catholic
priest acting as a "family minister" did not qualify for the Washington privilege because the
"family minister" was nonordained and there was no record that the religion required
disclosure to such a functionary of the church).
146. See State v. Hereford, 518 So. 2d 515,516 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (although the Louisiana
statute does not define "clergyman," denying privilege to a "self ordained minister," noting
that "{slimply because [the preacher] studied the Bible and took it upon himself to give
religious guidance to others does not make him a clergyman"); State v. Barber, 346 S.E.2d
441, 445-46 (N.C. 1986) (finding the clergy-communicant privilege inapplicable to
conversations with a nonordained "licensed exhorter").
147. See People v. Johnson, 497 N.Y.S.2d 539, 539-40 (App. Div. 1985) (recognizing that
confidential communications with a Muslim brother may in some instances be privileged);
Ellis v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 539, 541-42 (D. Utah 1996) (finding that even assuming
that the "ward" and the "stake" leaders of the Church of Latter Day Saints were clergy within
the meaning of the Utah privilege statute, their investigation about a drowning during a
church-sponsored youth trip was not a communication for the purposes of spiritual
counseling).
148. See Cox v. Miller, 296 F.3d 89, 110 (2d Cir. 2002) (reversing lower court's
determination that petitioner's communications with fellow Alcoholics Anonymous (A.A.)
members were protected by clergy-penitent privilege; although "Twelve Step" methodology
of A.A. is religiously based, petitioner did not seek A.A. counseling for purposes of "spiritual
advice" within the meaning of the state privilege statute).
149. See People v. McNeal, 677 N.E.2d 841, 852-53 (I11. 1997) (holding defendant's
statements to his brother, who was a self-proclaimed minister of the "Church of the Second
Coming" were not privileged because theywere not made for purposes of spiritual counseling).
150. Georgia has interpreted its privilege statute to exclude communications with a
"'spiritual advisor' or 'psychic," ruling that such a person is not a "minister of the gospel"
within the meaning of the applicable statute. Manous v. State, 407 S.E.2d 779, 782 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1991). Georgia's statute does not have a catch-all provision protecting conversations with
a "similar functionary" of a church, or a person performing functions "similar to" a minister.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22 (1995).
151. Rev. Martin R. Bartel, O.S.B., Pennsylvania's Clergy-Communicant Privilege: For
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the protections of the privilege any communications with "clergy-
men or ministers, who are self-ordained or who are members of
religious organizations in which members other than the leader
thereof are deemed clergymen or ministers."'52 Ohio is another
example of a jurisdiction that appears to have drafted its privilege
statute in an attempt to withhold protection for conversations with
ministers of emerging or fringe religions. Ohio defines "minister" for
the purposes of its privilege statute as "[a] member of the clergy,
rabbi, priest, or regularly ordained, accredited, or licensed minister
of an established and legally cognizable church, denomination, or
sect." '5 Under the terms of Ohio's statute, the court can thus look
to either church doctrine or to church licensure to determine
whether a person is a "minister" for the purposes of its privilege
statute. 1
4
Whether courts apply a broad or narrow construction of
"minister" for purposes of the privilege depends not only on the
precise wording of the applicable state statute, but also on what
types of relationships the court feels inclined to promote. If the court
views the privilege as a means to promote spiritual counseling in
general, it is likely to apply the privilege broadly to any religious
functionary who, by way of training or experience, is in a position to
provide spiritual aid and comfort to the parishioner.' If the court
views the privilege as a means only to foster relationships which
Everything There is ... A Time to Keep Silent, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 817, 822 (1996) ("The current
statutory definition seems to be construed with a Judeo-Christian bias.").
152. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5943 (West 2000). For example, Jehovah's Witnesses believe
that all members of the church are called to the ministry and that the church constitutes a
"society of ministers." See Reese, supra note 9, at 66 n.45 (citing ROYSTON PIKE, JEHOVAH'S
WITNESSES: WHO THEYARE, WHATTHEYTEACH, WHATTHEY Do 99-102 (1954)). Statutes like
those in effect in Pennsylvania would not construe private conversations between two
Jehovah's Witnesses as privileged unless one played a leadership role in the church. See id.
at 66.
153. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(c) (West Supp. 2002).
154. Cf. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 387 n.21, 388 (3d Cir. 1990)
(directing the lower court to look to church doctrine and practices to determine whether group
counseling was accepted as an efficacious form of spiritual advice, and holding that "inquiring
into the pastoral counseling practices of a particular denomination would appear to pose no
such threat to first amendment rights").
155. See, e.g., Cox v. Miller, 296 F.3d 89, 110 (2d Cir. 2002) (even if lower court was correct
in concluding that A.A. was a religion for purposes of state's privilege statute, petitioner did
not attend meetings for purposes of obtaining spiritual advice); Eckmann v. Bd. of Educ., 106
F.R.D. 70, 73 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (upholding assertion of privilege by a Roman Catholic nun).
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may lead to redemption and spiritual salvation, it is likely to apply
the privilege only to that narrower class of church professionals
who are directly responsible for spiritual healing under the
established tenets of the religion-usually the pastor or leader of
the congregation. 156 The arguments in favor of interpreting
"minister" broadly are the same as those advanced for abandoning
the "discipline enjoined" requirement; that is, to avoid distin-
guishing between and among religions, and avoid inquiring into
religious doctrine.157 Another reason to interpret "minister" broadly,
however, is that spiritual guidance, unlike mental health care,
does not typically cost money. Applying a testimonial privilege to
psychiatrists, but not to religious counselors or lay ministers, favors
those who can afford to pay for therapy; less affluent individuals
quite frequently turn to various functionaries within their church
for the same types of problems for which the elite turn to
psychiatrists.1 58 Applying a broad definition of "minister" may avoid
not only difficult problems of line drawing between religious sects,
but also class-based disparities that could result from recognizing
some forms of therapeutic professional privileges but not others.'59
III. THE EVOLVING FEDERAL PRIVILEGE
Precedent establishing the contours of the clergy-penitent
privilege in federal courts 16 is scarce, likely because a large
percentage of criminal and family law cases, wherein the privilege
frequently arises, are brought in state court where state law of
privilege governs. Even in diversity and federal question cases
involving pendant state law claims, state privilege law applies
in federal court. 16' Recognition of a common law clergy-penitent
156. See, e.g., In re Murtha, 279 A.2d 889, 892 (N.J. App. Div. 1971) (construing "minister"
to include priests, but not nuns).
157. See Yellin, supra note 13, at 136.
158. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1996) (recognizing that the class disparity
argument favors applying psychiatric privilege to licensed clinical social workers performing
psychotherapy).
159. See id.
160. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 377 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting the
"relative dearth of federal precedent"); Yellin, supra note 13, at 96 (recognizing that the
"minister's privilege has not been the subject of extensive appellate litigation").
161. FED. R. EVyD. 501.
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privilege has thus been slower to evolve in the federal courts, and
has followed the trend in most states. 162
Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 after
more than four years of study and debate.'63 Rule 501 does not
contain a specific and exclusive list of privileges to be applied in the
federal courts.'64 Instead, Rule 501 dictates the evolution and
application of privileges "in the light of reason and experience."'65
The common law privilege formula adopted by Congress in Rule 501
eschews the nine specifically enumerated privileges recommended
by the Advisory Committee and approved by the Supreme Court,
including the clergy-penitent privilege.'6 In order to determine
whether a conversation is privileged in federal cases, the courts
must thus look to federal common law. 167
Proposed Rule 506, adopted by the Supreme Court's Advisory
Committee in 1972 but not enacted by Congress, provided a
"Communications to Clergyman Privilege" which placed the
privilege in the hands of the parishioner. 68 Rule 506 would have
significantly liberalized the 1942 and 1953 model rules. 6 9 The
terms "priest," "penitent," and "penitential communication" were
abandoned.' v Proposed Rule 506 extended the privilege to any
162. One of the earliest federal cases to recognize the clergy-penitent privilege was decided
in 1958. See Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 276, 280 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (Fahy, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that even absent an erroneous jury instruction on criminal intent, the
admission of a Lutheran minister's testimony regarding defendant's confidential admission
that she had shackled her children constituted grounds for overturning criminal conviction).
163. H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 3-4 (1973). The more general privilege formula adopted by
Congress in Rule 501 had its origin in Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See
Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 379.
164. FED. R. Evm. 501.
165. Id. This standard was derived from Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26, which
governed the application of privileges in federal cases prior to the enactment of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 8-9 (1973). The Rule 26 standard was, in turn,
derived from Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 13 (1934), a case concerning the competence
of witnesses in federal courts.
166. See PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 502-510, 56 F.R.D. 183, 234-58 (1973).
167. In federal diversity cases where state law provides the rule of decision, and for
pendant state law claims brought in federal court, the court must apply the rules of privilege
which govern in the applicable state. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
168. See PROPOSED FED. R. EvlD. 506, 56 F.R.D. 183, 247 (1973) (requiring that a
communication "not [be] intended for further disclosure" in order to be covered by the
privilege).
169. See MODEL CODE EVID. 219 (1942); UNIF. R. EVID. 29 (1953).
170. UNIF. R. EviD. 29 (1974); see TIEMANN & BUSH, supra note 7, at 151-53.
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"confidential communication by the person to a clergyman in his
professional character as spiritual advisor." 7' Significantly, the
Proposed Rule eschewed any "discipline enjoined" language, making
it irrelevant whether the minister's religious denomination pro-
moted spiritual counseling or required the minister to keep such
sessions confidential. 7 2 Proposed Rule 506 would have also ex-
tended the definition of "minister" to include an accredited
Christian Science practitioner, and one who, although not an official
minister, was a "similar functionary" of a religious organization. 1
73
The phrase "similar functionary" seems to have been intended to
allow for growth in the application of the privilege to new or
emerging religions, or to new roles within existing religions. 74
Although Congress did not adopt Proposed Rule 506 or the other
specifically enumerated privileges recommended by the Supreme
Court, neither did it specifically disapprove of them. 75 Significantly,
Proposed Rule 506 was "one of the least controversial of the
specifically enumerated privileges" proposed by the Supreme Court
and debated by Congress.'76 This was most likely because a clergy-
penitent privilege was by that time seen as firmly rooted in
American law notwithstanding its somewhat dubious history,'7 7 and
because confidential communications with priests and ministers
were perceived as beyond secular intervention in any event.1
8
The Supreme Court has cited the clergy-penitent privilege on at
least three occasions, implicitly recognizing its common law status,
although never squarely addressing its contours.'79 Although
171. PROPOSED FED. R. EviD. 506, 56 F.R.D. 183, 247 (1973).
172. For a general discussion of the "discipline enjoined" requirement, see supra notes 70-
86 and accompanying text.
173. PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 506, 56 F.R.D. 183, 247 (1973); see also supra note 142 and
accompanying text (discussing state statutes that apply the privilege to "similar
functionaries" of a religious body).
174. See PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 506 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 248 (1973)
("No further specification seems possible in view of the lack of licensing and certification
procedures for clergymen.").
175. The Senate Judiciary Committee's Report on Rule 501 states: "It should be clearly
understood that, in approving this general rule as to privileges, the action of Congress should
not be understood as disapproving any recognition of ... any ... of the enumerated privileges
contained in the Supreme Court rules." S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 13 (1974).
176. Bartel, supra note 151, at 838 (emphasis added).
177. Id. at 838-41.
178. Id. (citing MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 76.2, at 109).
179. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1979) (discussing privilege for adverse
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relatively few lower federal courts have had occasion to interpret the
clergy-penitent privilege since the enactment of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, those that have done so have found the common law
privilege to be consistent with the express terms of Proposed Rule
506, essentially adopting that expansive formulation for the federal
courts.' One of the most thorough discussions of the clergy-
penitent privilege by a federal court can be found in the Third
Circuit's In re Grand Jury Investigation decision, in which the court
looked to Proposed Rule 506 to define the scope and contours of the
privilege under federal common law.'' In that case, the Third
Circuit remanded the matter for a factual determination of whether
a grand jury subpoena to a Lutheran minister who had engaged in
a counseling session with a family suspected of burning down the
home of an African-American neighbor met the court's new test
for application of the clergy-penitent privilege. 182 The Third Circuit
instructed the trial court to grant the Government's motion to
compel the minister's testimony unless the trial court concluded
that the communication was (1) made to a clergyperson, (2) in his or
spousal testimony and favorably referring to other privileges by analogy, including the clergy-
penitent privilege); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,709 (1974) ("lAin attorney or a priest
may not be required to disclose what has been revealed in professional confidence."); Totten
v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875) (dismissing a contract suit brought by a secret agent
to recover for espionage services and recognizing that claims on contract for spy services, like
suits which "would require a disclosure of the confidences of the confessional," may not be
maintained). Several United States courts of appeals and district courts recognized the clergy-
penitent privilege prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, either expressly
or in dicta. See, e.g., United States v. Luther, 481 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1973) (finding that
the clergy-penitent privilege would not prevent the IRS from inspecting corporate records of
the Bible Institute) (expressly); In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433, 435-36 (C.D. Cal. 1971)
(quashing subpoena of grand jury investigating selective services violations directed to
Claremont College's chaplain, who was engaged in draft counseling) (expressly); United States
v. Keeney, 111 F. Supp. 233, 234 (D.D.C. 1953) ("Under the law of the United States
privileged communications are strictly limited to a few well-defined categories, such as
communications between attorney and client, clergyman and penitent, and physician and
patient."), rev'd on other grounds, 218 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (dictum).
180. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 380 (3d Cir. 1990) ("We believe that
the proposed rules provide a useful reference point and offer guidance in defining the
existence and scope of evidentiary privileges in the federal courts."); Verplank, 329 F. Supp.
at 435 (citing Proposed Rule 506 with approval while pending).
181. Grand Jury Investigation 918 F.2d at 380.
182. Id. at 385, 388.
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her spiritual and professional capacity, and (3) with a reasonable
expectation of privacy.'
Most federal courts that have addressed the issue have suggested
that the clergy-penitent privilege belongs to the parishioner,'84
following the suggestion of Proposed Rule 506."85 Only one federal
court has suggested that the privilege belongs to the clergy person,
and this was a federal question case involving pendant state law
claims in which the court was interpreting both federal and state
privilege law."m
In terms of the types of confidential communications covered,
most federal courts have focused not on whether the communication
was a confession or a penitential communication, but rather
whether it occurred in private with a clergy member in that person's
professional capacity as a spiritual advisor. 8 ' This is consistent
with the expansive approach of Proposed Rule 506.8' Under this
183. Id. at 385-88.
184. See id. at 380; Scott v. Hammock, 133 F.R.D. 610, 615 (D. Utah 1990).
185. "The privilege may be claimed by the person, by his guardian or conservator, or by his
personal representative if he is deceased. The clergyman may claim the privilege on behalf
of the person. His authority so to do is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary."
PROPOSED FED. R. EViD. 506, supra note 8. In the comment to Proposed Rule 506(c), the
Advisory Committee "makes clear that the privilege belongs to the communicating person."
PROPOSED FED. R. EVD. 506 advisory committee's notes, 56 F.R.D. 183, 249 (1973).
186. Eckmann v. Bd. of Educ., 106 F.R.D. 70, 72-73 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (explaining that the
privilege belonged to the Roman Catholic nun under Missouri and federal law, and could not
be waived by plaintiff in submitting facts of conversation to book publisher). Because the court
did not know whether the nun's deposition testimony was relevant to the federal claim or the
state claim, the court assumed that it was relevant to both. Id. at 72. The court found it
unnecessary to decide whether federal or state law of privilege should apply in such
situations, because it ruled that the nun's testimony "is privileged under both federal and
state law." Id. The court interpreted federal law as vesting the privilege in the hands of the
clergy member. Id.
187. See United States v. Dube, 820 F.2d 886, 889 (7th Cir. 1987) (explaining that
conversations the defendant had with his pastor about income tax obligations were not for
purposes of spiritual counseling, and therefore not within the federal common law privilege);
United States v. Wells, 446 F.2d 2, 3-4 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding that admission into evidence
of letter from defendant to priest did not violate privilege, where there was no indication
either that the letter was intended to remain confidential or that it was for the purposes of
spiritual counseling).
188. The Federal District Court in Utah, applying state law in a diversity case, construed
"confession" in that state's privilege statute broadly to mean any confidential communication
for purposes of spiritual advice, essentially following the approach of Proposed Rule 506.
Scott, 133 F.R.D. at 616. This construction was considered necessary in order to avoid a free
exercise problem. Id. at 617. According to the court:
It is difficult to believe or concede that the Utah territorial legislature, around
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"spiritual counseling" approach, the privilege has been applied to
protect the contents of draft counseling sessions 8 9 and group family
counseling sessions"9 with clergy members.
The comments to Proposed Rule 506(a)(2) suggested that the
definition of confidential communication for the clergy-penitent
privilege should be consistent with the doctrine of confidentiality
under the attorney-client and psychotherapist-patient privilege, and
that the presence of a third person should not destroy the privilege
so long as the presence of that person was necessary in aid of the
communication.' 9 ' "Given the requisite showing of confidentiality,
proposed Rule 506 would have extended the clergy-communicant
privilege to group discussions." 92
There is a paucity of case law on the subject of who constitutes a
clergy member under the federal privilege. In the Verplank case,'93
the district court extended the privilege to members of the college
draft counseling staff working with a college chaplain, even though
they were not themselves ordained ministers.' 94 Relying on advisory
committee notes to Proposed Rule 506, the court found that they
performed functions "conforming at least in a general way with
those of... an established Protestant denomination,"'95 and therefore
quashed a grand jury subpoena seeking records of both the chaplain
and the nonordained counselor working with him. In applying the
1876, would have intended to limit the term confession to something akin to the
Catholic religion where the dominant church in the Territory did not follow that
form of religious practice.... A second reason is also compelling for a more liberal
construction of the privilege. A statute should be construed, if possible, to avoid
an unconstitutional application.
Id. at 618.
189. See In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433, 435-36 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
190. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374,385-86 (3d Cir. 1990). But see Dube,
820 F.2d at 889 (denying privileged status to defendant's conversation with minister
regarding defendant's efforts to avoid taxation because conversation did not involve "a
penitent seeking spiritual relief from his sins").
191. In comment (aX2) to Proposed Rule 506, the Advisory Committee noted that the
definition of "confidential' communication" for purposes of the clergy-penitent privilege "is
consistent with the use of the term in Rule 503(a)(5) for lawyer-client ...." PROPOSED FED. R.
EVID. 506, advisory committee's notes, 56 F.R.D. 183, 248 (1973).
192. Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 380.
193. Verplank, 329 F. Supp. at 433.
194. See id. at 436.
195. Id. (quoting PROPOSED FED. R. Evm. advisory committee's notes, 51 F.R.D. 372
(Revised Draft 1971)).
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functional approach of Proposed Rule 506, the court concluded that
the staff member was essentially performing a function similar to
the college chaplain.1" This case was unusual in not insisting that
the draft counseling staff member be performing his spiritual
counseling functions at either the direction of the chaplain19 ' or at
least under the authority of the church.'98 This case highlights the
dangerous elasticity of the "similar functionary" language of
Proposed Rule 506.1'
196. See id. The Supreme Court recently applied a similar functional approach to federal
privileges in Jaffee v. Redmond, recognizing for the first time a federal common law patient-
psychiatrist privilege under Rule 501 and ruling that this privilege applied to
psychotherapeutic counseling sessions with a licensed social worker. 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1995).
Noting that the poor and people of modest means are more apt to receive mental health
counseling from a social worker than a medical doctor, the Supreme Court agreed with the
court of appeals that "[dlrawing a distinction between the counseling provided by costly
psychotherapists and the counseling provided by more readily accessible social workers serves
no discernible public purpose." Id. (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1358 n.19 (7th
Cir. 1995)). Importantly, however, social workers are licensed and regulated by the state,
whereas clergy are not. Even with respect to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, a number
of states have declined to follow the Supreme Court's functional approach of Jaffee in
interpreting their state privilege statutes. See State v. Clark, 570 N.W.2d 195,204 (N.D. 1997)
(holding that a conversation with a social worker who was not a psychologist or psychiatrist
was not covered under state's psychotherapist-patient privilege); Williams v. Texas, No. 07-96-
0087-CR, 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 260, at *2 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 1997) (holding that no
privilege exists for conversations with suicide prevention worker).
197. The court in Verplank analogized the counselor to a paralegal working with an
attorney whose assistance is indispensable to the provision of services to a client. Verplank,
329 F. Supp. at 436. However, the element of "assistance," which is necessary to the
application of the attorney-client privilege to a paralegal was not apparent from the record
in Verplank. Id.; see also PROPOSED FED R. EvrD. 503, supra note 8, at 235-37. Although the
court in Verplank noted that the chaplain had hired "staff to assist him" in providing
counseling, it did not make any finding that the chaplain exerted direction or control over the'
other counselor. Verplank, 329 F. Supp. at 436.
198. The court in Verplank overlooked the fact that the language of Proposed Rule 506
defines clergyman as a "minister, priest, rabbi, or other similar functionary of a religious
organization." PROPOSED FED. R. EvID. 506, 56 F.R.D. 183, 247 (1973) (emphasis added). The
record in Verplank suggests that the nonordained counselor was an employee of the college,
and not an employee of a church. 329 F. Supp. at 436.
199. In Eckmann v. Board of Education, a federal district court in Missouri denied a motion
to compel a Roman Catholic nun to answer questions about her communications with a
postulate in her charge. 106 F.R.D. 70 (E.D. Mo. 1985). The nun objected on the grounds that
she served as the spiritual director of the young woman seeking admission to the religious
congregation, and that their conversations pertaining to such admission were privileged. Id.
at 71. The court concluded that the role of "spiritual director" within a religious congregation
was "such a position within the Church" as to entitle the nun to invoke the clergy-penitent
privilege. Id. at 73. Unlike the claimant in Verplank, however, the claimant of the privilege
in Eckmann at least was a member of a religious order. Id. at 71.
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IV. CLERGY OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO DANGEROUS PERSONS:
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE MANDATED REPORTING STATUTES
The issue of whether professionals should have a role to play in
identifying dangerous clients and helping to prevent their future
injurious conduct raises competing tensions that have been felt
acutely in the area of state child abuse reporting requirements, so-
called "mandated reporting" laws.2" Whether a clergy member
should have a legally enforceable duty to report suspected child
abuse is different from, but related to, the question of whether he
should have an obligation to report threatened future harm. First,
mandated reporting statutes apply to past or ongoing acts of child
abuse; a mandated reporter has a duty to disclose reasonably
founded suspicions of past abuse, even if he has no reason to believe
that it will reoccur.2 ' Although one of the aims of mandated
reporting statutes is the intervention and prevention of future
harm, another primary aim is the detection of ongoing abuse and
the punishment of those responsible. 2 Second, child abuse
reporting statutes focus on only one limited type of dangerous
conduct, and single it out for special treatment. °3 The question
posed by this Article is whether clergy should have a role to play in
identifying and preventing a much wider scope of dangerous
activity, including violent crimes such as murder, rape, and arson.
Notwithstanding the differences in these two questions, there are
lessons to be learned from the state experience with mandated
reporting laws because many states have already grappled with the
difficult issue of whether society's interest in exposing dangerous
behavior outweighs the parties' interests in confidentiality.
Mandated reporting statutes were first enacted in the 1960s after
research established that child abuse was a problem of widespread
200. See, e.g., Karen L. Ross, Revealing Confidential Secrets: Will It Save Our Children?,
28 SETON HALL L. REV. 963, 968 (1998). A smaller number ofjurisdictions have also adopted
mandated reporting statutes that apply to elder abuse. See Seymour Moskowitz & Michael
J. DeBoer, When Silence Resounds: Clergy and the Requirement to Report Elder Abuse and
Neglect, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 33-35 (1999).
201. For example, most states require mandated reporters to disclose child abuse even if
the abuser is believed to be deceased. See, e.g., 78 Op. Att'y Gen. 189 (Md. 1993).
202. See Ross, supra note 200, at 967.
203. See Mitchell, supra note 47, at 807.
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proportions likely to go undetected by law enforcement due to the
age and vulnerability of its victims and a variety of other socio-
logical factors.20' The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
drafted the first model reporting statute in 1963.2o8 By 1967, every
state had passed a mandated reporting law."° Modem mandated
reporting statutes generally require professionals with frequent
contact with children to file a report with the state Department of
Social Services, or an equivalent child protection agency, whenever
they have reasonable cause to believe that a child has suffered
abuse.0 7 These statutes generally provide the mandated reporter
with immunity from civil liability for filing a report and set forth
misdemeanor criminal penalties, usually a fine, for failure to report
when required to do so. 2° Reportable conditions typically include
evidence of past or current "physical, mental, or sexual abuse" of a
child under circumstances indicating "harm or threatened harm" to
the child's health or welfare.2°
The development of mandated reporting laws has proceeded in
several stages; in fact, most states have amended their statutes at
least once since 1967.210 The first mandated reporting statutes
applied to medical personnel, who were likely to encounter evidence
of child abuse in a treatment context, and law enforcement
personnel, who were likely to encounter such evidence in responding
to domestic disturbance. 21' Following the Federal Child Abuse
and Treatment Act of 1974, and a revised model reporting statute
issued by the American Medical Association in 1975, most states
amended their statutes to require reports from a broader class of
professionals with access to or responsibility for children, including
teachers, social workers, and in some instances, attorneys and
members of the clergy.212
204. See id. at 726.
205. See id.
206. See Mosteller, supra note 29, at 212.
207. See Ross, supra note 200, at 966-67.
208. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (Supp. 2002)
209. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5106a (2000) (requiring each
state to develop procedures for investigation and intervention).
210. Mitchell, supra note 47, at 727.
211. Mosteller, supra note 29, at 212.
212. Id. at 212-13.
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Today, thirty-two of the fifty states include clergy as mandated
reporters of child abuse. Eighteen of these states expressly include
clergy within their list of mandated reporters, among designated
professionals such as teachers, social workers, doctors, and mental
health care workers.213 Fourteen other states have general catch-all
provisions that apply the mandatory reporting requirement to "any
person" who has reason to suspect child abuse, potentially, but not
expressly, sweeping clergy within the statutes' reach. 1
States that apply their mandated reporting statutes to clergy take
differing approaches as to whether the clergy-penitent privilege
survives the duty to report.21" This debate has been brought into
sharp focus by the recent scandal of child sexual abuse by priests in
the American Catholic Church. In response to the crisis, some states
have amended their child abuse reporting statutes to include clergy
among their lists of mandated reporters, 2 6 and in the context of this
amendment have debated whether privileged conversations should
give rise to a duty to report.217
While the current scandal among clergy in the Catholic Church
has focused public attention on the matter of clergy confidences, the
213. See AiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620 (West 2001); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11,165.7 (West
Supp. 2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-101 (West Supp. 2002); LA. CH. C. Art. 603, 609
(West 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4011-A (West Supp. 2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 119, § 51A (West Supp. 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556 (West Supp. 2002); MIsS. CODE
ANN. § 43-21-353 (1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.115 (West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-201
(2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 432b.220 (Michie Supp. 2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29
(1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-03 (1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 419b.010 (2001); 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 6311 (West 2001); TEX FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101 (Vernon 2002); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 62A-4a-403 (2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6A-2 (Michie 2001).
214. Mitchell, supra note 47, at 786; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 903 (Supp. 2000); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 39.201 (West Supp. 2002); IDAHO CODE § 16-1619 (Michie 2001); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 31-33-5-1 (Michie 1997); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.030 (Michie 1999); MD. CODE ANN., FAm.
LAW § 5-705 (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-711 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8:10 (West 1993);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-3 (Michie 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7b-301 (2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 7103 (West Supp. 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-3 (Supp. 2001); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 37-1-403 (2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-205 (Michie 2001).
215. The 1963 Model Child Abuse Reporting Statute recommended abrogating the
physician-patient and husband-wife privileges in all judicial proceedings resulting from
reports of abuse, but did not recommend abrogating the attorney-client or clergy-penitent
privileges. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'T, 24 SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 66, 67-68 (1965).
216. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West Supp. 2002); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
210.115 (West Supp. 2002).
217. Michael Paulson, Sex Abuse Reporting Measure Hits Snag House, Senate Divided Over
Clergy Exemptions, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 7,2002, at Al.
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detection and prevention of pedophilia infrequently raise broad
implications for issues of privileged communications. Church
leaders who receive information about sexual misconduct by clergy
seldom learn of this information solely in a privileged setting,
such as when the offending minister confesses or seeks spiritual
counseling from his superior. Much more frequently, church leaders
learn of the abuse from parents of the children affected, or by other
clergy members who are reporting misconduct by their peers."'
In both of these latter scenarios, the information generally arises
in an employment context 'rather than a spiritual counseling
context. These types of communications, even if intended to be kept
confidential, generally would not be subject to the clergy-penitent
privilege because they are not made for the purpose of spiritual
counseling.21 9 Thus, in all thirty-two states that include clergy as
mandated reporters, a priest or a bishop who learns of abuse of a
child from a victim, a victim's relative, or another clergy member in
most instances already would be subject to criminal prosecution and
penalty for failure to notify authorities of these allegations.
But what about a priest or minister who learns about suspected
child abuse in a privileged setting? Let us suppose that a parish-
ioner confides to a minister in a spiritual counseling context that he
has been molesting his stepdaughter. Fifteen of the thirty-two states
that apply their mandated reporter statutes to clergy provide that
the clergy-penitent privilege survives the duty to report; that is,
that the clergy member is exempt from the statutory duty to
report suspected child abuse if the information was obtained in a
privileged setting, and will have a duty to report only that infor-
mation received outside of the confidential spiritual counseling
context.220 In seven states, it is unclear whether and how the
218. See, e.g., Michael Rezendes & Walter V. Robinson, The Issue of Record Keeping; Critics
Blast Law for Comments on Archdiocese Files, BOSTON GLoBE, Apr. 13, 2002, at B7.
219. In those few states which sweep within the reach of their privilege statute any
confidential communication with a minister in his "professional capacity," without regard for
the spiritual counseling nature of the conversation, a court can consider such employment-
related discussions privileged if intended to be kept confidential. See supra notes 104-08 and
accompanying text.
220. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-805, 13-3620 (West 1999); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11,166 (West
2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.204 (West Supp. 2002); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.050 (Michie
1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403 (West 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4011-A (West
Supp. 2001); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-705 (1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51a
(West Supp. 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556 (West Supp. 2002); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.140
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legislature intended to preserve the clergy-penitent privilege.22' In
ten states, however, the mandated reporting statutes "abrogate" the
privilege, and require disclosure of evidence related to child abuse
even if it would otherwise be protected from disclosure by the
evidentiary privilege.22
"Abrogation" of the privilege can mean two different things for the
purposes of mandated reporting statutes: It can mean that the
clergy member is required to report suspected child abuse even if he
learns of it in a privileged setting, and/or it can mean that the clergy
member is required to testify about the child abuse if he is later
called as a witness in a judicial proceeding. 23 Most of the statutes
in these ten states use widely varying language in abrogating the
privilege, and unfortunately many of the statutes are imprecise in
(West Supp. 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-201 (2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 432b.220
(Michie 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 419b.010 (2001); 23 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6311 (West 2001); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-403 (2000). Many of these mandated reporter statutes make cross-
references to their state's clergy-penitent privilege statutes; others exempt from the duty to
disclose "otherwise privileged" communications; others delineate precisely the types of
confidential communications which are exempt from disclosure.
221. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-101 (West 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-33-5-1 (West
1997); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-711 (Michie 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (West 1993);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-3 (Michie 1999); N.D. CENT. CODES §§ 50-25-1-03,50-25-1-10 (1999);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-403 (2001). North Dakota, for example, abrogates testimonial
privileges between "any professional person and the person's patient or client, except between
attorney and client ... " in cases involving child abuse and neglect. N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25-1-
10 (1999). No court has yet construed whether a minister engaged in counseling represents
a "client" for purposes of this statute. Moreover, when a state enacts a statute that requires
certain professionals to report, and does not address specifically the effect of a preexisting
statutory privilege on this reporting obligation, a difficult statutory interpretation question
arises as to whether the later-enacted reporting requirement was intended to abrogate the
otherwise general rule of privilege. See Mosteller, supra note 29, at 221. No court has yet
addressed this difficult issue in any of the aforementioned states.
222. See infra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
223. In discussing how the mandated reporter statutes apply to attorneys, Professor
Mosteller has pointed out that the issue of abrogation is further complicated by the fact that
some state privilege statutes shield a confidential communication from disclosure only in
judicial or administrative proceedings. Mosteller, supra note 29, at 224-26. It can be argued
that a report of child abuse to the Department of Social Services is not a "proceeding" even
if it is compelled by law, and therefore that there is no conflict between a duty to report and
such state's applicable evidentiary privilege. Id. at 225-26. One consequence of this argument
may be that in states that abrogate the privilege, and where it is unclear whether the
legislature intended to exempt privileged communications from the duty to report child abuse
or the duty to testify about child abuse, or both, courts should favor the latter approach
because there would be no need for the legislature to abrogate a privilege which does not exist
in a reporting context.
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defining exactly how the privilege is intended to be abrogated,
making the law in this area extremely unclear.224 Nonetheless,
some categorization of the laws in these ten states is possible. In
Wyoming, clergy appear to have a duty to report child abuse even if
it is learned in a privileged setting, but have no duty subsequently
to testify in judicial proceedings.225 In Delaware, Mississippi, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas, and
West Virginia, clergy have a duty to report child abuse even if
learned in a privileged context, and must later testify about the
privileged communication in judicial proceedings arising out of the
child abuse or neglect. In other words, the mandatory reporting
statutes in these states abrogate the privilege in the child abuse
context both as to reporting and as to testifying.226 Oddly, in Idaho,
a clergy member has no duty to report child abuse if the abuse was
learned of in a privileged context, but does have a duty to testify
about the same privileged communication if later called as a witness
in a judicial proceeding. 2 7
224. Id. at 220-21. This lack of statutory clarity is exacerbated by the fact that the
intersection between the law of privilege and the law of mandated reporting has seldom been
addressed by the courts, most likely because law enforcement authorities have been reluctant
thus far to enforce criminal sanctions against ministers for failure to report evidence which
may have been learned in private counseling sessions. But see JM-342 Op. Att'y Gen. 1559
(Tex. 1985) (opining that clergy privilege is abrogated by a statute which abrogates all
privileges for child abuse proceedings).
225. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-210 (Michie 2001).
226. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 909 (Supp. 2000) (excluding only sacramental confessions
from the duty to report and testify); MiSs. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 169-C:32 (2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-310 (2002); OILA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 7103,
7113 (West 1998); R.I. GEN. LAws § 40-11-11(1997); TEX FAM. CODEANN. §§ 261.101,261.202
(Vernon 2002); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6A-7 (Michie 2001). Notwithstanding the language of
these statutes, whether an assertion of the clergy-penitent privilege in a judicial proceeding
would actually be denied by a court in these states is open to debate. For example, the New
Hampshire statute abrogates the testimonial privilege "between husband and wife and any
professional person and his patient or client" in "proceedings instituted pursuant to (the child
abuse] chapter." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:32 (2001). A clergy member could argue that
he does not serve patients or clients, and therefore is not within the reach of this attempted
abrogation of the privilege.
227. Under Idaho law, a clergy member is exempt from reporting child abuse learned via
a "confession or confidential communication ... made in the manner and context which places
the duly ordained minister of religion specifically and strictly under a level of confidentiality
that is considered inviolate by canon law or church doctrine." IDAHO CODE § 16-1619(c)(3)
(Michie 1995). However, another provision of Idaho law abrogates all privileges "except the
lawyer-client privilege ... at any proceeding regarding the abuse, abandonment or neglect of
the child." IDAHO CODE § 16-1620 (Michie 1995).
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Notwithstanding the differences in these ten statutes, one
important conclusion can be reached about the policy judgment that
underlies their enactment. By abrogating the privilege in their
mandated reporter statutes, ten states have made a legislative
determination that protecting children from mental, physical, and
sexual abuse is more important than protecting and fostering
confidential communications between clergy and their parishioners
about such unlawful activity.22 This leads to an obvious question:
If the state's interest in detecting and deterring past or ongoing
child abuse is paramount to fostering a confidential relationship,
why isn't the prevention of future serious bodily harm an even more
compelling state interest?229 Child abuse is certainly pernicious and
widespread, but is it any more dangerous or destructive to our
society than homicide? Bioterrorism? Airline hijacking? In nine of
the ten states described above, a minister who receives a confidence
in a spiritual counseling session from a parishioner revealing that
the parishioner has molested a child would have a duty to disclose
this confidence, but paradoxically a minister who receives a con-
fidence during a spiritual counseling session from a parishioner
revealing that he intends to blow up a public building would have no
duty to report this future crime, and furthermore would have a valid
privilege to refuse subsequently to testify about it in court. The
experience of mandated reporting states should lead to the con-
clusion that the confidence is unworthy of protection in either
situation, and certainly less spiritually beneficial in the latter.
V. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE OTHER PROFESSIONS: THE
"HOMICIDAL SPOUSE" EXAMPLE
The broad application of the clergy-penitent privilege described
above should give lawyers, judges, and scholars reason for great
concern. First, testimonial privileges stand in the way of the search
228. See WIGMORE, supra note 17, § 2285, 527 (stating that the fourth criterion for
application of an evidentiary privilege is whether "[tihe injury that would inure to the relation
by the disclosure ... must be greater than the benefit thereby gained") (emphasis omitted).
229. This is not necessarily to suggest that murder, terrorism, or hijacking are more evil
or socially destructive than child abuse. Rather, I am arguing that society has a more
compelling interest in preventing future harm than it does in detecting and punishing past
wrongs or acts because the prevention of future harm spares identifiable individuals from
bodily injury.
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for truth, and historically have been interpreted narrowly wher-
ever possible."0 In stark contrast to other professional privileges,
however, the clergy-penitent privilege seems to have been defined
and interpreted broadly by courts and legislatures, out of fear that
a narrow construction would trample religious freedoms.23' Second,
unlike other professional privileges, the clergy-penitent privilege,
when applicable, is considered absolute. In contrast to the attorney-
client and the psychotherapist-patient privileges-both riddled with
exceptions that allow for the revelation of a confidential com-
munication when interests of fairness or necessity outweigh the
parties' interest in privacy232-the clergy-penitent privilege admits
no exceptions except in the mandated reporting context. 3 This
presents a multiplier effect of socially undesirable consequences:
The clergy-penitent privilege has been applied to a larger class of
communications and a broader class of clergy, and, when it is
deemed to apply, it is considered impenetrable.
The deference afforded clergy members stands in sharp contrast
to that shown to other professionals with respect to the law's
treatment of their obligations in terms of dangerous clients. Imagine
a scenario in which a spouse is experiencing difficulties in his
marriage, and turns to an attorney, psychotherapist, or clergy
member for professional assistance with respect to his marital
problems. Imagine further that in the context of a confidential
counseling session, the client reveals to his attorney/psycho-
therapist/clergy member that he believes the situation to be
hopeless, and that he has purchased a gun and intends to shoot his
spouse the following day. Assume further that the level of detail
provided by the "client" and his demeanor give the attorney/
psychotherapist/clergy member reasonable cause to believe that the
230. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,44-45 (1980).
231. See, e.g., State v. MacKinnon, 957 P.2d 23 (Mont. 1998); Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d
947, 954 (Utah 1994).
232. STONE & TAYLOR, supra note 109, §§ 1.01-1.66,7.02, at 1-4 through 1-179, 7-8 through
7-10; see also PROPOSED FED. R. EvID. 503, 56 F.R.D. 183, 235-37 (1973) (creating exceptions
to attorney-client privilege for communications in furtherance of crime or fraud, for will
contests, for proof of document attestation, for action between joint clients, and when breach
of duty by the lawyer is alleged); id. (creating exception to psychotherapist-patient privilege
in proceedings for hospitalization, when a court orders a psychiatric examination of a party,
or when the patient puts his mental or emotional condition at issue in litigation).
233. See, e.g., PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 506, 56 F.R.D. 183, 247 (1973).
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client intends to carry out the planned homicide. As discussed
below, the way that the law constrains the behavior of the clergy
member in this scenario is vastly different from the way it
constrains the behavior of the attorney or the psychotherapist.
When either an attorney or a psychotherapist has reason to believe
that his client presents a serious risk of danger to a known third
person, he may have an ethical, and in some cases, legal duty to
warn that third party, and might also be foreclosed from refusing to
testify about the confidential communication at a later proceeding
if called upon to do so.23 But no legal duties, binding rules of ethical
conduct, or exceptions to the testimonial privilege operate to
constrain the behavior of the clergy member.
In order to frame the discussion of the various professionals'
obligations in this "homicidal spouse" hypothetical, it is helpful to
first draw a distinction between rules of privilege and rules of client
confidence. Testimonial privileges are rules of evidence that
typically prevent disclosure in judicial or administrative proceedings
without the consent of the holder of the privilege.23 Rules of
confidentiality are ethical norms that typically prevent disclosure
outside of court without the consent of the client, except in limited
circumstances.3 6 Testimonial privileges are not always coextensive
with professional obligations of secrecy; a professional may in
certain circumstances be authorized under the ethical canons of his
profession to breach client confidences, even if the communication
is subject to a testimonial privilege. In such circumstances, the
professional would have the right to breach confidentiality outside
of court, for instance, to warn a third party about a dangerous
client, but he would still be entitled to refuse to answer questions
about the same confidential communication in a later judicial or
administrative proceeding.23
234. See infra notes 238-83 and accompanying text.
235. See Mosteller, supra note 29, at 224-28.
236. Rules of confidentiality typically operate outside of the judicial setting because many
such rules contain "unless required by law" exceptions which allow revelation in a judicial or
administrative proceeding if the tribunal orders disclosure. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFtL
CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 5 (2002) ("The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations
other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law.").
237. A testimonial privilege may only be waived by the holder of the privilege. In
circumstances where a lawyer, psychiatrist, or clergy person reveals a confidence out of court
without the client's consent, the client may still claim the privilege at a later judicial
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A. Responsibilities of the Psychotherapist
Confronted with the homicidal spouse situation, the psycho-
therapist may reveal his client confidence under the controlling
ethical norms of his profession. Section 9 of the Principles of Medical
Ethics governing psychiatrists provides:
A physician may not reveal the confidences entrusted to him in
the course of medical attendance, or the deficiencies he may
observe in the character of patients, unless he is required to do
so by law or unless it becomes necessary in order to protect the
welfare of the individual or of the community."8
Standard 5.05 of the American Psychologist Association's Code
of Conduct provides that a psychologist may disclose confidential
information "to protect the patient or client or others from
harm.""9 Some states have enacted statutes providing a similar
exception to the psychotherapist's duty of confidentiality for
dangerous patients.2 °
Even apart from ethical considerations, the psychotherapist will
be subject to civil liability if he fails to act reasonably to protect
the victim's spouse. In Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
California,24 1 the Supreme Court of California recognized that a
psychiatrist treating a mentally ill patient under certain cir-
cumstances has a duty to warn third parties of potential danger,
ruling that "once a therapist does in fact determine, or under
applicable professional standards reasonably should have deter-
mined, that a patient poses a serious danger of violence to others,
[the therapist] bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect
the foreseeable victim of that danger."24 2 The Restatement (Second)
proceeding to prevent the professional from testifying.
238. AMA PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 9 (1958) (emphasis added); see Victor W. Sidel,
Confidential Information and the Physician, 264 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1133 (1961).
239. ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT § 5.05, reprinted in 47
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1597, 1606 (1992) (emphasis added).
240. See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/11 (West 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-95
(Law Co-op Supp. 2001).
241. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
242. Id. at 345.
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of Torts provides that as a general rule a person owes no duty to
control the conduct of another nor to warn those endangered by this
conduct.24 The court in Tarasoff, however, relied on section 315(a)
of the Restatement, creating an exception to the "no duty to warn"
rule when a special relation between the defendant and the violent
person imposes on the defendant a duty to control the violent
person's conduct.2" The court relied on two unique aspects of the
therapist-patient relationship in concluding that such a "special
relationship" existed: (1) the psychotherapist's ability to predict
dangerous behavior,245 and (2) the psychotherapist's ability to
exercise some degree of control over dangerous behavior.246 The
court also looked to the dangerous person exception to the California
psychotherapist-patient privilege247 as evidence of a strong public
policy in favor of disclosure where essential to avert danger to
others.248
Most states have followed Tarasoff and have recognized that the
duty of reasonable care for psychotherapists includes a duty to warn
or protect reasonably identifiable third parties whenever a patient
confides in them a realistic threat to commit serious physical harm
to another.249 Some states have codified or redefined this Tarasoff
243. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
244. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 343.
245. Id. at 345.
246. Id. at 344. The court analogized a psychotherapist's duty in this regard to the duty of
a hospital to exercise reasonable care to prevent one patient from injuring other patients. Id.
This reasoning is derived from section 319 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which
provides that "[o]ne who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be
likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable
care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (1965). Some commentators have argued that this ability to control
has never in and of itself been sufficient to create a "special relationship" under the
Restatement approach, which explains why mere bystanders are not under a duty to rescue
those in peril, even if they may have the capacity to do so. "Instead, the Restatement and
developing case law took the approach that a duty will be imposed where a person can
exercise an ability to control and there is some additional ingredient to the relationship." John
M. Adler, Relying Upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Observations About the
Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or Protect Others, 1991 Wis. L. REV.
867, 888. That "additional ingredient" in Tarasoff may have been the recognition by the
legislature, as expressed by enactment of an exception to the testimonial privilege, favoring
disclosure in furtherance of public safety.
247. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1024 (West 1995).
248. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 347.
249. See Peter F. Lake, Revisiting Tarasoff, 58 ALB. L. REV. 97, 100 (1994).
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duty by statute.2 ° In almost every state today, however, a
psychiatrist or psychologist faced with the homicidal spouse
scenario must take some affirmative action to avert the perceived
danger, such as warning the spouse, notifying the police, or, if
appropriate, hospitalizing the client.251 A psychiatrist or psycho-
logist who failed to do so would face tort liability for any resulting
injury to the third party victim. 252
Let us assume that our hypothetical psychiatrist exercised his
duty to warn under Tarasoff, and the threatened murder of the
spouse was averted at the eleventh hour. The patient/spouse is then
charged with attempted murder. If the psychotherapist is called as
a witness against his patient at the criminal trial, may he assert the
evidentiary privilege? The privilege has not been waived because
the privilege belongs to the patient, who did not consent to the
disclosure. Whether a "dangerous patient" exception to the privilege,
as opposed to the duty of confidentiality, exists has been a matter of
considerable debate.253 Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 504
contained no such exception to the privilege. 4 However, in Jaffee
v. Redmond,255 the first Supreme Court case to recognize the
psychotherapist-patient privilege under the common law privilege
formulation of Rule 501, the Court stated in a now famous footnote:
"[Wle do not doubt that there are situations in which the privilege
must give way, for example, if a serious threat of harm to the
250. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.059 (West 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148.975 (West
1998).
251. It should be noted that one therapist defendant in Tarasoff in fact did warn the
campus police about his client's threats, but the campus police released the client after briefly
taking him into custody for questioning. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 341. The California Supreme
Court did not rule on the issue of whether the therapist's notification to the police satisfied
his duty of reasonable care under the circumstances, because the court was only deciding the
narrower issue of whether the pleadings stated a cause of action. See id. at 348 n.16. Since
the date of the Tarasoff decision, the California legislature has enacted a statute providing
that a psychotherapist's duty of care with respect to dangerous patients shall be discharged
by "communicat[ing) the threat to the victim or victims and to a law enforcement agency."
CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92(b) (West Supp. 2002) (emphasis added).
252. See id.
253. See George C. Harris, The Dangerous Patient Exception to the Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege: The Tarasoff Duty and the Jaffee Footnote, 74 WASH. L. REV. 33, 47-48 (1999).
254. PROPOSED FED. R. EvID. 504, 56 F.R.D. 183, 241 (1972).
255. 518 U.S. 1 (1995).
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patient or to others can be averted only by means of a disclosure by
the therapist."" 6
At least for the federal courts, the Jaffee footnote has left open the
question of whether there is a dangerous person exception to the
psychotherapist-patient testimonial privilege. The Tenth Circuit has
adopted such an exception, ruling that when a psychiatrist has a
duty to warn a third party of potential danger arising out of a
confidential communication, this communication loses its privileged
character, and the psychiatrist may later be required to testify in
court.257 The Sixth Circuit has rejected this approach, ruling that a
duty to protect this type of communication creates an exception
to the requirement of confidentiality, but not an exception to the
testimonial privilege. 258 Most states have left the intersection of the
duty of disclosure and the privilege unanswered.5 9 California and
several other states, however, have enacted a dangerous person
exception to their testimonial privilege that requires the psy-
chiatrist to testify about these conversations pertaining to future
dangerous activity in a later criminal or civil proceeding.2 0
256. Id. at 18 n.19.
257. United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 1998).
258. The court opined:
[W]e will first clarify a misperception held by Hayes, the government, and, to
some extent, the Tenth Circuit that the standard of care exercised by a treating
psychotherapist prior to complying with (or, for that matter, failing to comply
with) a state's "duty to protect" requirement is somehow pertinent to the
applicability of the psychotherapist/patient privilege in criminal proceedings. We
think there is little correlation between these two inquiries.
United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 583 (6th Cir. 2000).
259. See Harris, supra note 253, at 47-48.
260. See CAL. EViD. CODE § 1024 (West 1995); D.C. CODEANN. § 14-307(b)(1) (2001) (stating
that no testimonial privilege exists when the accused is charged with death or bodily injury
to another and disclosure is required "in the interests of public justice"); LA. CODE EVID. ANN.
arts. 510(B)(2Xe), 510(C)(2Xb) (West 1995) (stating that there is no privilege in criminal cases
when the conversation in question was intended to assist in crime or fraud); NEV. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 49.213 (Michie 2002) (offering an exception to the privilege "[i]f there is an immediate
threat that the patient will harm himself or other persons"); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 33-27-
123(aXiv) (Michie 2001) (stating that no privilege exists when the communication discloses
to a psychiatrist an immediate threat of physical violence toward an identifiable victim); see
also Menendez v. Superior Court, 834 P.2d 786,786-87 (Cal. 1992) (holding that a psychiatrist
who has a duty to warn of patient's threats loses the privilege to later refuse to disclose
audiotapes of counseling sessions in which threats were made in response to subpoena). The
Oregon Supreme Court has taken the opposite approach, and has held that Tarasoff
disclosures do not vitiate that state's statutory psychotherapist-patient privilege. State v.
Miller, 709 P.2d 225, 236-37 (Or. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986).
1678
2003] SHARING SACRED SECRETS 1679
B. Responsibilities of the Attorney
A lawyer confronted with the homicidal spouse scenario may also
reveal his client's confidences under the ethical rules applicable to
attorneys in most states. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6
provides the following exception to the duty of confidentiality: "A
lawyer may reveal [client confidences] to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary ... to prevent reasonably certain death
or substantial bodily harm."26 Under the Model Rules, a lawyer who
learns from his client that he may commit a serious crime of
violence towards another is allowed, but not required, to disclose
this confidence." 2 However, in ten states, the attorney has an
ethical obligation to reveal the confidence; these states phrase the
ethical obligation as mandatory ("shall" or "must") rather than as
261. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002). The predecessor to Rule 1.6,
Model Code DR 4-101, provided a broader exception to confidentiality, allowing an attorney
to reveal a client confidence involving "the intention of his client to commit a crime and the
information necessary to prevent the crime." PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS,
RULES AND STATUTES 580 (Dzienkowski ed., 2001).
262. When the Model Rules of Professional Conduct were enacted in 1983, the Commission
in charge of their drafting recommended that the "may" in former Model Code provision 4-101
be changed to the mandatory "shall." See Robert J. Kutak, The Law of Lawyering, 22
WASHBURN L.J. 413,426-27 (1983). There was substantial criticism of this proposal, however,
and the draft was changed to reflect the current permissive language of Model Rule 1.6(b).
Symposium, The Lawyer's Dilemma Over Model Rule 1.6 and Client Confidentiality-
Conflicting Duties to Clients and Society, 13 FORDHAM Us. L.J. 1, 7 (1984). The Model Rules,
where they apply, do not take a firm position on whether the lawyer "should" disclose the
dangerous intentions of his client, they simply state that he "may" do so. MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002). According to the comments, the lawyer "has professional
discretion to reveal information in order to prevent such consequences." Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 12.
Elsewhere in the comments, however, the ABA appears to weigh in on the side of
nondisclosure:
[To the extent a lawyer is required or permitted to disclose a client's purposes,
the client will be inhibited from revealing facts which would enable the lawyer
to counsel against a wrongful course of action. The public is better protected if
full and open communication by the client is encouraged than if it is inhibited.
Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 9 (emphasis added). Some commentators and state bar associations have
recognized that the permissive language of Rule 1.6 leaves a gap between what is morally
required and what is ethically required. DEL. BAR ASSWN PROF'L ETHICS COMM., OP. 1988-2,
digested in 5 A.B.AJB.N.A. LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 203 (1989)
(discussing propriety of lawyer disclosing fact that his client has AIDS). See generally Deborah
Abramovsky,A Case for Increased Disclosure, 13 FORDHAm UPB. L.J. 43,44-53 (1984) (arguing
that permissive disclosure under Rule 1.6 places unwarranted emphasis on client
confidentiality to the detriment of society).
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permissive ("may").2  In these states, the lawyer is required under
threat of suspension or disbarment to reveal the confidential
information in order to prevent the client from inflicting death or
serious bodily injury on an identifiable third person.2 "
Whether our hypothetical attorney reveals his client's homicidal
intent, the attorney may in certain circumstances also be compelled
to testify about the confidential communication in a later pro-
ceeding. Most states and the federal courts carve out an exception
to the attorney-client privilege if the lawyer's advice is sought in
order to obtain assistance with respect to future or ongoing criminal
activity, the so-called "crime-fraud" exception. a8 In circumstances
where a client is enlisting or engaging the attorney's help in
perpetrating a crime or fraud, such conversation is not privileged.
266
This exception is founded on the recognition that there simply is no
public interest in protecting the attorney-client relationship when
it is being exploited for an unlawful purpose.287
In the attorney-client context, mere disclosure of intent to commit
a future crime to an attorney, without more, does not destroy the
263. See ARiz. SUP. CT. R., 42 RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT E.R. R. 1.6(b) (1997); CONN. RULES
OF PROftL CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2002); FLA. ST. BAR R. 4-1.6(b) (1994); ILL. SUP. CT. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2002); NEv. SUP. CT. R. 156(2) (2002); N.J. RULES OF PROFL
CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (1) (2002); N.D. RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2002); TEX. RULES OF
PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.05 (2002); VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002); Wis. SUP. CT.
R. 20:1.6 (2001); cf. N.M. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 16-106(B) (2002) (contending that an
attorney "should* reveal his client's intention to commit a crime involving serious bodily
harm). See generally Davalene Cooper, The Ethical Rules Lack Ethics: Tort Liability When a
Lawyer Fails to Warn a Third Party of a Client's Threat to Cause Serious Physical Harm or
Death, 36 IDAHO L. REv. 479, 481 n.4 (2000) (stating the Model Code and Model Rules do not
require that a lawyer issue a warning if his or her client threatens to kill or injure a third
party).
264. See Cooper, supra note 263, at 479.
265. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933); see J. Michael Callan & Harris David,
Professional Responsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client Misconduct
in an Adversary System, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 332, 342 (1976).
266. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562-63 (1989); see also PROPOSED FED. R. EViD.
503(d)(1), 56 F.R.D. 183, 236 (1973) (not enacted) ("There is no privilege under this rule.... If
the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan
to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud.").
267. "The [attorney-client] privilege is intended to encourage'full and frank communication
between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the
observance of law and the administration ofjustice.'" Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524
U.S. 399, 403 (1998) (quoting Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)). If the client
is using the lawyer's services to engage in a crime or fraud, the utilitarian justification for the
privilege fails. Id.
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privilege.26' For example, when a defendant in an eviction pro-
ceeding confided to his lawyer that he intended to blow up his
apartment building, a Massachusetts court held in Purcell v.
District Attorney for the Suffolk District that the statement was not
subject to the crime-fraud exception because the client was not
engaging the lawyer's help in the criminal enterprise, or seeking
legal advise in order to obtain assistance in perpetrating the
crime."" Even though the attorney in Purcell was justified in
breaking client confidences and warning the intended victims, he
could not later be subpoenaed to testify against his former client in
a grand jury proceeding arising out of the criminal act °.27 The crime-
fraud exception to the testimonial privilege is thus both narrower
and broader than the exception to the lawyer's ethical duty of
confidentiality. It is narrower because it excepts only communi-
cations "in furtherance" of the lawyer's assistance with the crime or
fraud.271 It is broader because a lawyer's assistance or intended
assistance in any crime or fraud will result in a piercing of the
privilege, not just crimes involving death or substantial bodily
injury.27s
Returning to our homicidal spouse example, the client's disclosure
to his lawyer would generally remain privileged, and the attorney
could refuse to testify against his client even after revealing the
client's murderous scheme pursuant to Model Rule 1.6, unless the
legal advice was sought or used in furtherance of the intended
crime. Courts are increasingly expanding the scope of the crime-
fraud exception,2 7 ' however, and have found assistance by the
lawyer in an illegal act even where none was expressly requested by
268. See, e.g., Purcell v. Dist. Attorney, 676 N.E.2d 436, 441 (Mass. 1997) ("A statement of
an intention to commit a crime made in the course of seeking legal advice is protected by the
privilege, unless the crime-fraud exception applies. That exception applies only if the client
or prospective client seeks advice or assistance in furtherance of criminal conduct.").
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 440-41.
272. RICE, supra note 110, § 8.11, at 84.
273. David J. Fried, Too High a Price for Truth: The Exception to the Attorney-Client
Privilege for Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C. L. REV. 443, 479 (1986) (arguing that
courts have interpreted the 'in furtherance" requirement of the crime-fraud release very
loosely, and have simply inferred that the client's purpose in obtaining the legal advice was
unlawful from the fact that a consultation on the same subject was followed by the crime).
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the client or contemplated by the attorney.27' If the party seeking
the evidence could make any prima facie showing275 that the client
approached the lawyer with the intent to utilize his services to
assist in planning or implementing the crime, or, regardless of
the client's purpose at the time of the visit, actually used the
lawyer's advice in some fashion to assist with the illegal plan, then
courts have been willing to pierce the testimonial privilege for
reasons of public policy. The intent of the lawyer is irrelevant; the
determinative factors are the intent of the client in seeking the
legal advice, or the actual use to which the advice is put.2 76 In
our scenario, then, if there was some foundation in fact for a
conclusion that the homicidal spouse used any of the advice or
recommendations provided by the attorney in pursuit of his un-
lawful plan, by transferring assets, for example, or arranging for
child custody, then the conversation would lose its privileged
character.
May the attorney in our hypothetical situation be subject to civil
liability in tort if he fails to warn the victim-spouse? Thus far, there
274. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032, 1041 (2d Cir. 1984)
(finding that the government made prima facie showing that sale of company was a
fraudulent conveyance and concluding that law firm's records recounting legal advice
precipitating such sale could be subpoenaed by grand jury); Henderson v. State, 962 S.W.2d
544, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 978 (1988) (holding that the privilege
did not protect subpoena of maps that an alleged kidnapper had delivered to her attorney
because secretion of evidence was determined to be continuing crime); see also In re Grand
Jury, 845 F.2d 896, 898 n.5 (11th Cir. 1988) ('[Tlhe requirement that legal advice must be
related to the client's criminal or fraudulent conduct should not be interpreted restrictively.")
(quoting In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 1987)).
275. Application of the crime-fraud release doctrine presents difficult questions concerning
the degree of proof necessary to make out the exception to the attorney-client privilege. There
has been widespread "disagreement and confusion" regarding what constitutes a prima facie
case, and whether such a prima facie case dispels the privilege, or merely shifts the burden
back to the claimant to prove that he had no intent to use the legal advice in furtherance of
a crime or fraud. RICE, supra note 110, § 8.6, at 38-63. Those complex issues are beyond the
scope of this Article.
276. Judith A. McMorrow & Daniel R. Coquillette, The Federal Law of Attorney Conduct,
in MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 811.06[21 [c) (3d ed. 2001). The Restatement (Third) of the
Law Governing Lawyers § 82 (1969) provides that a confidential attorney-client
communication is not privileged when the client:
(a) consults a lawyer for the purpose, later accomplished, of obtaining assistance
to engage in a crime or fraud or aiding a third person to do so, or (b) regardless
of the client's purpose at the time of consultation, uses the lawyer's advice or
other services to engage in or assist a crime or fraud.
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have been no reported cases in which the court has extended the
Tarasoff duty to lawyers.277 In fact, those few courts that have
addressed the issue have concluded that lawyers have no common
law duty to warn third parties of their client's dangerous in-
tentions. s78 There are several explanations advanced for this
result.279 First, attorneys are trained to solve legal problems, they
are not trained to predict dangerousness.2" Psychological assess-
ment of a client and the realistic probability of violent behavior is
not ordinarily a part of most attorneys' skill sets. Second, attorneys
are less-well equipped than therapists to control dangerous clients,
such as by prescribing medication or institutional commitment.2 1
Finally, an attorney has a unique role as a "zealous advocate"1 2 for
his client; extending duties to third parties would be contrary to the
client-centered model of our adversarial system.283
C. Responsibilities of the Clergy
The clergy member faced with our homicidal spouse scenario has
much more discretion, and much less guidance from legal norms and
277. Cooper, supra note 263, at 481.
278. See Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1339 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (noting
that under Florida law communications protected by the attorney-client privilege cannot give
rise to a duty to warn); Hawkins v. King County, 602 P.2d 361 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (refusing
to extend Tarasoff to tort action brought by guardians of criminal defendant against his
attorney for failure to warn of client's violent and suicidal tendencies following release on bail
and attack on mother; recognizing common law arguments in favor of applying duty to warn
to attorneys, but refusing to apply Tarasoff in this case because victim-mother already knew
about violent tendencies, and because the lawyer had heard about danger from mother and
not based on secrets learned from client).
279. Third party liability for lawyers, at least in the context of litigation, remains "virtually
unheard ofr because of the adversarial process and the need for zealous representation.
Cooper, supra note 263, at 486 (quoting Forest J. Bowman, Lawyer Liability to Non-Clients,
97 DICK. L. REv. 267, 273 (1993)).
280. Marc L. Sands, The Attorney's Affirmative Duty to Warn Foreseeable Victims of a
Client's Intended Violent Assault, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 355, 362-63 (1986).
281. Id. at 362.
282. See MODEL CODE OF PROF' RESPONSIBLITY EC 7-1 (1983).
283. Although it could certainly be argued that differing treatment between psychiatrists
and attorneys in terms of their responsibilities for dangerous clients reflects nothing more
than self-protection by lawyers/lawmakers, it is true that attorneys may have a continuing
role to play within the legal system with respect to a dangerous client whether he discloses
the dangerous intentions, and that forced disclosure might drive a wedge between the
attorney and any client whom he continues to represent.
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standards of professional conduct, in determining an appropriate
course of action. First, there are no universal standards of ethics
that govern clergy conduct."' Attorneys, physicians, and psy-
chiatrists derive their authority to practice from the state, which
conditions the issuance of a license on the completion of formalized
education, certification, and training. Regulations governing these
professions prohibit the disclosure of certain confidences, and allow
or require the disclosure of others. "In contrast, clerics are free to
engage in religious activities without the State's permission, they
are not subject to State-dictated educational prerequisites and,
significantly, no comprehensive statutory scheme regulates the
clergy-congregant ... relationship."" Although individual religious
groups and pastoral associations have enacted statements of best
ethical practice for particular ministries,2"6 clergy members in
284. See GULA, supra note 32, at 3; see also Lightman v. Flaum, 761 N.E.2d 1027, 1032
(N.Y. 2001).
285. Lightman, 761 N.E.2d at 1032. InLightman, the New York Court of Appeals reversed
a trial court order denying summary judgment in a case where the plaintiff sued two of her
former rabbis alleging breach of fiduciary duty by their disclosure in a divorce proceeding of
confidential communications between herself and the rabbis. Id. at 1028-29. The plaintiff
argued that these confidential communications were privileged underNew York Civil Practice
Law and Rules § 4505, and that their disclosure without her consent was an actionable tort.
Id. at 1029. The court rejected the argument that rules of evidence can establish an actionable
fiduciary duty of confidentiality, distinguishing attorneys and psychiatrists, who have ethical
codes independent of the rules of privilege, from clerics, who do not. Id. at 1032.
286. See supra notes 72,83. The American Association of Pastoral Counselors provides the
following instructions regarding confidentiality of counseling sessions: "We do not disclose
client confidences to anyone, except: as mandated by law; to prevent a clear and immediate
danger to someone; in the course of a civil, criminal or disciplinary action arising from the
counseling where the pastoral counselor is a defendant; ... or by previously obtained written
permission." AM. ASS' OF PASTORAL COUNSELORS CODE OF ETHICs Principle (IVXD) (1994),
available at http://www.aapc.org/ethics.htm (emphasis added). The College of Chaplains Code
of Ethics requires that the seal of the confessional be broken when "greater health for
individuals can be achieved by such revelation." Yellin, supra note 13, at 146 (citing COLL. OF
CHAPLAINS CODE OF ETHICS (1976)) (emphasis added). Bylaws of the Lutheran Church state
that a minister may divulge a confidential disclosure made to him 'in order to prevent the
commission of a crime." TEMANN & BUSH, supra note 7, at 60 (quoting Minutes of the Twenty-
Second Biennial Convention of The United Lutheran Church of America (1960) (emphasis
added)). Jewish law suggests that "ifanother human being is in imminent harm," the need for
disclosure outweighs the requirement of confidentiality. Moskowitz & DeBoer, supra note 200,
at 21 (1999) (citing MICHAEL J. BROYDE, THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE AND JEWISH LAW: HALAKHIC
PERSPECTIVES ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION 25-29 (1996)) (emphasis added). Even in the
conservative Jewish tradition, the prohibition of talebearing is not absolute; rabbis who know
about an abusive situation are required "to report it to the civil authorities so that it might
end." Id. at 20 (quoting ELLIOT DORFF, FAMILY VIOLENCE 28 (1995)).
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general are not required to adhere to uniform rules of practice that
guide or curtail their discretion in addressing this difficult issue." 7
Moreover, courts have declined to impose tort liability on clergy
members for failure to warn a third party of a parishioner's dan-
gerous intentions. Twelve years after its decision in Tarasoff, the
California Supreme Court in Nally v. Grace Community Church of
the Valley2 . declined to extend the duty to warn/protect to a
pastoral counselor who had failed to take steps to prevent the
suicide of a college student who attended his church.289 The court
distinguished nontherapists from mental health professionals,
concluding that the lack of a supervised medical relationship
precluded application of a Tarasoff duty to the clergy.2" Pragmatic
concerns over and above the minister's inability to predict and
control behavior contributed to this decision: The court felt that it
would "be impractical, and quite possibly unconstitutional, to
impose a duty of care on pastoral counselors," in light of the
diversity of religious practices in the United States.29' Courts
outside of California that have addressed the issue have similarly
declined to extend Tarasoff to clergy members.292
Finally, there is no recognized exception to the evidentiary
privilege that would require a clergy member to testify against his
parishioner in our "homicidal spouse" example. Whereas the Jaffee
footnote suggests that an exception to the testimonial privilege for
dangerous persons may be imposed on psychotherapists, and the
crime-fraud exception may operate to dispel any protection for the
lawyer, no similar doctrine would operate to require a clergy
member to testify about his confidential communications with a
parishioner concerning a future dangerous crime. So long as the evil
287. TIEMANN & BUSH, supra note 7, at 171.
288. 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988).
289. Id. at 960.
290. Id. at 957. See Knapp & VandeCreek, supra note 105, for a discussion of lack of formal
counseling training provided to clergy.
291. Nally, 763 P.2d at 960.
292. See Neufang v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., No. 81-08118-CS (Fla. Cir. Ct. Apr. 29, 1981)
(concluding that the First Amendment compelled the conclusion that a minister owed no duty
to wife to disclose violent tendencies of husband learned about in counseling relationship),
cited in Sands, supra note 280, at 368 n.75; J.A.W. v. Roberts, 627 N.E.2d 802, 810 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1994) (noting that there is no duty in tort law imposed on clergy to report suspicions of
child abuse and that the status of clergy member, standing alone, does not give rise to a
"special relationship").
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plan was disclosed in a private spiritual counseling context, most
states would protect the conversation from compelled disclosure." 3
As discussed above, where the clergy-penitent privilege is held to
apply, it is generally thought to admit no exceptions, even on
obvious public policy grounds.29' Moreover, because in most states
the parishioner and not the clergy member holds the privilege,
295
even if the minister wished to testify he could not do so over the
parishioner's objection.
Few courts or commentators 29 have addressed the lack of a
"dangerous person" exception to the clergy-penitent privilege. The
Third Circuit, in reviewing the federal law of clergy-penitent
privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 501, flagged the issue by
noting: "The precise scope of the privilege and its additional facets,
such as whether a clergy-person should be required to disclose
confidential communications when harm to innocent parties is
threatened and imminent, are, therefore, most suitably left to case-
by-case evolution."2 7 The reluctance of courts and legislatures to
recognize an exception to the clergy-penitent privilege is perhaps
best understood as simple avoidance of a delicate and complex policy
issue. Nonetheless, it is both a curious and troubling omission in our
laws. Even the spousal communication privilege, perhaps the most
jealously guarded of all testimonial privileges,298 has been held to
admit an exception for conversations pertaining to joint future
crimes. 299
293. See discussion supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
294. See United States v. Isham, 48 M.J. 603, 606 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 1998); Kruglikov
v. Kruglikov, 217 N.Y.S.2d 845 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961).
295. See discussion supra note 109 and accompanying text.
296. See Yellin, supra note 13, at 147 (concluding 'lilt is difficult to reach a firm conclusion
on the limit of the clergy privilege," and that a "definitive answer [on this public safety issue]
must await further judicial pronouncement"). Without elaboration, Yellin suggested in a
model statute appended to his 1983 article that the clergy-penitent privilege should contain
an exception when the communication at issue "threatens harm to any person." Id. at 156; see
also Harris, supra note 253, at 60 n.116 ("Whether there is an exception to the clergy-
communicator privilege for prevention of harm, like the dangerous patient exception to the
therapist-patient privilege, remains undecided.").
297. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 385 (3d Cir. 1990).
298. Due to the strong public policy in favor of protecting marital harmony and providing
a safe haven with one's spouse for the discussion of personal affairs, exceptions to the spousal
communications privilege have been very slow to develop. See Note, The Future Crime or Tort
Exception to Communications Privileges, 77 HARV. L. REV. 730, 734 (1964).
299. There are two types of marital privilege: (1) a privilege that protects confidential
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VI. CLOSING THE GAP
When a parishioner reveals to a minister an intent to commit a
future violent crime, there is marginal social value in protecting
that conversation.'o In utilitarian terms, the injury caused to
communications between spouses, which applies to both civil and criminal cases; and (2) a
privilege against adverse spousal testimony, which is the right of one spouse to refuse to
testify against another spouse in a criminal proceeding. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S.
40, 52-53 (1979). The former applies only to private communications, and both parties must
waive the privilege where it is applicable before the substance of the communications may be
disclosed. The latter applies to testimony about facts perceived by the witness other than
through confidential communications, and may be waived by the testifying spouse.
One almost universally recognized exception to the spousal communication privilege is for
cases alleging a crime by one spouse against another or a crime against a child of the
marriage. Scorr N. STONE & ROBERT K TAYLOR, 2 TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 5.13, at 5-31
(2d ed. 1993). Until the latter half of the twentieth century, those were the only recognized
exceptions at common law and under the statutes existing in most states. However, many
federal circuits have recently begun to recognize an exception to the spousal communications
privilege for conversations pertaining to ongoing or future joint criminal activity, on the
grounds that such communications are contrary to public policy and therefore not worthy of
protection. United States v. Sims, 755 F.2d 1239, 1241 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Ammar, 714 F.2d 238,258 (3d Cir. 1983); United States v. Price, 577 F.2d 1356,1365 (9th Cir.
1978); United States v. Mendoza, 574 F.2d 1373, 1379-81 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Kahn, 471 F.2d 191, 194-95 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 415 U.S. 143 (1974).
Even when faced with a privilege statute cast in absolute terms, some state appellate
courts have also crafted a "future crimes" exception to their spousal privilege. See, e.g., In re
Heistandt, 708 S.W.2d 125, 126 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (stating that as a matter of public policy
the marital privilege should not apply to discussions in written communication related to
future crimes); People v. Watkins, 63 A.D.2d 1033, 1034 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (holding that
conversations between husband and wife pertaining to management of joint gambling
operation was not privileged). Federal circuits are split on the issue of whether this emerging
"joint or future crimes" exception applies to the privilege for adverse spousal testimony as well
as the privilege for spousal communications; that is, whether a spouse may validly refuse to
testify as to facts witnessed where the couple is engaged in joint criminal conduct. But see In
re Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 280 (3d Cir. 1980) (reversing order of contempt against wife who
refused to testify at husband's criminal trial about corporate records which she had access to
as corporate secretary on grounds of adverse spousal testimony privilege); United States v.
Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393, 1396-97 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1091 (1974)
(holding marital privilege for adverse spousal testimony does not apply if the testifying spouse
is either a victim or a participant in the crime).
300. See WIGMORE, supra note 17, § 2396, at 877. A utilitarian may argue that breaching
confidentiality or privilege in this situation will not save lives, it will simply chill the act of
disclosure, and thereby eliminate the possibility that a clergy person could counsel the errant
party to forego his intended unlawful conduct. The same argument was rejected by the
California Supreme Court in Tarasoffv. Regents of University of California, wherein the court
cited empirical studies casting doubt on the suggestion that rules piercing confidentiality
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society by shielding the conversation outweighs the harm to the
relationship occasioned by disclosure. The harm to the person
threatened is real and immediate. The likelihood of the parishioner
benefitting from spiritual counseling about his future violent
conduct is speculative.0 1 Concern for the preservation of human life
should outweigh concerns for maintaining confidentiality, because
the primacy of human life is paramount in the hierarchy of moral
values recognized by most individuals, and even most religious
faiths. 3 ' Even viewed from the perspective of the privacy rationale
for the privileges, there is no greater justification for shielding
a conversation with a priest pertaining to a future dangerous
conduct than in shielding the very same conversation with a
psychotherapist.
Fundamental decency and respect for human dignity suggest that
a clergy member faced with the difficult choice of respecting
confidentiality and protecting someone's bodily integrity should
choose the latter path. But the difficult question is, how should the
law influence this choice? One approach would be to do nothing.
Perhaps we should have confidence in the moral choices made by
our clergy. Most conscientious clergy members faced with a violent
parishioner undoubtedly would try to advise the person not to
engage in the criminal conduct, counsel him or her to seek medical
or legal intervention,3 3 and ask for permission to disclose the
deter violent persons from being candid in their therapy sessions. 551 P.2d 334,346 n.12 (Cal.
1976).
301. This is not to diminish the valuable role clergy may play in helping parishioners to
modify their conduct and turn away from sin. Even if a minister learns of a violent intention
from his parishioner, however, he may not be in an adequate position to prevent it because
the parishioner might be suffering from a severe mental illness or an addiction--diseases of
the body, and not of the soul. Simply put, the parishioner's spirit might be able and willing
to conform to moral and legal codes of conduct, but their mind and body might be weak.
Psychotherapists are in a better position than clergy to diagnose and treat violent tendencies
that stem from such conditions. If the public interest is best served by requiring
psychotherapists to disclose the criminal intentions of dangerous persons, the public safety
argument holds even greater weight for members of the clergy. Because the minister is less
competent to handle such dangerous tendencies, there is more, rather than less, need for
disclosure. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 920 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing
the amicus brief of the American Psychiatric Association estimating that psychiatrists are
only able to accurately predict future violence one-third of the time).
302. Roger C. Cramton & Lori P. Knowles, Professional Secrecy and Its Exceptions:
Spaulding v. Zimmerman Revisited, 83 MINN. L. REV. 63, 87 (1998).
303. One anomaly of the current state of the law is that a clergy member has no duty to
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conversation to others for the purposes of seeking help. If those
approaches were unavailing, many if not most of those clergy
members not constrained by sacred duties of confidentiality would
probably "do the right thing" and disclose their parishioner's violent
intentions, either to their intended victim or to the police. 3° So long
as this option of voluntary disclosure is available to clergy,05 why
should we not have confidence that their discretion will be exercised
appropriately?
One response to this argument is that recent history provides us
with examples of the clergy putting personal or institutional
interests ahead of the interests of innocent third parties, especially
if they believe that their failure to disclose might never become
public. The current crisis of child sexual abuse in the Roman
Catholic Church, and the apparent decision by some clergy members
to transfer known pedophiles to positions where they would have
further access to and responsibility over children, is one obvious
example of this phenomenon.
Assuming that the law should stake a position in this important
battle between confidentiality and public safety, the question
becomes where? Other professions have licensing systems, which
subject their members to mandatory compliance with common
ethical standards. States have been reluctant to engage in licensing
of clergy, however, due to the entanglement that would ensue
between church and state, and the obvious difficulty in establishing
eligibility and performance criteria without interfering with the free
exercise of religion.
warn about a parishioner's dangerous intentions, but if that same clergy member refers the
parishioner to a psychotherapist for medical help and the parishioner makes an identical
revelation in a clinical context, the psychotherapist would be under a legal duty to disclose.
304. See GULA, supra note 32, at 151-52 (proposing a model code of ethics for pastoral
ministers, and recommending disclosure of confidence "{wlhen it is necessary to avert a
serious threat of harm to another').
305. Lightman v. Flaum suggests that disclosure by clergy in violation of the testimonial
privilege is not an actionable breach of fiduciary duty. 761 N.E.2d 1027. 1031-32 (N.Y. 2001).
306. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Avoidance of scandal, or perceived connection
to scandal, seems to have been a dominant value in the decision making of some in the
Catholic Church. One possible positive outcome of the ongoing sexual abuse crisis in America
may be that church decision makers will be more sensitive in the future to the adverse effect
which failure to warn will have on public opinion.
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Were the state to require licensing of the clergy, it would, on the
one hand, have to establish criteria of eligibility which would
necessitate the state's involvement in doctrinal and theological
matters clearly forbidden by the [F]irst [A]mendment.... On the
other hand, licensing by the state, even without fixed eligibility
criteria, would have the state place its imprimatur on religion
and put it in the business of legitimizing anyone who claimed to
be a qualified clergyman.0 7
Even apart from First Amendment concerns, the wide disparity of
acceptable clergy counseling practices in America is generally
considered a sufficient reason to exempt clergy from professional
licensing requirements."°
Another option would be for the courts to recognize a clergy
member's common law duty in tort to warn third parties of their
parishioner's intended violent acts, similar to the duty imposed on
psychotherapists by the Tarasoff decision.0 9 The threat of civil
liability and large damage awards would then act as a check on
clergy decisions in this area. However, as discussed above, courts
have been reluctant to recognize a special relationship within the
meaning of the Restatement (Second) of Torts between a clergy
member and an ordinary parishioner,31 ° due to clerics' inability to
either predict or control dangerous behavior.11 Moreover, the
impracticability of crafting reasonable standards of care for the
clergy is a major obstacle to creating a common law duty in tort.3 12
307. Ben Zion Bergman, Is the Cloth Unraveling? A First Look at Clergy Malpractice, 9 SAN
FERN. V. L. REV. 47, 51 (1981) (citations omitted).
308. See Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of
Constitutional Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219, 232-34 (2000).
309. Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 344, 345-47 (Cal. 1976).
310. A clergy member's duty to warn/protect could be found where an employment
relationship exists between the clergy member and the penitent. Cf. Marquay v. Eno, 662
A.2d 272, 280 (N.H. 1995) (holding that school officials had a duty to act affirmatively to
prevent sexual misconduct by an employee against students that occurred outside of the scope
of his employment). It may also be found where a special relationship exists between the
clergy member and the third-party victim. See C.J.C. v. Corp. of the Catholic Bishop of
Yakima, 985 P.2d 262,276-78 (Wash. 1999) (en banc) (imposing on church an affirmative duty
to prevent foreseeable harm to children in its care).
311. Sands, supra note 280, at 368-69 (discussing possible extension of Tarasoff to
ministers, and concluding that "attempts to apply a Tarasoff-like duty to the clergy have so
far failed"); see Knapp & VandeCreek, supra note 105, at 298.
312. TIEMANN & BUSH, supra note 7, at 171.
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The duty owed to a third party victim, assuming that such a duty
was imposed, would be the duty to exercise "reasonable care" under
the circumstances. 13 The very fact that a reasonable clergyperson
standard would be difficult or impossible to define cautions against
fashioning a common law remedy in tort. 14 Courts and juries may
simply not be well enough equipped to ascertain the competence of
counseling when performed by persons affiliated with religious
organizations.
A third possibility would be to create a statutory duty to warn,
essentially legislating Tarasoff and extending the "mandated
reporting" statutes beyond their present application to past or
ongoing acts of child abuse,31 to include intended future violent
conduct. Such a statute could require clergy members to warn
authorities, the intended victim, or both of a parishioner's com-
municated intent to commit serious bodily injury, and either subject
a clergy member who violates this statutory requirement to a
criminal penalty, or to a private right of action by the victim. But
whether creating statutory disclosure obligations in this piecemeal
fashion is wise policy, it is unlikely to be politically viable. If a
clergy member should have a statutory duty to warn individuals
about future violent acts intended by a parishioner, why not a
bartender, a hairdresser, or the parishioner's best friend? Those
individuals might be just as likely to learn about an individual's
dangerous behavior, and equally or better suited to prevent it. 31 6 For
these and other reasons, Good Samaritan proposals generally have
not fared well in our federal or state legislatures.311 Imposing an
affirmative duty on strangers to help one another has always been
suspect in the American legal tradition because it is considered
313. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 345 ("[T]herapists need only exercise 'that reasonable degree of
skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of [that professional
specialty] under similar circumstances.) (alteration in original).
314. Sands, supra note 280, at 369.
315. See discussion supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
316. An individual who knows about the criminal plans of another and fails to prevent
them is not liable as an accomplice or accessory before the fact to the crime, absent evidence
that he shared the required mental state of the actor and either solicited the crime, or aided,
agreed to aid, or attempted to aid in its perpetration. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) (1962).
317. See Mosteller, supra note 29, at 277. Mosteller cites one failed legislative attempt in
1983 to require attorneys to report future crimes when the lawyer's professional services had
wittingly or unwittingly aided in the scheme. Id. at 277 n.212 (citing Lawyer's Duty of
Disclosure Act of 1983, S. Res. 485, 98th Cong., 129 CONG. REc. 2281 (1983)).
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inconsistent with our society's commitment to personal autonomy
and privacy.31 Only a handful of states have passed general "duty
to aid" statutes, imposing a misdemeanor penalty on any bystander
to an accident or person with knowledge of a crime in progress who
fails to render aid to the victim.31s
A fourth potential solution to the problem, and the one that I
propose, is for states to enact a dangerous person exception to
their clergy-penitent privilege statutes. This is both a modest and
an inelegant solution. It is modest because it is consistent with the
Supreme Court's admonition that testimonial privileges stand in
the way of the search for truth, and should be narrowly applied
wherever possible.32 ° It is also consistent with, if not directly
parallel to, similar exceptions already found in the psychotherapist-
patient and attorney-client privileges.32' The proposal is inelegant,
however, in the sense that it attempts to solve a problem of
confidentiality with an alteration to the laws of privilege. An
exception to the testimonial privilege will not require clergy to
warn, at most it will require clergy to testify about the confidential
communication if ever called upon to do so. What we care most
about-and what we are trying to promote-is a warning by clergy
to third party victims before a crime occurs, so that death or serious
bodily injury may be averted. Although society certainly has a
strong interest in detecting crime and punishing criminals, the
objective of preventing crime in the first instance is of a higher
318. Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A Rejoinder to Opponents of
Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 1-2 (1993).
319. See Shayna Rochester, What Would Seinfeld Have Done if He Lived in a Jewish State?
Comparing the Halakhic and Statutory Duties to Aid, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1185, 1200 (2001)
(citing "duty to aid" statutes in Minnesota, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin). In
addition, nine states have enacted "duty to report" statutes for violent crime outside the area
of child abuse or elder neglect; these jurisdictions typically apply their Good Samaritan
provisions only to completed or ongoing designated felonies that have been observed or
witnessed by the individual upon whom the legal duty evolves, not to inchoate or future
crimes. See Nancy Levit, The Kindness of Strangers: Interdisciplinary Foundations of a Duty
to Act, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 463, 466-67 (2001). Massachusetts, for example, has enacted a
statute that requires a citizen "at the scene of" a rape, murder, or armed robbery to report the
crime to authorities "to the extent that said person can do so without danger or peril to
himself or others." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 40 (West 1999).
320. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1979).
321. See discussion supra notes 257, 260, 265 and accompanying text; see also Jaffee v.
Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 n. 19 (1996) (protecting conversations between a psychotherapist and
her patient as privileged within the meaning of Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
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moral priority than the objective of punishing it after the fact. Due
to the lack of licensure and common law standards of reasonable
care for clergy, however, a solution of the duty to warn problem
within the doctrine of confidentiality is extremely unlikely. Perhaps
the best we can do is to tailor our laws of evidentiary privilege in
judicial proceedings to mirror what we think a clergy member's
obligations of confidentiality should be outside of the courtroom. 22
Though perhaps an imperfect solution,23 a privilege exception
would have two important benefits. First, it would send a strong
message to those clergy members conscientiously trying to do the
right thing that the law values human life over confidentiality,
and that there is no extant public policy to promote confidential
communications on the subject of future dangerous crimes.
Knowledge by a clergy member that the law will require him to
testify about the conversation if later called upon to do so, for
example, in a civil commitment or criminal proceeding, may be
sufficient to encourage him to reveal the information in time to
avoid the harm.2 4 Second, a dangerous person exception to the
322. Critics of my proposal may also argue that creating a privilege exception based on the
subject matter of the communication creates problems of judicial administration, because a
court will not be able to determine whether the privilege applies without examining the
contents of the conversation, thereby breaching confidentiality. But this same argument could
be leveled against the crime-fraud exception under the attorney-client privilege, and courts
nonetheless have been willing to conduct a limited in camera review in order to determine
whether the privilege attaches. See, e.g., United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 568-69 (1989).
Moreover, if my proposal operates as intended, it will encourage the clergy to reveal the
confidence in advance of litigation in order to prevent the harm. This revelation, by way of
notification to the police or the victim, would create a nonprivileged source of evidence that
the court could examine to determine whether the parishioner's initial conversation with the
clergy member is subject to the exception for conversations pertaining to future violent
crimes. See id. at 574-75.
323. Purists will not be satisfied with my approach, because an exception to the privilege
for future dangerous crimes is being suggested in order to solve a problem of confidentiality
that arguably should be dealt with through licensing or professional regulation. But the axiom
that "the perfect should not be the enemy of the good" seems apposite in this area. Courts and
legislatures may have done nothing about the problem of clergy confidentiality to date due to
the vast complexities of the issues involved. Competing tensions and strongly held views
about the underlying core values suggest that no single solution will be without some
limitations.
324. GULA, supra note 32, at 126 (arguing that because ministers have no codified rules of
ethics, they tend "to look for moral guidance in legal statutes"). It may be argued that clergy
will be less likely to reveal their parishioner's dangerous intentions if they perceive that such
a revelation will cause them to be subpoenaed to testify against their parishioner at a later
civil or criminal proceeding, and that creating an exception to the testimonial privilege will
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evidentiary privilege may alleviate concerns held by clergy members
that they could be sued if they voluntarily revealed their parish-
ioners' dangerous secrets,325 providing them with a defense to a
possible cause of action for malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty
arising out of their morally laudable decision to warn the victim, the
authorities, or both.326
One reason that courts and legislatures may have been reluctant
to create such an exception to the clergy-penitent privilege for
dangerous persons is that it raises the difficult and controversial
issue of what to do about sacramental confessions.327 Returning to
actually discourage warnings because it will expose the clergy member as a source of future
damaging testimony against his parishioner. Cf. Purcell v. Dist. Attorney, 676 N.E.2d 436,
441 (Mass. 1997) (permitting an attorney to disclose a client's contemplated dangerous act
without later being called upon to testify about the confidence revealed). I find this argument
unconvincing. It assumes that clergy members would rather avoid testifying than avoid a
potential murder or other violent act. Assuming that the clergy member has some modicum
of interest in his parishioner's welfare and the welfare of others, it seems that preventing the
parishioner's crime altogether will be a higher priority than avoiding testifying after the fact.
325. Because there are no uniform standards of conduct or state licensing requirements
applicable to clergy, there is no legal impediment, other than fear of tort liability, to prevent
most clergy members from voluntarily disclosing a parishioner's serious threat of violence
towards another. Cf 1983 CODE c.1388, § 1 (imposing penalty of excommunication for breach
of confidentiality in the priest-penitent relationship). Attorneys and psychotherapists, by
comparison, are required under threat of suspension, to retain their clients' confidences unless
an exception to the rule of confidence applies. See supra notes 238, 261 and accompanying
text.
326. Although the New York Court of Appeals has ruled that a clergy member's
unauthorized disclosure of otherwise privileged communications does not give rise to a
common law action for breach of fiduciary duty, Lightman v. Flaum, 761 N.E.2d 1027, 1031
(N.Y. 2001), there is disagreement among other jurisdictions as to whether similar tort actions
are sustainable, leaving clergy at risk that they could expose themselves to liability if they
warn the authorities or innocent third parties of their parishioner's stated intent to commit
a future violent crime. See Barnes v. Outlaw, 937 P.2d 323, 327 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996)
(recognizing cause of action against clergy for counselor malpractice for disclosure of
confidence in contravention of state privilege); Alexander v. Culp, 705 N.E.2d 378, 382 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1997) (recognizing cause of action against clergy in common law negligence for
disclosure of confidence in contravention of state privilege). Another tort theory possibly
applicable to this situation is invasion of privacy. This tort, however, generally requires proof
not only that the defendant intentionally disclosed facts of such a personal nature that it
would be highly offensive to the reasonable person, but also that these facts were of no
legitimate concern to the public. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (1965). This last
element of an invasion of privacy claim would be difficult to prove in a case where a clergy
member disclosed a parishioner's intent to commit a violent crime. See In re Viviano, 645 So.
2d 1301, 1307 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (holding action of psychiatrist in disclosing patient's threats
on judge's life reasonable under the circumstances).
327. As discussed supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text, the state of New Jersey has
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our "homicidal spouse" example, let us suppose that the parishioner
reveals his intent to murder his wife not in a private spiritual
counseling session, but in a confessional of a Roman Catholic
Church. Let us further suppose that this penitent confesses to a
priest and asks for absolution of past sins committed towards his
wife, say rage or infidelity, but also in the course of this confession
reveals both an irrepressible homicidal impulse towards his wife
and a plan to carry it out. In that situation, may the priest warn the
wife or the authorities about the danger, or does the seal of the
confessional protect the communication?
Canonists of the Roman Catholic Church have struggled with this
difficult issue. Because the priest cannot give absolution unless the
penitent is resolved to turn away from sin and make satisfaction,"
some canonists have recognized legitimate arguments in favor of not
applying the seal of the confessional to the revelation of an intent to
commit future sins. 29 Although not free from doubt, however, the
prevailing view among canonists in the Roman Catholic Church is
to the contrary.33 ° Canon law declares the seal of the confessional
come the closest to creating a dangerous person exception to the clergy-penitent privilege by
placing the privilege in the hands of the minister when the confidential communication
concerns "a future criminal act." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West Supp. 2002). Under the
New Jersey statute, a minister has the option of disclosing a communication that reveals an
intent to harm another. Although this is an improvement from the law in effect in most states
in which the penitent holds the privilege, it still does not serve the purpose of signaling to
ministers that they should disclose these conversations. On the critical issue of whether
concerns for public safety outweigh the parties' interests in confidentiality, this statute
remains completely neutral.
328. Under Canon law, the faithful may receive the remedy of the sacrament of penance
only if they are disposed toward "repudiating the sins they have committed and having the
purpose of amending their lives." See 1983 CODE c.987. Confession in the Catholic Church is
thus a sacrament of conversion, or "a call to a change of heart." LAWRENCE E. MICK, PENANCE:
THE ONCE AND FUTURE SACRAMENT 18 (1987). The sacrament of penance consists of three
actions by the penitent and absolution by the priest. The penitent's three acts are (1)
confession of sin; (2) contrition (or "sorrow") for sin; and (3) the intention to make reparation
(or "satisfaction"). PATRICK J. TWOHIG, A BRIEF CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 32
(2001).
329. Lynwood, perhaps the most famous English canonist, wrote in the Provincial of
Lynwood in 1679: "Others say that where the confession is one of a sin about to be committed
it is not a real confession, and that to the person making it, a penance cannot be given."
TIEMANN & BUSH, supra note 7, at 43.
330. Anthony Cardinal Bevilacqua argued that the obligation to protect the seal of the
confessional is absolute, and that this seal may not be broken even if the penitent consents
or if it is necessary to prevent a greater evil. Anthony Cardinal Bevilacqua, Confidentiality
Obligation of Clergy from the Perspective of Roman Catholic Priests, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1733,
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inviolable, and mandates that matters revealed attendant to a
confession may not be disclosed under any circumstances. 331 Thus,
in the Roman Catholic tradition, requiring clergy to reveal evidence
of their parishioner's intent to commit a future dangerous act may
require the clergy member to take action in direct contravention of
their sacred duties, and expose them to the penalty of automatic
excommunication.332
I propose that states concerned about the absolute nature of the
clergy-penitent privilege enact a "dangerous person" exception to
this privilege for conversations revealing the parishioner's intent to
commit a future dangerous crime, but that this exception be limited
to confidential communications occurring outside of the confes-
sional. When a parishioner reveals to a clergy member his intent to
commit a future dangerous crime in a sacramental setting such as
a confessional, the communication should still be privileged, but
1737 (1996). "[T]he secret [of the confessional] is more rigid than any other and never permits
the least exception." Id. at 1735-36 (quoting Emile Jombart, Le Secret, in 4 DICTIONAIRE DE
DROIT CANONIQUE 41 (Raoul Naz ed., 1957). "That which the priest learns in the confessional,
he knows uniquely as the representative of God, and not at all through human knowledge or
communication; he should completely detach himself from (such knowledge); it is as if he
knows nothing." Id. (quoting Jombart, supra). The catechism of the Catholic Church requires
that a priest "never reveal any sins he has heard in confession." REV. GERALD WILLLAMS, THE
CONTEMPORARY CATHOLIC CATECHISM 136 (1973). Because desiring and undertaking a plan
to murder one's wife is itself a sin, most priests would take the view that disclosure of this
secret outside of the confessional would violate the seal, irrespective of whether the penitent
had "perfected" his confession by resolving to make reparation and turn away from the
intended act. See HENRY DAVIS, S.J. MORAL AND PASTORAL THEOLOGY 317-18 (Z.W. Geddes,
S.J. ed., 8th ed. 1959) (arguing that even when a confession is interrupted before absolution
is conferred, or when the priest decides to deny or postpone absolution, the priest is still
forbidden to disclose the contents of what he heard in such an imperfect confession); see also
1983 CODE c.984, § 1, ("The confessor is wholly forbidden to use knowledge acquired in
confession to the detriment of the penitent, even when all danger of disclosure is excluded.")
(emphasis added).
331. Canon 983 provides: "The sacramental seal is inviolable. Accordingly, it is absolutely
wrong for a confessor in any way to betray the penitent, for any reason whatsoever, whether
by word or in any other fashion." 1983 CODE c.983, § 1. The commentary to Canon 983
supports an absolute construction of the seal of the confessional:
Neither the Canon nor earlier interpretations admit exceptions to the norm: this
is the meaning of the expression In any way ... by word or in any other manner
or for any reason.' No distinction is made among the matters confessed, whether
the sinful act itself or attendant circumstances, or the acts of satisfaction of
penances imposed, etc. The secrecy concerning the penitent and his or her
confession of sins that is to be maintained is properly described as total.
Id. (emphasis added).
332. See id. c.1388, § c.1.
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only at the option of the clergy member."3 ' Catholic, Greek
Orthodox, and Lutheran ministers would have the option tb reveal
a parishioner's intent to commit future harm learned in a con-
fessional setting, but would have no obligation to do so if, after
consultation with their superiors, they believed their sacred duty
of secrecy outweighed their ethical duty to warn. A model clergy-
penitent privilege statute reflecting this proposed exception would
look something like the following:
A. Definitions. As used in this rule:
1. A "clergy member" is a minister, priest, rabbi, or other
similar functionary of a religious organization, or a person
reasonably believed to be so by the individual consulting
him.
2. A "confidential communication" is any communication,
written or oral, made privately by an individual to a clergy
member for the purposes of spiritual advice or counseling,
and not intended for further disclosure except to other
persons present in furtherance of the purpose of the
communication.
3. A "penitential communication" is any confidential
communication between an individual and a clergy
member made pursuant to the recognized sacraments of
the church for the purposes of spiritual absolution or
forgiveness, provided that the clergy member is authorized
under Canon law or church doctrine to hear such
communication and has a sacred duty under Canon law or
church doctrine to keep it secret.
B. General Rule of Privilege:
An individual has a privilege to refuse to disclose and
to prevent another from disclosing a confidential
333. My proposal borrows one positive feature of the New Jersey statute, discussed supra
notes 122-24 and accompanying text, by providing that for conversations pertaining to future
dangerous crimes that occur under the seal of the confessional, the privilege should rest with
the clergy member rather than with the parishioner. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West
Supp. 2002). If the priest feels morally bound to disclose such a communication, even ifit is
in violation of Canon law, he may do so. The choice should be his, since the consequence in
terms of religious penalty (excommunication) will inure to him and not to the parishioner.
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communication made by the individual to a clergy member
in his professional character as a spiritual advisor.
C. Who May Claim the Privilege:
Except as provided in subparagraph (D), the privilege
under this rule may be claimed by the individual or the
individual's guardian or conservator, or by the individual's
personal representative if the individual is deceased. The
clergy member who heard or received the confidential
communication is presumed to have authority to claim the
privilege on behalf of the individual in the absence of
evidence to the contrary.
D. Exception:
There is no privilege under this statute for confidential
communications other than penitential communications
if the communication provides the clergy member with
reasonable cause to believe that the individual com-
municating with him intends to commit a future criminal
act causing death or serious bodily injury to a reasonably
identifiable third person. Penitential communications
revealing the penitent's intent to commit a future criminal
act involving death or serious bodily injury to a reasonably
identifiable third person shall be privileged, but this
privilege shall be held by the clergy member, and may be
waived by the clergy member without the consent of the
individual.3"'
Pursuant to such a model statute, most private conversations
with a clergy member which give the clergy member reasonable
cause to believe that the confider intends to commit a serious violent
crime in the future would not be privileged. For example, if a
parishioner revealed to his minister continuing acts of child sexual
abuse against a family member, or an intent to plant a bomb at his
former place of employment, these conversations--even if made in
private and for the purposes of spiritual guidance-would no longer
be shielded from disclosure. The minister could reveal these
conversations to authorities or the intended victim without fear of
334. Other than the exception, this model statute tracks the UNIF. RULES OF EvID. 505,
NATt CONFERENCE OF COlod'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS (Aug. 1974).
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suit or censure, and authorities could thereafter subpoena the
minister to testify about the conversations in a subsequent legal
proceeding.
There are compelling policy reasons, however, for excluding
sacramental confessions from this newly created "dangerous person"
exception to the privilege, and for making those communications
privileged at the option of the clergy member. First, as discussed
below, clergy who practice sacramental confessions would have at
least a colorable argument that if they were compelled to reveal
confidential communications occurring in a confessional, their
freedom to practice their religion would be impeded."s8 It is certainly
appropriate to be sensitive to possible constitutional challenges in
drafting privilege statutes or interpreting common law doctrine, so
as to avoid problems whenever possible."' Moreover, because many
Catholic priests would view their sacred obligations under Canon
law to be paramount to their obligations under civil law, compelling
them to testify about conversations pertaining to "future crimes"
might be ineffective because they may choose to be held in contempt
rather than violate the seal of the confessional. The specter of a
priest being jailed for contempt for refusing to answer questions
about what occurred in a confessional is extremely unappealing, and
likely to undermine faith in the government. A priest who refuses
to testify because he is following a sacred obligation and adhering
to the dictates of a perceived higher moral authority could well be
viewed as a martyr rather than as an unsympathetic contemnor of
our justice system.
335. Robert L. Stoyles, The Dilemma of the Constitutionality of the Priest-Penitent
Privilege-The Application of the Religion Clauses, 29 U. Prrr. L. REv. 27,51 (1967). A Catholic
priest, unlike most other clergy, would face denunciation and excommunication if he were to
violate the seal of the confessional, stripping him of his religious functions and making him
incapable of continued membership in the Church. It is worth noting that the first case in
America to recognize the priest-penitent privilege was People v. Phillips, and in that case, the
court concluded that "free exercise" protections found in the state constitution prohibited the
government from compelling a Catholic priest to answer questions about facts learned in a
confessional setting. See People v. Phillips, 1 W.L.J. 109 (1843); see also supra notes 53-54 and
accompanying text.
336. See, e.g., Scott v. Hammock, 133 F.R.D. 610,615-17 (D. Utah 1990) (favoring a broad
reading of state privilege statute); Cook v. Carroll, 1945 I.R. 515, 515-19 (Ire.) (deciding to
depart from English common law and recognize privilege, due to Ireland's constitutional
"special recognition" of Catholic faith and the "indefeasible right of the Irish people to develop
its life in accordance with its own genius and traditions.).
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VII. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
My proposal distinguishes among religions, offering an exception
to the privilege for certain communications pertaining to future
crimes, and a privilege in the hands of the clergy for others,
depending on the particular religious discipline and the context of
the communication. Due to this distinction, it will be criticized on
the grounds that it burdens the religious practices of some, and
favors the practices of others.
At the outset, it should be noted that the form of distinction
I propose is not altogether unique. At least three states have
structured their exception to their child abuse reporting require-
ments in a way that distinguishes among the type of confidential
spiritual counseling sessions at issue." In those three states, many
confidential spiritual counseling sessions are not protected from
mandated disclosure if they give rise to suspicions of child abuse,
even though they would otherwise be subject to the testimonial
privilege. These states essentially have recognized that the testi-
monial privilege has grown beyond its constitutional underpinnings,
and have cut it back in the interests of public policy for certain
forms of required reports, limiting it to a much narrower class of
spiritual confidences.338 Only those clergy who have a colorable
claim that their freedom of religious worship would be impeded by
the reporting requirement are excused from the duty to do so.
Creating a dangerous person exception that distinguishes between
sacred and nonsacred communications would operate in much the
same manner.
337. In Delaware, Louisiana, and Maryland, for example, the testimonial privilege is broad,
and protects confidential communications for the purposes of spiritual advice or counseling
in a manner consistent with Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 506. See DEL. R. EviD. 505;
LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 511 (West 1995); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-111 (2002).
The exception to the child abuse reporting requirement, however, is much narrower,
mandating a report unless the clergy member learns about this child abuse in the course of
a "sacramental confession," DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 909 (Supp. 2000); "confession or other
sacred communication," LA. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 603 (West 1995); or from a communication
"in the course of discipline enjoined by the church," where the clergy member is doctrinally
bound to maintain secrecy, MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-705 (Supp. 2002). No reported cases
in these jurisdictions have addressed a challenge to the states' mandated reporting statutes
on Establishment Clause grounds.
338. See supra note 337.
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The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof."3 39 The United States Supreme Court has held
that the Fourteenth Amendment embraces both the Free
Exercise Clause 4' and the Establishment Clause, 41 making them
applicable to the states. The religion clauses demand a cautious
balance between tolerating religious belief on the one hand, and not
promoting religion on the other.342 The difficult challenge in First
Amendment jurisprudence is to find a neutral course between the
two religion clauses, "both of which are cast in absolute terms, and
either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash
with the other.3 43 If the government refuses to recognize the
practices of religious organizations for fear of violating the
Establishment Clause, it may impinge on a citizen's free exercise,
and if it takes action to accommodate religious belief, it may be seen
as promoting religion. Taken together, however, the religion clauses
require at a minimum that the government not establish an official
church, and that the government be neutral in its treatment of
religions, not preferring or burdening one sect to the advantage or
disadvantage of another. Through this lens, I will analyze the
proposed dangerous person exception to determine whether it is
likely to survive a constitutional challenge.
A. The Free Exercise Clause
The Free Exercise Clause prohibits the enactment of laws that
suppress religious belief or practice. 34 The central tenet of the Free
Exercise Clause, as envisioned by the Founders, is that "the
citizenry [should] be free from governmental pressure as to how
they worship."34 15 It thus imposes at least two distinct but related
restraints on governmental power: (1) the government may not
compel its citizens to attend any particular place of worship, or
339. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
340. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
341. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
342. Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
343. Id. at 668-69.
344. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 523 (1993).
345. Nicholas Wolterstorff, A Religious Argument for the Civil Right to Freedom of
Religious Exercise, Drawn from American History, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 535, 543 (2001).
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maintain any particular ministry against their free will; and (2)
the government may not deprive any persons of the benefits
of citizenship on account of their preferred religious belief or
nonbelief.3"
The First Amendment "embraces two concepts, freedom to believe
and freedom to act."347 Whereas the freedom to believe is absolute
and never subject to regulation, the government may in certain
circumstances curtail the freedom to act.3  Laws that either directly
or indirectly burden religiously motivated conduct implicate First
Amendment concerns.349
For approximately twenty-seven years, the Supreme Court
extended the highest level of constitutional protection to laws that
burdened religiously motivated conduct.3' The Court applied a
strict scrutiny analysis to laws that were facially neutral but which
otherwise imposed a "substantial burden" on religious practices, and
struck down those laws unless the government could show that it
had a compelling interest in enacting the law, and that the means
chosen for achieving that interest were narrowly tailored to meet
the permissible objective.35" ' In the 1990 case of Department of
Human Resources v. Smith, 2 however, the Supreme Court lowered
the standard of scrutiny applied to most free exercise challenges,
ruling that in the absence of a constitutional claim in addition to the
free exercise of religion, the government may apply "neutral" and
"generally applicable" laws that burden or suppress religious
practices without running afoul of the First Amendment.353 "[11f
prohibiting the exercise of religion ... is not the object of the [law]
but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and
346. Id. at 539.
347. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940)).
348. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 168 (1879) (upholding polygamy
convictions).
349. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
350. Id. at 404-05.
351. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972) (striking down compulsory
school attendance law as applied to Amish children beyond eighth grade).
352. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
353. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
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otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been
offended."354
Under the Supreme Court's current free exercise analysis, if a law
is neutral and of general applicability, it need not be justified by a
compelling governmental interest even if the law incidentally
burdens a particular religious practice.35 A law failing to meet
either of these two prerequisites, neutrality and general appli-
cability, or a law that implicates constitutional protections in
addition to those afforded by the religion clauses, will receive strict
scrutiny.3 6
One important implication of Smith is that a state no longer
needs a compelling interest in order to refuse to enact a religious
exemption to an otherwise neutral and generally applicable law."
This reasoning suggests that it may be constitutional to eliminate
the clergy-penitent privilege altogether. Our justice system requires
that all persons summoned to testify must give the finder of fact
information in their possession bearing on the charge; privileges
are limited, providing only narrow exceptions to this general
requirement." s If the state is not required to enact an exception to
the criminal laws for the sacramental use of peyote,59 perhaps it
is also not required to recognize an exception in its evidentiary
rules for confidential communications with the clergy. Whereas
the clergy-penitent privilege clearly is rooted in religious toler-
ance, 360 several commentators have suggested that it may not be
354. Id. at 878.
355. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,,508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993).
356. Id.; see also Smith, 494 U.S at 881 (discussing "hybrid" claims).
357. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 ('Even if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life
beyond the unemployment compensation field, we would not apply it to require exemptions
froma generally applicable criminal law."); see also CityofBoernev. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,536
(1997) (holding Religious Freedom Restoration Act unconstitutional as applied to states); cf.
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (discussed infra notes 425-32 and
accompanying text).
358. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 674 (1972).
359. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884-85.
360. "Realistically, the statutory privilege must be recognized as basically an explicit
accommodation by the secular state to strongly held religious tenets of a large segment of its
citizenry." In re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d 557, 565 (Cal. 1970) (holding that in habeas corpus
proceeding brought by psychotherapist challenging order to produce evidence about prior
treatment of patient-litigant, broad statutory privilege for clergyman and limited privilege for
psychotherapist did not deny psychotherapist equal protection of laws where accommodation
of religion was legitimate state interest).
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constitutionally required.36' And although the Supreme Court has
never directly considered the constitutionality of the clergy-penitent
privilege, it has stated in dicta that the only testimonial privilege
for unofficial witnesses that is constitutionally based is the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 62 Even allowing
for the Supreme Court's sometimes inscrutable First Amendment
jurisprudence, if eliminating the clergy-penitent privilege entirely
would not violate the Free Exercise Clause, it is difficult to discern
how retaining the privilege curtailed only by a limited "future
harms" exception could be construed to offend the same consti-
tutional protection.363
361. Stoyles, supra note 335, at 51-52; Yellin, supra note 13, at 112. Mary Mitchell, in her
groundbreaking 1987 work on child abuse, explored the First Amendment issues raised by
designating clergy as mandated reporters and concluded that although there were strong
arguments in favor of exempting privileged conversations, "[c] ase law provides little support
for a free exercise grounding for the clergy privilege." Mitchell, supra note 47, at 796; see also
W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring).
The right of freedom of thought and of religion as guaranteed by the
Constitution against State action includes both the right to speak freely and the
right to refrain from speaking at all except in so far as essential operations of
government may require it for the preservation of an orderly society, - as in the
case of compulsion to give evidence in court.
Id. (Murphy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
362. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 689-90; see also In re Williams, 152 S.E.2d 317, 324-25 (N.C.
1967) (holding that a Baptist minister had no right to refuse to disclose contents of spiritual
counseling sessions with parishioner where parishioner had waived privilege under state
statute and finding that the Free Exercise Clause did not provide clergy member with
independent grounds for refusing to testify); cf. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976)
(holding that the Fifth Amendment does not bar enforcement of subpoena to attorney seeking
taxpayer's records, where "testimony" in drafting papers preceded any governmental
compulsion). Some commentators have suggested that the attorney-client privilege may be
grounded in the "right to counsel" provision of the Sixth Amendment, at least in those
circumstances where the government seeks to compel the attorney to produce evidence of
communications made by a defendant to the attorney in order to aid the attorney in the
preparation of the client's defense on pending criminal charges. See, e.g., Mosteller, supra note
29, at 270-72 nn.201-05.
363. The Supreme Court recognized in Smith, citing the unemployment cases, "that where
the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend [these
exemptionsl to cases of'religious hardship' without [a) compelling reason." Smith, 494 U.S.
at 884 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)). As argued supra, however, the states
do not have in place a testimonial privilege for conversations relating to future dangerous
conduct; on the contrary, most if not all citizens are required to testify about such confidential
communications if called upon to do so, and even the privileges for psychotherapists and
attorneys are curtailed as to communications on these subjects. See supra Part V.
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Moreover, a dangerous person exception would not substantially
burden the religious practices of the faithful. Even under the public
benefits cases predating Smith, "substantial" interference is viewed
as a precondition to the invocation of First Amendment protection
where the law regulates conduct and not belief."6 4 The Supreme
Court has made it abundantly clear that no one is shielded entirely
from every aspect of regulation that impinges in any way on their
right to practice religion, however remote or incidental this burden
may be. 65 Nothing in the proposed dangerous person exception to
the clergy-penitent privilege coerces or impedes any particular
belief. Under the proposed exception, religious persons may still
worship in the churches of their choice, visit the spiritual counselors
of their choice, and disclose to those spiritual counselors the
confidences of their choice. They are free to worship as they see fit
or not to worship at all. The only "benefit" that is withdrawn by the
exception is the benefit of talking to a clergy member about future
violent conduct without fear that this statement will later be used
in a court of law. It strains credulity to believe that a dangerous
person exception to the privilege would chill the free exercise of
religion by causing practitioners to modify their religious beliefs,3
or to cease engaging in spiritual counseling.36 7 It may cause the
364. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-19
(1981) (withholding unemployment benefits from Jehovah's Witness who quit job at munitions
plant for religious reasons put "substantial pressure" on adherent to modify religious belief);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-06 (1963) (withholding unemployment benefits from
person who refuses to take job that would require her to work on Saturdays constitutes a
substantial infringement of First Amendment rights).
365. "[Elvery person cannot be shielded from all the burdens incident to exercising every
aspect of the right to practice religious beliefs." United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982)
(holding that the imposition of social security tax on Amish employer did not violate Free
Exercise Clause).
366. Under my proposal, neither the Catholic nor the non-Catholic has the benefit of
confiding future dangerous intentions to their clergy member without fear of subsequent
disclosure. For the non-Catholic, the conversation about future dangerous crimes is not
privileged. For the Catholic, the conversation about a future crime, if it occurs in a
confessional, is privileged, but only at the option of the priest. In confiding future criminal
intentions, each parishioner therefore undertakes a substantial risk that his minister will
reveal the communication to authorities. The proposed law therefore does not put any
pressure on a worshiper to switch faiths. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18.
367. One study in the context of the psychotherapist-patient relationship found that the
existence of an evidentiary privilege was not a factor in encouraging individuals to seek
counseling. Daniel W. Shuman & Myron F. Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Empirical
Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient Priilege, 60 N.C. L. REV. 893, 925 (1982). People
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religiously observant to be less frank in their revelations to
ministers about their intention to commit a future dangerous crime,
but this is at most conduct "incidental" to religion,3N and not
interference with a belief or practice central to religious doctrine.3 9
The mere fact that some ministers operate under professional norms
of confidentiality does not make these religious rules,"' or render
compliance with state mandated disclosure a burden on a religious
practice.37'
Some may argue that the dangerous person exception proposed
in this Article is not neutral within the meaning of Smith, because
it draws distinctions between religions in terms of how the exception
operates. However, a close reading of the Court's decision in Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah3 72 suggests that
nondifferentiation between religions is not required under Smith in
order for a statute or regulation to meet the test of neutrality. In
seek counseling in order to get well; it may matter little to them in making this decision that
the court may later protect or deny protection to their conversations with a doctor. Id. at 925-
26. Similarly, parishioners seek spiritual counseling to achieve peace with themselves and
with their God; it is difficult to imagine that a faithful person would forgo such counseling for
fear that pieces of this confidence may later be used against them in court. At most they
would withhold from the minister their intention to commit a future crime.
368. To have more than an "incidental" burden, the law must directly or indirectly make
the believer's religious practices more difficult or more costly. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries
v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 392-95 (1990) (holding that the collection of sales tax on
books sold by religious organization "impose[d] no constitutionally significant burden on
appellant's religious practices or beliefs").
369. See Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680,699 (1989) (stating doubts about whether IRS
disallowance of deduction for auditing and training sessions constituted a "substantial"
burden on religious practices, where church did not proscribe the payment of taxes).
370. See Yellin, supra note 13, at 130-32.
371. Cf Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834-35 (1989) (holding that
although free exercise claimant did not need to point to any tenet or teaching of an established
religion that supported his claim to religious burden, he did need to establish that his conduct
was rooted in religious belief). Assume, for example, that the state enacted a law that
required all elementary school teachers in both public and private schools to hold a master's
degree in education. Assume further that the Catholic Diocese within the state previously had
enacted a requirement for its parochial schools that all elementary school teachers must hold
a bachelor's degree. The state statute would clearly burden the parochial schools of the
Diocese because it would require them to hire teachers with advanced degrees. But this would
not be a burden on a "religious" practice of the church or its followers; rather, it would be a
burden on the practical and secular means by which the church had chosen to advance its
religious mission. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972) (distinguishing religious
beliefs from beliefs which are "philosophical and personal").
372. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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City of Hialeah, the Court struck down a city ordinance prohibiting
the ritual slaughter of animals because it was clear that the
ordinance was aimed at religiously motivated conduct.373 The Court
stated that a law is not neutral "if the object of [the] law is to
infringe upon or restrict [religious] practices.3  Creation of a
dangerous person exception to the clergy-penitent privilege does not
target a practice for special treatment because of its religious
character, rather it targets a minister's decision to keep confidential
his parishioner's intent to commit a future violent crime.
Confidentiality is not a "religiously motivated" practice for most
clergy; 375 although it may be a pragmatic decision about how best to
encourage frank communications with parishioners, or an ethical
judgment about the duty of loyalty owed to those who put their faith
and trust in the clergy, neither of these professional justifications
for confidentiality are "rooted in religious belief."376 As one state
court has noted in affirming a narrow construction of that state's
clergy-penitent privilege statute in the face of a First Amendment
challenge: "It is the right to exercise one's religion ... [that] is
protected, not one's sense of ethics."377 And even if confidentiality
were religiously motivated, the state would not target
confidentiality because of its religious motivation, it would target
confidentiality because of its effect on a vulnerable third party.37
373. Id. at 547.
374. Id. at 533.
375. Yellin, supra note 13, at 130-32. Professor Mitchell also suggested that confidentiality
may be professionally recognized and encouraged by many religions, but this does not mean
it rises to the level of a religious belief or practice for purposes of First Amendment analysis,
except for those clergy members for whom it is specifically mandated under religious doctrines
of their church. Mitchell, supra note 47, at 800.
376. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
377. In re Williams, 152 S.E.2d 317, 325 (N.C. 1967) (declining to extend state testimonial
privilege to Baptist minister who had counseled members of a family involved in a rape
investigation, and rejecting the minister's free exercise challenge to this limited construction
of state privilege law).
378. In discussing neutrality, the Court in City of Hialeah was concerned with two forms
of motivation. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 524, 533-34. First, the Court was concerned with
the motivation of the legislature in enacting the prohibition. Id. at 533. The Court recognized
that a law may lack facial neutrality because it applies in express terms only to religious
practices, or it may lack neutrality due to a "covert" intent on the part of the legislature to
"suppress[] ... particular religious beliefs." Id. at 534 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703
(1986)). Second, the Court was concerned that "the object or purpose of [the] law" might be to
prohibit only conduct which is religiously motivated, and not similar conduct motivated by
secular interests. Id. at 524, 533.
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Although churches that practice sacramental confessions are
treated differently for purposes of this exception, this alone does not
rob the proposed statute of neutrality.379 As Justice Souter stated
persuasively in his City of Hialeah concurrence, a law may be
formally neutral but substantively nonneutral if it does not take
into account the differences among religions.38 ° Justice Souter
pointed to an exemption that allowed for the sacramental use of
wine during Prohibition as an example of a law that might appear
to be biased in favor of certain religions on its face, but should be
considered "neutral" for purposes of First Amendment analysis.38'
According to Justice Souter, the exemption for sacramental wine use
"reflec[ts] nothing more than the governmental obligation of
neutrality in the face of religious differences."382
What the Court meant by "general applicability" in Smith has
been the subject of much disagreement.3 3 Whatever the precise
contours of the requirement, however, the regulatory evil that the
Court seemed most concerned about preventing was governmental
action aimed only at religiously motivated conduct.384 Because
in City of Hialeah the legislature devised mechanisms, both
"overt" and "disguised," to prohibit only religiously motivated
animal slaughter and not other forms of animal killing, for example
379. See Aviam Soifer, Full and Equal Rights of Conscience, 22 U. HAW. L. REv. 469, 482
(2000) (quotingJames Madison's statements to Congress in support of the First Amendment:
"nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext,
infringed"). Soifer argues that "the protection of full rights of conscience" sometimes can be
indirect conflict "with the protection of equal rights" of conscience because"[tlo treat everyone
the same is to miss critical contextual differences." Id. at 499.
380. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 562 (Souter, J., concurring) ("If the Free Exercise Clause
secures only protection against deliberate discrimination, a formal requirement will exhaust
the Clause's neutrality command; if the Free Exercise Clause, rather, safeguards a right to
engage in religious activity free from unnecessary governmental interference, the Clause
requires substantive, as well as formal, neutrality.").
381. Id. at 561 & n.2 (Souter, J., concurring).
382. Id. (Souter J., concurring) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972)).
383. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872passim (1990). Justice Kennedy, writing
for the plurality in City of Hialeah, recognized that "[nleutrality and general applicability are
interrelated" concepts, and that "failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that
the other has not been satisfied." City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 531. Justice Scalia was much
more frank in his concurring opinion, suggesting "that the terms are not only 'interrelated,'
they "substantially overlap." Id. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring).
384. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 542-43 (finding that the First Amendment is violated
"when a legislature decides that the governmental interests it seeks to advance are worthy
of being pursued only against conduct with a religious motivation").
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hunting, or the slaughter of farm cattle, the ordinances had every
appearance of selective application against Santeria worshippers
alone.385
The duty to testify about confidential communications pertaining
to future crimes, however, is not being bestowed uniquely upon
religious clerics. All persons have this burden, including bartenders,
hairdressers, best friends, and in many instances even psycho-
therapists and lawyers. The clergy-penitent privilege is itself an
exception to a general testimonial duty borne by all; crafting an
exception to this exception does not carve out religious conduct for
special treatment. It returns the clergy to the position occupied by
average lay people with respect to the duties owed to the state in
this limited circumstance.
Even if a court were inclined to apply a Sherbert analysis to this
exception to the privilege, either because the exception was
determined not to be "neutral" and "generally applicable" or because
it was determined to implicate a constitutional right to privacy as
well as free exercise of religion, 86 the law would still survive strict
scrutiny. First, the state has a compelling interest in protecting its
385. Id. at 546-47.
386. A likely attack on any curtailment of the clergy-penitent privilege would be on grounds
of privacy as well as free exercise. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977)
(recognizing that right of privacy afforded by Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
encompasses both "interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters" and "interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions"). But see Pesce v. J. Sterling
Morton High Sch., 830 F.2d 789, 797-98 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding no unconstitutional
interference with privacy right by discipline of tenured school teacher for failing to report
child abuse learned about in private counseling session). Moreover, the dicta in Smith
regarding "hybrid" constitutional claims appears to be on unstable footing following the recent
Supreme Court decision in Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of
Stratton, wherein the Court struck down a village ordinance requiring solicitors and
canvassers to obtain permits prior to engaging in door-to-door solicitation. 122 S. Ct. 2080
(2002). Because the canvassing regulation covered both religious proselytizing and political
speech, it seemed to implicate both the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment. See id. at 2083. The Sixth Circuit held that the ordinance was "content neutral
and of general applicability" and therefore subjected it to only intermediate scrutiny,
concluding that the discussion of hybrid constitutional claims in Smith "was dicta and
therefore not binding." Id. at 2085-86. In reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court
addressed the ordinance as a free speech problem and sidestepped this issue of whether the
ordinance should be subject to strict scrutiny under Sherbert, stating: "We find it unnecessary
... to resolve that [standard of review] dispute because the breadth of speech affected by the
ordinance and the nature of the regulation make it clear that the Court of Appeals erred in
upholding it." Id. at 2088.
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citizens from dangerous individuals, avoiding serious bodily harm,
and committing and/or prosecuting responsible parties when such
harm cannot be avoided. The Supreme Court has recognized that
public safety is a compelling state interest that may justify some
curtailment of religious liberty.117 Second, the law is narrowly
tailored to meet this public safety objective. The exception applies
only if the clergy member has reasonable cause to believe that a
parishioner in fact poses a serious threat to another individual; idle
chatter or ungrounded fantasies of violent behavior will not give rise
to the testimonial exception.8 8 Moreover, not every threatened
crime or fraud will pierce confidentiality; only communications
about future crimes exposing an identifiable third party to a
realistic threat of death or serious bodily injury will vitiate the
privilege. By carving out communications pertaining to the most
serious future crimes, and by invoking the exception only when the
communication gives the clergy member adequate cause to believe
that such a crime is real and imminent, a state would be narrowly
tailoring its privilege exception to meet a compelling and urgent
need.
Several courts have upheld restrictions on religious liberty in
similar contexts when necessary to promote the public welfare. For
example, several state and federal courts have upheld mandated
child abuse reporting statutes against constitutional challenge,
ruling that the degree of intrusion on the privacy or free exercise
rights of a professional required to report is more than justified by
the state's compelling interest in protecting the health and safety
of its children.8 9 In addition, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
rejected a free exercise challenge to a construction of its state
privilege statute which required the Catholic Diocese to turn over
to a defendant accused of murder the archived personnel records of
387. "The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community
... to ill health or death." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) (upholding
child labor laws against free exercise challenge); see Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11,
31-32 (1905) (upholding compulsory vaccination law).
388. See Harris, supra note 253, at 46-48 (discussing reasonable belief standard for
psychotherapist duty to warn).
389. Pesce, 830 F.2d at 798 (rejecting challenge by psychologist); People v. Hodges, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 412, 420-21 (1992) (rejecting challenge by church pastor); People v. Cavaiani, 432
N.W.2d 409, 412-13 (Mich. 1988) (rejecting challenge by psychologist).
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the victim and priest' 9° The church claimed that compliance with
the subpoena would violate Canon law by interfering with the
bishop's authority to shepherd priests in his charge.39 The court
ruled that even assuming that production of church personnel
records would require the clergy to violate church doctrine and
thereby substantially intrude upon their religious freedom, it fur-
thered "a compelling governmental interest by the least restrictive
means available.3 92
B. The Establishment Clause
Having its origins in the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty,393
in turn heavily influenced by James Madison's Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,"' the primary goal of
the Establishment Clause is to ensure our government's respect
for religious diversity in America.3 95 At its core, the Establishment
Clause prevents the government from sponsoring an official reli-
396 f91gion, from favoring one religion over another, 97 from making
religious observance compulsory,398 or from coercing citizens to
attend a particular church, or any church at all.39 Although a strict
separation between church and state is impossible,o the goal of the
390. Commonwealth v. Stewart, 690 A.2d 195, 202 (Pa. 1997).
391. The Diocese cited Canon 381, arguing.
[a] bishop must be able to candidly discuss with a priest his character, talents,
spiritual life, health, and pastoral or familial problems and concerns in order to
be able to assign the priest to compatible duties and to provide him with
appropriate guidance in the conduct of his affairs and ministry to the faithful.
Id. at 200-01.
392. Id. at 202.
393. The Virginia statute provided [t]hat no man shall be compelled to frequent or support
any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained,
molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his
religious opinions or belief." Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1946) (citing 12 HENING,
STATUrES OF VIRGINIA 86 (1823)).
394. Everson, 330 U.S. at 12; see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,430 (1961).
395. See Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1559, 1598-99 (1989).
396. See Walz v. Tax Commn'r, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
397. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15.
398. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
399. See McGowan, 366 U.S. at 452.
400. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672 (1984) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 614 (1971)).
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Establishment Clause is to maintain governmental neutrality
towards religion."1
In attempting to enforce the First Amendment's primary objective
of neutrality, the Court has been unwilling to confine itself to a
single test,4°2 noting that "the purpose [of the Establishment Clause]
was to state an objective, not to write a statute."' ° When the
legislature enacts a law that aids or advances religion, such as in
the tax exemption and public education cases, the Court has most
frequently employed the multiple-part test enunciated in Lemon v.
Kurtzman40 4 to assess the law's constitutionality. In addressing the
public display of religious symbols and the practice of including
prayer in public ceremonies, the Court has applied the "coercion
test" of Lee v. Weisman." When the legislature has enacted a law
that creates a denominational preference for or against a particular
religion, the Court has applied the strict scrutiny analysis of Larson
v. Valente." Which of these tests would be employed in reviewing
an exception to the clergy-penitent privilege is highly debatable, but
the "coercion" test of Weisman is an unlikely candidate because it
has been used largely to assess the validity of religious observances
in public settings, conduct not implicated by the clergy-penitent
privilege.
Although acknowledging that Lemon is no more than a "helpful
signpost[]," 4°" the Supreme Court has been somewhat consistent
in analyzing Establishment Clause claims under this three-part
rubric.' 8 Under this test, challenged state action will be upheld if
it has a secular legislative purpose, has a primary effect that neither
401. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982); Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
402. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678.
403. Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
404. 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
405. 505 U.S. 577, 592-93 (1992); see also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290,
301 (2000) (striking down school district policy of permitting student led prayer at football
games).
406. 456 U.S. 228, 260 (1982).
407. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
408. Although not explicitly applying the Lemon test, the Supreme Court recently upheld
an Ohio school voucher program against Establishment Clause attack, ruling that the
program had both a secular purpose and a primary effect that did not advance or inhibit
religion. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2465 (2002). In her concurring opinion,
Justice O'Connor specifically applied the Lemon test to the voucher program at issue. Id. at
2476 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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advances nor inhibits religion, and does not foster excessive
government entanglement with religion. °9 InAgostini v. Felton, the
Supreme Court modified the three-part Lemon test for public aid
cases by collapsing the "entanglement" and "primary effects" tests
into a single prong of the analysis.410 Following Agostini, if either
the purpose or the effect of the statute is to promote or impede
religious belief, it will not withstand an Establishment Clause
challenge."
Courts will not strike down state regulations that incidentally
burden or benefit one religion over another as long as the primary
purpose of the regulation is secular.412 The creation of a "dangerous
person" exception to the clergy-penitent privilege has two secular
purposes. First, it will save potential victims from serious bodily
injury or death by encouraging clergy members to warn these
potential victims about demonstrably violent parishioners. Second,
even if a warning is not given and the crime is not avoided, an
exception to the privilege will promote public safety by preserving
evidence for use at a later civil commitment hearing or criminal
trial, thereby allowing the state to both segregate the dangerous
individual and deter other would be wrongdoers. There is no overt
or covert purpose behind the statute to discourage religious worship
or spiritual counseling. In fact, if that happened it would be directly
contrary to the rationale underlying the law: to encourage clergy
members to report evidence of imminent danger which they receive
in these sessions.
Carving out sacramental confessions for different treatment
under the proposed exception also has a secular purpose: to avoid
the unseemly and potentially polarizing effect of having a clergy
member jailed for following what he perceives to be a sacred
obligation. The Supreme Court has recognized that creating a
religious exemption does not necessarily run afoul of the first prong
409. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
410. 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997).
411. Id. In the aid to private schools cases, the Court has concluded that the "genuinely
independent and private choices of aid recipients" who use their public benefits at religious
schools insulates a state scheme from having a "primary effect" that advances religion.
Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2466 (citing Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481,487
(1986)). There is no indication from the Court that this "private choice" requirement has any
relevance to the second prong of the Lemon test outside of the government subsidy area.
412. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
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of the Lemon test."' Legislation that is aimed at alleviating
governmental interference with religion is considered to have a
secular purpose."' The state has an interest in avoiding un-
necessary clashes with religious doctrine and leaving ample room
for religious differences; this is not a religious purpose, but rather
a secular goal which grows out of our country's rich and "happy
tradition" of pluralism and respect for diversity."'
In allowing an exemption to the state property tax for religiously
held property, the Supreme Court in Walz recognized the stark
tension in the religious exemption area between the Free Exercise
Clause's admonition not to inhibit religion, and the Establishment
Clause's admonition not to advance religion." 6 The delicate prob-
lem underlying whether and how to create a future crimes exception
to the clergy-penitent privilege underscores the question of just
how much "play in the joints""7 there should be between the
Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. If legislators
attempt to craft a dangerous person exception to the clergy-penitent
privilege, but seek to avoid inhibiting the religious practices of
churches that practice sacramental confessions, they may be seen
as "favoring" those religions. In the words of the Supreme Court in
Walz, this requires lawmakers to "traverse [a] tight rope" between
preserving autonomy and freedom of religious belief on the one
hand, and avoiding any semblance of established religion on the
413. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 329.30 (1987) (upholding Title VII exemption for religious
organizations); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437,445 (1971) (upholding exemption from
selective service law for those who are opposed to war on religious grounds, even though
exemption was limited to those religious faithful who oppose all war, not those who oppose
particular wars).
414. Amos, 483 U.S. at 335.
415. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 453 ("1Ilt is hardly impermissible for Congress to attempt to
accommodate free exercise values, in line with 'our happy tradition' of 'avoiding unnecessary
clashes with the dictates of conscience."-) (quoting United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605,
634 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting)).
416. Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664,669 (1970). According to the Court:
The course of constitutional neutrality in this area cannot be an absolutely
straight line; rigidity could well defeat the basic purpose of these provisions,
which is to insure that no religion be sponsored or favored, none commanded,
and none inhibited.... Short of those expressly proscribed governmental acts
there is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality.
Id.
417. Id.
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other.' 8 This is precisely the sort of balanced judgment, however,
that the Supreme Court essentially encouraged legislatures not to
shy away from in Smith, when it stated that a legislatively created
exemption to the criminal law for the sacramental use of peyote
would be permissible under the Establishment Clause, even though
not judicially required under the Free Exercise Clause.419
I do not argue that singling out certain religions, and perhaps
most obviously the Roman Catholic Church, for special treatment
under the proposed exception is constitutionally required. As argued
above, it could well be entirely consistent with the Free Exercise
Clause to eliminate the clergy-penitent privilege altogether, or
to simply apply a "future harms" exception in the same manner
to clergy of every faith. But the fact that a blanket future harms
exception would be constitutionally permissible does not make it
wise social policy. Requiring certain clergy to risk excommunication
for violating church doctrine is simply too great a burden to impose
on them by a society that purportedly tolerates religious freedom. 20
Even if not required by the Free Exercise Clause, carving out an
exception for sacramental confessions both promotes religious
freedom and serves pragmatic ends.'21
418. Id.
419. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) ("But to say that a
nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is
not to say that it is constitutionally required, and that the appropriate occasions for its
creation can be discerned by the courts.*).
420. See John H. Garvey, An Anti-Liberal Argument for Religious Freedoms, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL IssUEs 275, 287 (1996) (positing religious justification for free exercise protection and
arguing that only believers can claim rights to be exempt from general laws because only they
believe that violating religious duties will expose them to transcendental harms).
421. It may be argued that conversations occurring in a sacramental confession should be
included in the exception to the privilege, and that religions that practice sacramental
confessions should be willing to face fine or imprisonment if they fail to disclose the
communication, as the fair price to pay for adhering to their religious beliefs. "[T rue religion
could and would take care of itself. It should not be defended with anything but spiritual
weapons." Soifer, supra note 379, at 475 (paraphrasing Roger Williams). But this argument
about the corrosive effect of state aid on religious convictions minimizes the costs that society
incurs in terms of disaffection and polarization whenever the state appears to be trampling
religious freedoms, for example, by compelling a citizen against their will to choose between
excommunication and compliance with civil law. Moreover, one purpose of the proposed
exception is to encourage reporting prior to litigation in order to avoid bodily injury and death.
It is simply much less likely that this instrumental objective will be achieved if revelation of
a matter occurring in a confessional will subject the priest to excommunication from his
church.
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The Supreme Court has declined to take the position that a
religious exemption enacted by the legislature is forbidden by the
Establishment Clause unless mandated by the Free Exercise
Clause.422 In circumstances where a religious exemption is created
legislatively rather than judicially, the exemption need not be
enacted to relieve an actual burden on the constitutional right of
free exercise, it may be adopted to relieve a potential burden on
religious freedom. 2"
Assuming that a court were to view the proposed statute's
treatment of sacramental confessions as an "exception" to the
nonprivileged status of disclosures of intent to commit bodily harm
made in other spiritual settings, then our difficult task is to
determine whether this is a "permissive"42 4 or a "forbidden" 2
exemption under current Supreme Court precedent. In Texas
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 2' the Supreme Court struck down a Texas
statute that provided an exception to the state sales and use tax for
religious periodicals. 27 The Court ruled that the statute violated the
Establishment Clause, reasoning that the legislature's act in
carving out the sale of religious magazines and books from a system
of general taxation amounted to "state sponsorship of religious
belief."2" In addressing when an exemption not required by the Free
Exercise Clause will offend the Establishment Clause, the Court
stated:
When government directs a subsidy exclusively to religious
organizations that is not required by the Free Exercise Clause
and that either burdens nonbeneficiaries markedly or cannot
422. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989).
423. See East Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. California, 13 P.3d 1122 (Cal. 2000) (affirming
legislative exemption to historic preservation law for religiously affiliated organizations).
424. See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-35 (1987) (upholding religious exemption to Title VII);
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,318-19 (1952) (upholding New York City's decision to release
students early from public schools for religious instruction elsewhere); see also Forest Hills
Early Learning Ctr., Inc. v. Grace Baptist Church, 846 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1988) (relying
on Amos, the Court held that a Virginia statute which exempted religiously affiliated child
care centers from state licensing requirements did not violate the Establishment Clause).
425. See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 18.
426. Id.
427. Id. at 18-19.
428. Id. at 15.
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reasonably be seen as removing a significant state-imposed
deterrent to the free exercise of religion ... [it] cannot but"convey
a message of endorsement" to slighted members of the
community." 9
In the clergy-penitent context, neither of these two disqualifiers is
present. First, allowing certain clergy the option of not revealing
confidential communications pertaining to future crimes does not
burden those who are compelled to do so. This is not a tax or a
subsidy case, where relieving some citizens of a common burden,
such as a financial responsibility, necessarily increases the burden
on others.430 It is more like the school attendance exemption
permitted in Zorach, where the Court found that allowing some
students to leave early for religious instruction did not burden those
who were left behind."3' Moreover, the treatment of sacramental
confessions in the proposed exception is indeed connected to a state-
created deterrent to religious freedom. It is the state-created
obligation to testify at judicial proceedings that poses a stark
conflict with the seal of the confessional in the Roman Catholic
Church. For both of these reasons, the statute proposed in this
Article would satisfy the Texas Monthly standard for determining
when a legislatively created religious exemption is permitted under
the Establishment Clause. Rather than being an instance of the
government putting its power, prestige, and financial support
behind a particular religion, 32 this is simply an instance in which
the government is getting out of the way of certain forms of religious
observance.
Turning to the second prong of the Lemon test, the proposed
exception does not have a "primary effect" that either advances or
inhibits religion.'33 It does not advance the Catholic faith or any
429. Id. at 15 (quotingAmos, 483 U.S. at 348).
430. When the alleged violation does not involve the expenditure of public funds sufficient
to trigger taxpayer standing, a litigant seeking to challenge the deferential treatment for
sacramental confessions within this exception would have to allege that the new rule of
privilege caused him to suffer some personal injury. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams.
United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 486 (1982). Such standing to raise
this Establishment Clause issue may well be difficult to establish.
431. Zorach v. Clanson, 343 U.S. 306, 311-12 (1952).
432. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (striking down recitation of Regents' Prayer in
New York schools).
433. As argued in the Free Exercise Clause section above, the proposed exception does not
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other religion that practices sacramental confessions because
those clergy hold the privilege for communications pertaining to
future violent crimes, and have an option of disclosing these
communications without the consent of the parishioner. No
religiously observant person is likely to choose which religion to
follow based on this exception to the privilege, because whether they
worship in a religion that practices sacramental confessions or
one that does not, they cannot confide in their ministers an intent
to commit a future violent crime without running the risk that
this communication will later be revealed. Thus, no reasonable
observer is likely to draw from these facts an inference that the
state is endorsing one religion over another.3 4 It certainly leaves
no greater impression of sponsorship or active involvement in
religion than allowing religious organizations to meet in public
school buildings,435 or permitting a special home-schooling exemp-
tion for the Amish." 6
Finally, to the extent that it is still relevant after Agostini v.
Felton,4 7 a dangerous person exception would not foster excessive
government entanglement with religion. Some governmental
involvement in religion may be necessary to assure religious
freedom.43 "The test is inescapably one of degree."43 9 Government
substantially burden religious worship. In the absence of such burden, the "inhibition" prong
of Lemon has not been met. The primary purpose of the Establishment Clause is to prohibit
government endorsement of religion. Although the government may offend this principal by
either favoring or disfavoring religious practices, where an "inhibition" is alleged, the "effects"
prong of the Lemon test should require no lesser showing of a burden on religion than a free
exercise claim. Otherwise, the Sunday closing laws and polygamy laws could have been struck
down on grounds that they had the "effect" of inhibiting certain religious practices, without
any showing that they actually violated the free exercise rights of Jews and Mormons,
respectively. See Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878).
434. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2465 (2002) (quoting Mitchell v. Helms,
530 U.S. 793, 810 (2000)); see also Good News Club v. Milford Central Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119
(2001) (stating that the "reasonable observer' test under endorsement inquiry looks to the
concerns of the political community writ at large, and not to the perceptions of particular
individuals or "isolated nonadherents").
435. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 119.
436. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 n.22 (1972).
437. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
438. Professor Tribe has posited a theory of free exercise predominance, suggesting that
when the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses clash, free exercise must win out.
LAURANCE H. TRiBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-8, at 1201-04 (2d. ed. 1988).
439. Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
1718 [Vol. 44:1627
SHARING SACRED SECRETS
involvement will be considered excessive and will violate the
entanglement inquiry when it leads to continuing surveillance of the
religion," when it constitutes a delegation of political power to a
group chosen according to religious criteria, 41 or when it requires
the state to determine the validity of particular interpretations of
those creeds." 2 Under the exception proposed in this Article, a court
can determine whether the church at issue practices a sacramental
form of absolution, and whether church doctrine requires its clergy
to hear such communications and keep them secret, without
engaging in an inquiry as to the validity of those religious beliefs. In
determining whether the exception applies, a trial judge would not
be testing truth or falseness of belief, but only determining what the
beliefs are, and whether they are held in good faith. It remains up
to the church to define the religious practices that they will follow;
the only role of a court under the proposed exception is to determine
what those practices are.44
This inquiry is no greater in kind or degree than the inquiry
already undertaken by states that limit their clergy-penitent
privilege to communications "in the course of discipline enjoined
by the church,""4 or states that exclude from their child abuse
reporting requirement a similarly narrow class of spiritual com-
munications with clergy." 5 The Third Circuit in the In re Grand
Jury Investigation case recognized that a limited doctrinal inquiry
into the practices of a particular faith for the purposes of applying
an evidentiary privilege does not constitute an impermissible
entanglement with religion: "[We believe that establishing the
pastoral counseling practices of a particular denomination to
ascertain the types of communications that the denomination deems
spiritual and confidential is both a necessary and a constitutionally
440. Id. at 675.
441. Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705-06 (1994).
442. See Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680,699 (1989).
443. See Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 161 N.W. 290, 292 (Iowa 1917) (looking to church doctrine
to determine whether church elders constituted ministers of the faith within meaning of state
privilege statute); State v. Martin, 975 P.2d 1020, 1025-28 (Wash. 1999) (stating that in
applying state clergy-penitent privilege, a court must inquire whether the church at issue
practices confession and mandates secrecy, but it is still up to the church to define how it will
practice its faith).
444. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
445. See supra notes 337-38 and accompanying text.
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inoffensive threshold step in determining whether a privilege
interdenominational in nature applies.""6
Even if the proposed exception satisfies the Lemon test, it may be
struck down if it is viewed as discriminating between persons of
different religious faiths. In Larson, the Court stated that the
Lemon test was "intended to apply to laws affording a uniform
benefit to all religions, and not to provisions ... that discriminate
among religions.""7 Under Larson, courts must subject statutes that
create a "denominational preference" to strict scrutiny, and strike
them down unless narrowly tailored to further a compelling
governmental interest.4" Critics of my proposal will argue that it
impermissibly favors the Catholic, Lutheran, and Eastern Orthodox
religions, and therefore that Larson should apply. Even if this is
true, as argued above, the proposed statute meets a compelling state
interest test. I do not concede, however, that the proposed exception
creates a denominational preference in the first instance. The
exception does not single out any particular religion by name, and
its treatment of penitential communications does not apply to one
religion only." 9 All clergy who hear confessions in a sacramental
setting hold the privilege for conversations pertaining to future
violent crimes, just as in the Medicaid exemption cases'50 all persons
who objected to medical care for religious reasons were entitled to
claim the RNCIS exemption.'"" The fact that the safe harbor for
sacramental confessions applies to very few sects other than the
Roman Catholic Church, just as the Medicaid exemption applied to
446. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 388 n.21 (3d Cir. 1990).
447. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982).
448. Id. at 246-47. The Larson doctrine parallels equal protection analysis under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, pursuant to which a law or regulation which singles out
suspect classifications for disparate treatment will be subjected to strict scrutiny. See Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). "Neutrality" for purposes of the Establishment Clause may
thus "require[] an equal protection mode of analysis." Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 668
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
449. Children's Healthcare is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Min de Parle, 212 F.3d 1084, 1089, 1091
(8th Cir. 2000) (holding that provisions of Balance Budget Act of 1997 allowing persons who
hold religious objections to health care to receive Medicaid assistance for nonmedical care at
"religious non-medical health care institutions" did not violate the Establishment Clause,
even though it primarily benefitted Christian Scientists).
450. Id. at 1091; see also Kong v. Min de Parle, 2001 WL 1464549, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13,
2001).
451. Children's Healthcare, 212 F.3d at 1090-91.
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very few religions other than Christian Scientists, is not alone
sufficient to make the exception impermissibly discriminatory, given
the concomitant secular justification for the statute.452
Moreover, the central evil that the Establishment Clause was
designed to prevent is favoring or preferring one religion over
another.5 In Larson, the state violated this maxim because the
statute exempted certain religions from a substantial and onerous
burden born by others.454 No substantial burden is lifted from the
shoulders of any clergy members under the proposed law. Roman
Catholic priests are not altogether relieved of the burden of
testifying in court about a confidential communication pertaining to
a future crime; they merely have the option of choosing not to do so
if the conversation occurred in a sacramental setting.455 This poses
for them a moral dilemma: follow the dictates of church doctrine
or waive the privilege. Clergy members in churches that do not
practice sacramental confession are not put to this difficult choice,
rather, they are required to testify about conversations pertaining
to future violent crimes when subpoenaed to do so. Which clergy
member has the benefit and which has the burden? It might be
argued that clergy who do not practice sacramental confessions have
the benefit of not having to wrestle with a profoundly difficult moral
choice. Although the priest has the benefit of autonomy and freedom
452. Id.
453. See Larson, 456 U.S. at 245; WaLz, 397 U.S. at 669.
454. The statute invalidated in Larson required some religions to register with the
Minnesota Department of Commerce, and to report annually the source and use of their
funds. Larson, 456 U.S. at 230-31. Religions that received more than fifty percent of their
donations from members or affiliated organizations were exempt from this reporting
requirement. Id. at 231. The Court ruled that the benefit conferred by the exemption
"constitute [d] a substantial advantage." Id. at 253.
455. Roman Catholic priests who learn about a parishioner's dangerous intentions in a
spiritual counseling session outside of the confessional are treated exactly like ministers of
other religions; that is, the communication is not privileged, and the priest can be compelled
to reveal it. This status of nonsacramental communications comports with what many Roman
Catholic priests would perceive as their ethical responsibilities in such instances.
[TIhe Catholic Church recognizes that a professional secret-as opposed to that
uttered under the seal of confession-should be revealed in certain
circumstances: "The common teaching of the moralists is that the obligation of
professional secrecy ceases whenever this measure is urgently necessary for
warding off a serious evil ...."
Yellin, supra note 13, at 147 (quoting Robert E. Regan & John T. Maccartney, Professional
Secrecy and Privileged Communications, 2 CATH. LAW. 3,8 (1956)).
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from government. compulsion in making his choice, he also has the
burden of a very difficult moral decision. Viewed in this light, the
difference is not so significant that it should be perceived as
discriminating between religions in any constitutionally significant
way because the state is not imparting a benefit that society would
recognize as amounting to governmental endorsement of one
religion over another. 6
A construction of Larson that prohibited legislatures from taking
account of religious differences would hamstring their efforts to
promote religious freedom within an ordered, safe, and just society.
In the words of Justice Goldberg, sometimes it is necessary to "take
cognizance of the existence of religion" in order to attain the fullest
realization of religious liberty.57 When the clergy-penitent privilege
is viewed as just one of a whole series of privileges for confidential
communications, enactment of a future harms exception does not
appear to single out religions for special burdens because it in fact
attempts to treat clerics more like other professionals. When the
treatment of penitential communications within this exemption is
viewed against the backdrop of current law, it too does not resemble
an endorsement of religion because it does not bestow upon clergy
who practice sacramental confessions any benefit that they do not
already enjoy under the status quo.
CONCLUSION
Clergy confidentiality is valued too highly and guarded too
zealously when it conflicts with paramount social values, such
as the right of an innocent third party to be free from serious
bodily harm. Although it may be a challenge to draft a dangerous
person exception that does not run afoul of the First Amendment,
this struggle and the attendant debate are well worth the effort.
It is time to consider seriously the societal costs of the clergy-
penitent privilege and to discuss whether certain limitations on its
456. Although it maybe argued that the differing treatment for different religious practices
may itself engender divisiveness, the Supreme Court has ruled that the "political
divisiveness" test for entanglement should not be applied to cases not involving a financial
subsidy. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684 (1984).
457. Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305-06 (1963) (Goldberg,
J., concurring).
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application would better serve the public interest without compro-
mising First Amendment values. Creating a limited exception to the
privilege as described in this Article would be a modest step in the
right direction.
